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Abstract
Enabling technologies have driven standardisation e orts specifying B2B interactions
between organisations including the information to be exchanged and its associated
business level requirements. These interactions are encoded as conversations to which
organisations agree and execute. It is pivotal to continued cooperation with these in-
teractions that their regulation be supported; minimally, that all actions taken are held
accountable and no participant is placed at a disadvantage having remained compliant.
Technical protocols exist to support regulation (e.g., provide fairness and account-
ability). However, such protocols incur expertise, infrastructure and integration re-
quirements, possibly diverting an organisation’s attention from fulfilling obligations to
interactions in which they are involved. Guarantees provided by these protocols can
be paired with functional properties, declaratively describing the support they provide.
By encapsulating properties and protocols in intermediaries through which messages are
routed, expertise, infrastructure and integration requirements can be alleviated from
interacting organisations while their interactions are transparently provided with addi-
tional support.
Previous work focused on supporting individual issues without tackling concerns of
asynchronicity, transparency and loose coupling. This thesis develops on previous work
by designing generalised intermediary middleware capable of intercepting messages and
transparently satisfying supportive properties. By enforcing loose coupling and trans-
parency, all interactions may be provided with additional support without modification,
independent of the higher level (i.e., B2B) standards in use and existing work may be
expressed as instances of the proposed generalised design. This support will be provided
at lower levels, justified by a survey of B2B and messaging standards. Proof of concept
implementations will demonstrate the suitability of the approach. The work will demon-
strate that providing transparent, decoupled support at lower levels of abstraction is
useful and can be applied to domains beyond B2B and message oriented interactions.
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1 Introduction
Contracts and agreements have long been the standard construct by which parties agree
on a set of terms and conditions pertaining to exchanges resulting in mutually beneficial
outcomes [Hor07]. The terms and conditions in these contracts seek to simultaneously
allow for beneficial outcomes while also protecting the interests of those who do adhere
to expected behaviour against those who do not. In an electronic business-to-business
(B2B) context, these agreements are descriptions dictating the flow of communication
between organisations resulting in outcomes such as the exchange of goods, services and
information.
1.1 B2B Interactions
Open networks and enabling technologies have allowed B2B interactions to move in-
creasingly into an electronic setting. Organisations wishing to interact in this manner
create appropriate digital business messages containing business documents such as pur-
chase orders or invoices and exchange them with their intended recipient. Recipients
process these messages and sanction a response (e.g., a corresponding response message
or a real world action such as delivery). These exchanges are enabled by the develop-
ment of loosely coupled business services to asynchronously transmit, receive and process
business messages. These factors enable B2B interactions to become more streamlined;
however, higher degrees of automation require that more aspects of interactions are
agreed upon beforehand.
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For B2B conducted via the exchange of messages as previously described, agreements
are encoded as conversations. Conversations describe a complete set of exchanges to
achieve desired outcomes, minimally including: the expected contents of messages (syn-
tactic and semantic) and the order in which they are to be exchanged. Higher degrees of
automation and regulation may require the specification of elements such as: deadlines
for acknowledgement or processing messages, security requirements, evidence of origin
or receipt and actions to take should exceptional circumstances arise.
A
Ini$ator
B
Responder
Purchase+Order
Ack
Accept+/+Reject
Ack
B2B+
Conversa8on:
Order/
Submission
Figure 1.1: A and B execute an agreed upon ’Order Submission’ conversation.
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example conversation between two organisations for the sub-
mission of a purchase order. The conversation specifies that an initiator, A, transmits a
message containing a purchase order which is acknowledged as being received. Upon pro-
cessing, the responder, B, will transmit a response message indicating whether the initial
purchase order was accepted or rejected (i.e., whether the contents were syntactically and
semantically valid and the order can be met). The response message is acknowledged as
being received, thus terminating the conversation. Possible conversation elements such
as deadlines and encryption are omitted for the sake of clarity.
The requirement for complete conversation descriptions, and the benefits of a common
base of understanding, drove the development of standards seeking to provide tools to al-
low the definition and agreement of conversations and their requirements. Available B2B
standards range in scope from specifying only the format of messages(e.g., EDIFACT
2
1.1 B2B Interactions Chapter 1
[Uni11]), specifying a set of permitted conversations including their requirements and
how they be satisfied (e.g., RosettaNet [Ros02, Ros09]) and general standards capable of
expressing any conversations and their requirements (e.g., ebXML [OAS01a, OAS07b]).
This thesis adopts ebXML as the general B2B standard, capable of specifying any B2B
conversation and its requirements1. Other standards discussed including RosettaNet
and Open Travel Alliance represent subsets of what may be expressed using ebXML
[Ros09, Ope11b] and are surveyed with regards to what requirements they support in
their respective domains such that commonly supported requirements may be generalised
to support the widest possible range of B2B interactions.
ebXML provides a toolbox of building blocks upon which organisations can define
and agree upon conversations tailored to their specific needs [OAS01a]. ebXML
provides a set of general exchange types to be composed in any order into con-
versations. These conversations may specify business level requirements, but do
not how their execution and support must be carried out, ebXML decouples this
into conformance profiles specifying message formats, transports and how suppor-
ted requirements must be satisfied, allowing conversations and their requirements
to be tailored as needed. Interacting organisations wishing to use ebXML must
agree on a set of conversations to support and an ebXML conformance profile to
determine how conversations and requirements are executed.
Domain Specific Standards represent subsets of ebXML by providing a permitted list
of conversations and instructions for how these conversations must be executed
and how the requirements must be supported. RosettaNet is a domain-specific
standard aimed at the supply chain of major Computer and Consumer Electronics,
Electronic Components, Semiconductor Manufacturing, Telecommunications and
Logistics companies and the conversations it permits are designed to address these
1The requirements permitted are restricted to an ebXML approved list of functional requirements, more
on this in Section 2.8.
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needs [Ros02, Ros09]. Open Travel Alliance is a domain-specific standard aimed
at all aspects of the travel industry. Other domain-specific B2B standards include
CIDX aimed at the Chemical Industry, PIDX aimed at the Petroleum Industry. An
exhaustive list of all domain-specific standards is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Where domain-specific standards are discussed, it is with a view to generalising
commonly supported B2B requirements and message exchange patterns.
Following from the ebXML and domain specific standards, this thesis considers the
execution and regulation of B2B interactions to have two key aspects:
1. Specifications supporting high-level encoding of agreements as conversations, provid-
ing a definition for how organisations must be observed to behave, and
2. Low-level mechanisms enabling the execution of these conversations, the satisfac-
tion of their requirements and the support of their regulation. These mechanisms
will generate, exchange and store evidence irrefutably demonstrating where oblig-
ations, requirements and properties have (or have not) been satisfied.
B2B standards address the first point, providing definitions of conversations including
their functional requirements in well known format. Chapter 3 will generalise common
exchange patterns and supported requirements from varying B2B standards discussed
in Section 2.7.
Some B2B standards (e.g., RosettaNet) partially address the second point (e.g., by
specifying how certain requirements are satisfied); however, this thesis is concerned with
providing a generalised middleware design capable of satisfying multiple requirements
(e.g., fairness and accountability), with potentially stronger guarantees (e.g., account-
ability protected from cryptographic key revocation) such that regulation of all B2B
interactions may be supported, independent of the B2B standard in use.
Independence from B2B standards requires the middleware designed in this thesis
to operate in a decoupled and transparent manner, while this is considered a sound
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engineering decision [SRC84], there are complexities (e.g., what is the most appropriate
point and mechanism of interception) and trade-o s for doing so (e.g., is it possible to rely
on standard-specific information while also operating independently of any standard).
These complexities and trade-o s are discussed in the remainder of this thesis.
1.2 Supporting B2B Interactions
The ease with which businesses can make themselves available online presents increased
opportunity for organisations to involve themselves in B2B collaboration. This can lead
to a significant investment of resources into collaborations. While undertaking these
high value interactions organisations are assumed to continue to operate autonomously
and are likely to privilege their own interests over those of their partners. These factors
can lead to a tension between the desire to cooperate and the need to ensure their own
interests remain protected.
In addition to this tension, there may be occasions where obligations are not met by
one or more participants. Where organisations have complete trust in each other, they
are safe in the knowledge that where obligations are not met, responsibility will be taken
by the correct participants. Realistically, however, organisations may not have complete
trust in each other for reasons including: protecting their own interests first or a lack of
previous experience upon which trust can be established. In the face of these concerns,
fairness and accountability become critical issues to tackle. If satisfied, they allow the
execution and governance of interactions to be supported while also addressing the issues
of trust (or lack thereof) and conflicts with a desire to cooperate while protecting one’s
interests.
Fairness is defined as the property that no well-behaved participant in an interaction
is placed at a disadvantage as a result of misbehaviour by another [Aso98]. For
example, if two participants are exchanging goods, fairness dictates that at the
5
1.3 Support Intermediaries Chapter 1
end of the exchange, both have the desired item or neither do. Any other outcome
would be unfair to one of the participants [GPV99].
Accountability is the property that all actions taken within a system are undeniable,
certifiable and tamper-evident [YC04]. Accountability is generally achieved by the
generation, exchange and logging of evidence binding participants to the actions
they take (e.g., proof of origin and proof of receipt). Such evidence forms an audit
trail allowing the resolution of disputes by demonstrating where obligations were
or were not met. Without this ability to irrefutably resolve disputes, agreements
become unenforceable [PG99].
In this thesis, we consider fairness and accountability as desirable concerns to address,
in the context of B2B interactions, such that participants are assured that their interests
will remain protected in the face of misbehaviour and that all agreements in place remain
unambiguously enforceable. Motivation for addressing fairness and accountability (i.e.,
what happens without such guarantees) is discussed in Section 2.5.2 and 2.5.3.
Implementations of middleware designed in this thesis will use fairness and accountab-
ility as examples properties, satisfied by the use of suitable technical protocols. However,
the generalised middleware design is capable of allowing other concerns to be addressed.
Section 2.5.5 and 3.3.4 discuss how consistency, based on previous work [MJSC07], could
be supported as proof of concept of the extensibility of the approach taken in this thesis.
1.3 Support Intermediaries
Current business involves the use of third parties for services such as: identity and credit
checks, payment processing and document notarisation. Communication with these third
parties can be thought of as the satisfaction of properties supporting an interaction (e.g.,
a credit check allows a purchase to proceed).
Accountability and Fairness can be considered properties in the same way, their sat-
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isfaction allows interactions to proceed with guarantees that agreements remain en-
forceable and no participants will be disadvantaged as a result of compliance. These
guarantees allow organisations to interact focusing primarily on their fulfilling business
objectives and obligations while additional support is provided by service providers who
deal with the expertise and underlying technicalities of the support they provide.
Of the possible modes of interaction with third party services, intermediaries present
a particularly useful approach to supporting interactions. That is, a message being
delivered from its sender to recipient may be routed through one or more intermediaries
who act upon messages passing through them (e.g., logging, notarising or validation).
ebXML and domain specific standards acknowledge the importance of intermediaries in
this capacity and discuss their possible involvement [OAS07b, Ros02, Ope11b]. Figure
1.2 illustrates a message passing through multiple intermediaries during its delivery from
A to B:
A
Message i1
B
Message i2 Message
Intermediaries/may/take/addi2onal/ac2on/about,/and/
upon,/messages/passing/through/them
Figure 1.2: A message sent from A to B passing through multiple intermediaries.
1.3.1 Transparent Support Intermediaries
Intermediaries, such as those in Figure 1.2, in the delivery path of a message have the
potential to alter the contents of messages routed through them. Any change to the
contents of a message may have an unintended impact on the semantics of the message.
By considering the capability to alter contents, we can define a transparent intermedi-
ary as one whose operation does not alter the contents of the intercepted transmission.
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In the example of Figure 1.2, this means the contents of the message, as it arrives at B,
are exactly the same as when it was transmitted by A, regardless the number of inter-
mediaries passed through. An important consideration is that A or B may still be able
detect intermediary involvement other ways (e.g., increased delivery time for a specific
message against a known median) and A and B must trust some subset of intermediary
support and connecting infrastructure. These concerns are discussed in Section 4.3 and
2.4.
Transparency can be applied to preserve levels of abstraction, for example, business
level transparency ensures that business level operation remains unchanged even when
introducing additional lower level elements to provide support such as fairness and ac-
countability in a transparent manner (i.e., by not altering the contents of any intercepted
business transmissions).
Provided the above can be achieved, transparent intermediary middleware provides an
ideal place to support the execution and regulation of B2B interactions. Support can be
o ered to existing and new types of B2B interactions, independent of specific standards
in use, without any alterations to an organisation’s business level operation. Addition-
ally, existing support can be modified or extended by the reconfiguration of existing
intermediaries in the delivery process, still maintaining business level transparency.
The middleware designed in this thesis will operate as a set of transparent and de-
coupled intermediaries, promoting separation of concern and allowing the support o ered
to be independent of specific B2B standards. The intermediaries will operate asynchron-
ously, just as the B2B services implemented by organisations do, and will use composition
to demonstrate support for di erent properties (e.g., fairness, accountability or consist-
ency) and combinations of properties.
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1.4 Intermediary Accountability Support
Previous sections have introduced B2B interactions, supporting their execution and regu-
lation, how this can be achieved and why it is desirable. This section will use the support
of accountability, satisfied by a transparent intermediary to introduce the topics explored
and discussed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The intermediary discussed here
is simplistic in that it employs only two protocols to satisfy accountability with coarsely
defined characteristics. Discussion in subsequent chapters will expand upon the topics
introduced here by considering: multiple properties (and multiple characteristics of those
properties), multiple protocols to satisfy those properties and characteristics, support for
more B2B standards, and multiple mechanisms for declaring when supported properties
should be satisfied. The challenges associated are discussed in Section 1.5.
1.4.1 Accountability as a Functional Property
Accountability, as introduced above, can be described as the functional definition that
participants are held accountable for their actions. Where this thesis refers to functional
properties, this indicates a business level concern or requirement (e.g., accountability
or fairness) considered in functional terms (i.e., the details of how this is achieved are
irrelevant to the discussion).
Thus, for any functional property, its satisfaction ultimately depends on the specific-
ation of the imperative details (e.g., protocols, formats and transports). Combinations
of di erent imperative details may satisfy properties with varying characteristics. For
example, trust and fairness are discussed below as characteristics a ecting how account-
ability can be satisfied.
Firstly, we classify trust as a characteristic whose value is either ‘trusted’ (the sender
has complete trust in the recipient) or ‘untrusted’ (all other cases).
Fairness is defined as a binary characteristic defining whether the release of account-
ability evidence (and the business message being sent) should done in such a way that
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no participant gains an advantage by misbehaving.
Using these characteristics, we can reason that accountability, without complete trust,
should be delivered with fairness.
Non-repudiation protocols represent suitable protocols to satisfy accountability [KMZ02].
These protocols generate and exchange evidence irrefutably binding participants to the
actions they perform while interacting. Two non-repudiation protocols here for the sake
of brevity, both resulting in the generation and exchange of a message and two kinds of
evidence: non-repudiation of origin, irrefutably binding a message to its originator and
non-repudiation of receipt, irrefutably binding the receipt of a message to its recipient.
The first protocol is the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol [CS96], mandating
the involvement of a mutually trusted third party (TTP) to ensure a message and its
associated evidence are exchanged fairly. The second protocol is named “voluntary
exchange” in which evidence is exchanged directly (and voluntarily) between participants
without a third party guaranteeing the exchange [CRS06]. The involvement of a TTP
to ensure fairness, and the type of its involvement (inline, discussed in Section 2.6.3)
mean that the Co ey-Saidha protocol incurs a higher cost in terms of messages passed
and computational complexity (additional decryption and encryption at the TTP). For
the above reasons, it is assumed preferable to perform voluntary exchange where trust
relationships allow it.
As per the accountability property and its characteristics described above, voluntary
exchange is suitable only where the recipient is trusted at the time of exchange (i.e.,
fairness does not need to be guaranteed) and the Co ey-Saidha protocol is suitable in
situations where fairness is required in the exchange of message and its non-repudiation
evidence. For simplicity, we assume here that the trust relationship between two organ-
isations is known. The complexities of defining and expressing trust relationships are
discussed in Section 2.5.1 and 3.3.1.
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1.4.2 When to Provide Accountability Support?
The final piece is determining when accountability should be satisfied for an intercepted
message. Section 3.4 discusses all mechanisms for declaring when supported properties
should be satisfied. Here we consider the use of existing business level requirements to
create a rule inferring when accountability is required, as proof of concept for supporting
existing B2B interactions.
ebXML allows messages to specify whether they require “non-repudiation of origin”
and/or “non-repudiation of receipt” as binary parameters [OAS07b]. Where a message
specifies either of these parameters, the intermediary assumes that accountability is
desired and invokes the correct protocol to satisfy it with the desired characteristics
(e.g., fairness guaranteed without complete trust in recipient).
A valid question here is why, if ebXML specifies generation and exchange of non-
repudiation evidence, would we engage another non-repudiation protocol to satisfy ac-
countability? Section 2.7 will demonstrate that the support specified by ebXML and
other B2B standards is susceptible to cryptographic key revocation (rendering evidence
unusable) and exchanged without any fairness guarantees.
Transparent intermediaries allow stronger levels of support to be o ered (e.g., Co ey-
Saidha guarantees fairness and key revocation can be prevented) to better address iden-
tified concerns of B2B interactions, discussed in Section 2.5, 2.7 and 3.3.
1.4.3 Intercepted Message Flow
The previous section functionally defined accountability and specified two protocols sup-
porting its satisfaction under di erent trust characteristics defining when fairness guar-
antees are required. Rules were also defined for how the requirement for accountability
will be inferred. This allows the definition of intermediary accountability support for
intercepted messages. Figure 1.3 illustrates intermediary accountability support for an
intercepted message:
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A
Message
Intermediary+Accountability+Support
B
Message
The$intermediary$support$is$responsible$for$exchanging$and$
storing$non7repudia8on$evidence$proving$A$and$B's$interac8on
Accountability?
Trusted? Untrusted?
Voluntary
Exchange
Coffey<Saidha
Protocol
Figure 1.3: An intercepted message being provided accountability by an intermediary.
1. A message is generated by its sender (A) and transmitted.
2. The message is routed through the intermediary support.
3. Once intercepted, the message is analysed to determine if accountability should be
satisfied by:
a) Checking the message to see if its business level requirements infer account-
ability is required.
4. If accountability is required, which protocol should be invoked?
a) If the recipient is completely trusted, use voluntary exchange knowing that
will provide their associated evidence.
b) For all other situations, use Co ey-Saidha to guarantee fairness to both par-
ticipants.
5. Deliver the original message to its recipient (unaltered, to maintain business level
transparency between A and B) and reliably store any intermediary generated
evidence.
The figure shows a message, transmitted from A to B, passing through intermediary sup-
port whose determines whether accountability is required, satisfies the property where
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necessary using a suitable protocol and finally delivers the original message on to B. All
messages are o ered three routes through the intermediary support: without account-
ability, accountability via the Co ey-Saidha protocol and accountability via voluntary
exchange and all routes result in the original message being delivered to B, maintaining
business level transparency.
This provides a general set of processing instructions for the intermediary support
of functional properties, for any intercepted message: determine the required proper-
ties (and characteristics), satisfy them appropriately through the execution of technical
protocols and finally deliver the intercepted message onwards to maintain transparency.
The dashed edge of the intermediary support in Figure 1.3 denotes that the interme-
diary support is a composition of smaller services, discussed in the next section.
1.4.4 Composed Intermediary Accountability Support
A
Messages
Intermediary+Accountability+Support
B
Messages
IntA IntBNR#Protocol#Execu.on
Figure 1.4: An intercepted message being provided accountability by an intermediary.
Figure 1.4 represents a simple decomposition of the provision of intermediary account-
ability support. A’s messages pass through IntA, a transparent intermediary acting on
behalf of A to support its interactions. Similarly, IntB acts on behalf of B to transpar-
ently support its interactions. IntA and IntB communicate with each other to execute
technical protocols satisfying supported functional properties. Specifically for account-
ability as discussed in the previous section, IntA and IntB communicate to ensure the
message is exchanged and the correct non-repudiation protocol is invoked where re-
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quired. The composition of IntA and IntB provide the abstraction of “intermediary
accountability support”.
Henceforth, when referring to “A’s intermediary” or IntA, we are referring to any
intermediary acting on behalf of A. Specifically, the intermediary is not necessarily
owned or operated by A but A is assumed to have some degree of control over IntA.
For example, declaring when supported properties should be satisfied for intercepted
messages, configuring acceptable timeouts or exercising control over the cryptographic
keys used to generate evidence on its behalf.
IntA and IntB provide a known boundary at which business level transparency can be
guaranteed for A and B. That is, for a message transmitted from A to B, routed through
IntA and IntB, the last point at which transparency can be guaranteed (by intermediary
support) is when IntB emits the message, and vice versa. Additional intermediaries may
exist between A and IntA (and B and IntB), these are beyond the control of provided
intermediary support.
The provisioning of IntA and IntB in this manner match the loosely coupled asyn-
chronous exchange of messages facilitating the execution of B2B interactions. A, B,
IntA and IntB are all standalone entities who may communicate but are not all required
to be online at the same time to do so.
The composition of IntA and IntB to provide accountability support also illustrates
that the decomposition may be recursively applied. That is, IntA and IntB are themselves
composed of smaller services (discussed in Section 4.8.1).
A strong motivator for this approach is the possible configurations for the location
and operation of components, they may all be hosted by the same provider, split across
multiple providers or hosted within their respective organisations. This allows elements
to be composed across multiple domains of control (e.g., IntA’s composition may be
split across A and a dedicated provider). Section 4.10 discusses such configurations and
demonstrates that previous work can be expressed as instances of these configurations.
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Section 2.4 discusses issues relating to the trust of components between one or more
providers.
1.4.5 Summary
While IntA and IntB communicate to execute non-repudiation protocols to provide ac-
countability to A and B, the execution of other technical protocols would allow di erent
properties to be satisfied (e.g., synchronisation protocols to ensure consistency).
Although omitted for brevity, communication between IntA and IntB may engage a
trusted third party (TTP) to guarantee fairness [PG99] the important elements here
were A, B, their respective intermediaries and the illustration of composition to provide
intermediary support abstractions. A TTP would simply represent another composition
of services to provide required functionality.
“Intermediary Accountability Support” was used as a label in Figure 1.3 and 1.4 to
show that IntA and IntB (and TTPs) were composed to provide the required paradigm
(i.e., using non-repudiation protocols to satisfy accountability). Following this, “inter-
mediary support” in used to mean any support o ered to interacting organisations (e.g.,
A and B) through the use of intermediary components acting on their behalf to execute
protocols satisfying one or more support properties with varying characteristics.
1.5 Objectives of Work
Previous work has focused on supporting interactions through the provision of inter-
mediaries. This includes the execution of non-repudiation protocols [CRS06, NZB04],
contract monitoring [Str09], synchronisation for consistency management [MJS06], aug-
menting message delivery with additional capabilities [TMRS02] and ensuring agree-
ments are never violated [MU00]. These works have generally aimed to support one
property (e.g., non-repudiation) and placed significant requirements on organisations in
terms of:
15
1.5 Objectives of Work Chapter 1
Expertise: What protocols should be used, what properties do they provide and when
should they be used?
Infrastructure: The computing power required to executed the protocols rendering the
required support.
Integration: How is the o ered support integrated into new and/or existing business
processes.
This thesis aims to improve on previous work by designing and implementing generalised
support middleware that does the following:
1. Supports multiple functional properties (e.g., accountability or fairness) with mul-
tiple characteristics (e.g., accountability when the recipient is untrusted)
2. Provides the desired support through the use of intermediaries which are com-
posed to satisfy the supported functional properties by implementing the required
technical protocols.
3. Operates transparently
4. Operates decoupled from B2B standards
5. Operates asynchronously
6. Alleviates expertise, infrastructure and integration requirements placed upon in-
teracting organisations
For point (1), the challenges are identifying which properties to support, which proto-
cols satisfy these properties (with what characteristics) and establishing suitable map-
pings. Discussed in Section 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 3.2, 3.3 and 4.10. A generalised design
in which this is possible will be capable of expressing previous work as instances of
functional properties to be supported. Discussed in Section 2.12 and 4.12.
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For point (2), the challenges are decomposing the required support into individual
components that may be re-used to provide the widest range of support with minimal
duplication of e ort or functionality. Discussed in Section 1.4.4, 2.3, 4.2, 4.3, 4.8.1,
4.9, 4.12, 5.3, 5.4 and5.5. Expressing previous work within this generalised design be-
comes a matter of implementing components to be composed to provide the required
functionality. Discussed in Section 2.12, 4.8.1 and 4.12.
For point (3), the challenges are identifying points of interception at which the re-
quired information is available to the intermediary support and the desired support can
be provided to the interacting organisations, independent of B2B standard, while en-
suring business level transparency is maintained. Discussed in Section 1.3.1, 2.2, 2.7,
2.12, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 4.7 and5.6. By enforcing transparency in the intermediary support,
existing and new B2B interactions can be supported by placing intermediary support in
the delivery path of B2B interactions. Discussed in Section 1.4, 2.7, 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and
3.6.
For point (4), the challenges are ensuring that support o ered is not dependent upon
any specific B2B standard, that some useful minimal level of support is available to all
interactions and also that available business level information may be capitalised upon
where available. Discussed in Section 2.7, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.6 and 4.3. By ensuring the
intermediary support is decoupled from any B2B standard, existing and new standards
can be supported (assuming they communicate using message oriented middleware).
Discussed in Section 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 4.3.1.
For point (5), the challenges fall under the realm of an engineering challenge. It
is best to implement intermediary support asychronously simply as message oriented
middleware and all surveyed B2B standards operate asynchronously. The benefits of
doing so are that all components are not required to be online at the same time. However,
we assume any component will eventually be online such that it can process messages
and proceed with executing or supporting interactions. Discussed in Section 2.1, 2.4,
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3.1, and 4.3.1.
For point (6), we consider that expertise and infrastructure requirements can be sat-
isfied by dedicated service providers. Such providers would be responsible for implement-
ing component services and composing them into intermediary support that delivered
the required levels of support to interacting organisations. This thesis assumes the role
of one or more dedicated service providers for the purposes of supporting interacting
organisations. Discussed in Section 2.3, 2.11 and 4.11.
By enforcing transparency and decoupling, integration requirements can be minimised
to requiring only that an organisation’s messages are routed through the intermediary
support. Other scenarios for integration (including situations in which organisations
wish to retain control over specific aspects) are discussed in Section 2.4, 2.5.3, 2.6.3, 2.11
and 4.11.
The proposed approach to providing transparent, decoupled, asynchronous support
at lower levels, using middleware intermediaries, will be demonstrated as fit for purpose
and also applicable to domains beyond B2B and message oriented middleware.
Additionally:
1. Fairness and accountability will be developed as proof-of-concept properties along-
side technical protocols supporting their satisfaction. They will demonstrate that
multiple properties (and characteristics) can be supported independently of B2B
standards in use, all while maintaining transparency, loose-coupling and asynchron-
icity. Consistency will be described as a property that could be implemented (with
examples), demonstrating the extensibility of the generalised middleware design.
2. Example implementations will be created, representing di erent instances of com-
position and deployment of components to provide intermediary support for B2B
interactions. These implementations will be evaluated with regards to how well
they function compared to previous work and what impact they may have on B2B
interactions.
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1.5.1 Summary
In short, the major contributions are a generalised intermediary middleware design for
supporting interactions using by mapping functional properties to technical protocols
allowing their satisfaction and declaration mechanisms specifying when properties are
required for intercepted transmissions.
The challenges of transparency, asynchronicity and loose-coupling are addressed in the
support o ered, allowing:
• Existing and new interactions to be supported seamlessly
• Previous work to be expressed as instances of composition and deployment within
the generalised design.
• Expertise, infrastructure and integration requirements to be alleviated from inter-
acting organisations.
Example properties, protocols and implementations, coupled with generalisation of pre-
vious work and surveyed standards will demonstrate the suitability of low-level approach
to providing support. Cross domain applications of the work will be discussed in Section
6.3.
1.6 Thesis Structure and Contents
The work presented in this thesis expands upon the topics discussed in this chapter and
is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces general B2B terminology, concepts and assumptions made through-
out this thesis. Concerns relevant to supporting B2B interactions are presented
alongside technical protocols for their satisfaction and considerations for integra-
tion into intermediary support. B2B standards are surveyed, reporting on message
exchange patterns, supported requirements and extensibility. Cloud computing is
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briefly discussed including benefits and issues relating to trust, regulation and
operational requirements. The chapter finishes by surveying related work.
Chapter 3 generalises the results of the surveyed B2B standards to generalise common
exchange patterns, business level requirements and abstractions. These generalisa-
tions are to define declaration mechanisms, specifying when supported properties
should be satisfied. Hierarchies for Fairness and Accountability properties are
defined and mapped to technical protocols providing their with di erent charac-
teristics. The chapter finishes with discussions on supporting individual transmis-
sions (as a building block for grander support) and use of the proposed declaration
mechanisms.
Chapter 4 presents the generalised intermediary support middleware design, beginning
with its positioning within the a B2B stack and a breakdown of its layers of abstrac-
tion. Various design decisions are discussed with regard to their e ects on business
level operation. Individual components are discussed including minimal compon-
ents required to facilitate interception of messages and how functional properties
are supported by composing additional components to execute technical protocols.
Configurations for deployment will be discussed followed by a demonstration that
previous work can be expressed as instances of the proposed generalised design.
Chapter 5 discusses three implementations representing instances of the design in Chapter
4. These first is a decentralised solution providing accountability where organisa-
tions retain control of their own cryptographic operations generation while still
maintaining business level transparency[MC09]. The second implementation is a
centralised solution providing accountability built using cloud computing as to
minimise requirements on an organisation [MC10]. The third implementation is
an adaptation of the second with extremely granular timing information. All im-
plementations are evaluated on their functionality and the third is evaluated on
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its performance with regards to its impact on typical B2B interactions.
Chapter 6 concludes the work with a summary of contributions. An overview of contri-
butions will be followed by a description of contribution by chapter. Contributions
will be summarised and evaluated against the aims and objectives in this chapter.
The chapter will finish with a conclusion and an overview of future work.
21
2 Background
This chapter begins with a discussion of B2B terminology in Section 2.1. Section 2.2
and 2.3 discuss layers of abstraction involved in B2B interactions and their associated
components. Section 2.4 discusses relevant business and technical level assumptions.
Section 2.5 discusses relevant concerns to address when supporting B2B interactions
including fairness, accountability and consistency. Section 2.6 discusses technical pro-
tocols suitable to solving the identified concerns and how they can be integrated into
intermediary support while maintaining transparency.
Section 2.7 surveys current B2B standards, using ebXML as the general case and ex-
amining domain specific standards as subsets of ebXML. The survey reports on message
exchange patterns, supported business requirements, how B2B concerns are addressed
and how the B2B standards may be supported or have their own support extended.
Section 2.11 briefly discusses cloud computing with regards to its use for hosting com-
ponents of intermediary support. The discussion considers benefits typically associated
with cloud computing and where operational or compliancy issues may impact its use.
The chapter finishes with a survey of related work in Section 2.12 how it informs this
thesis. Section 2.13 summarises key points discussed in the chapter.
2.1 B2B Terminology
Before discussing issues associated with supporting the execution and regulation of in-
teractions, this section introduces some relevant terminology.
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2.1.1 Organisational Identity
For the purposes of this thesis an organisation is an autonomous body, responsible for
the business services they provision to enable their participation in B2B interactions.
To facilitate participation in these interactions, organisations are represented by a suf-
ficiently unique identity, this identity is authenticated and authorised within a given
context (e.g., through the use of standards such as X.509 infrastructure, enabling the
authoritative issuing of identity certificates) [SHF02]. In order to allow organisations to
maintain their autonomy, the internal assignment of an identity within an organisation
(i.e., whether it represents the entire organisation or some subset thereof) is considered
out of scope, the authorised use of an identity representing any part of an organisation
is their own responsibility.
2.1.2 B2B Terminology
B2B standards generally have their own terminology, these relate to general terminology
laid out in this section including relevant relationships and assumptions:
Participant A participant is a single organisation (represented by an identity) interact-
ing with another for the purposes of conducting business. This thesis assumes
interactions to contain two participants, generally an initiator and a recipient.
Intermediary An intermediary is an entity through which interactions may be routed.
The intermediary may take actions upon the intercepted information before passing
in on for eventual delivery to its intended recipient.
Document A business document is a self contained document constructed by one parti-
cipant to be sent to another. Example business documents include purchase orders
or invoices.
Message Participants interact by sending business messages to each other. A business
message contains one or more business documents and required information to
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ensure messages can be delivered to their intended recipient (i.e., the identity of
the sender and the recipient).
Signal Business signals are used to indicate significant events, these signals indicate both
positive and negative statuses including: the indication a participant is ready for
some message to be sent, the acknowledgement of receipt of a previously sent busi-
ness message or the acceptance or rejection of some business message’s contents.
Transmission A transmission constitutes the transmission of some business contents
(i.e., a message or signal) from one participant to another (e.g., Aæ B). It is the
smallest observable unit of communication between two participants.
Exchange An exchange between A and B involves an initial transmission of a message
or signal from Aæ B and then a subsequent transmission of a response signal or
message from B æ A. The response from B must explicitly reference the request
from A.
Conversation A conversations is a sequence of one or more transmissions and exchanges
(and their associated requirements), executed in order to achieve mutually benefi-
cial business outcomes.
Interaction Two participants engaging in a transmission, exchange or conversation are
interacting. Thus, interaction is used as a general term where the distinction is
irrelevant.
Additional terms are introduced in subsequent sections. The above definitions provide a
starting point for discussion related to B2B interactions. The survey of B2B standards in
Section 2.7 will relate general terms to standards-specific counterparts where illustrative.
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2.1.2.1 Conversations, Agreements and Contracts
Until this point, the terms conversation, agreement and contract have been used inter-
changeably without clarification. For the purposes of this work, where organisations
conduct business through the exchange of messages, ‘conversation’ and ‘agreement’ may
be used interchangeably depending on the context of the discussion. Where the focus of a
discussion is on the need for organisations to agree, agreement will be the preferred term
and where the focus is on the exchange of messages to facilitate business, conversation
will be the preferred term.
Contracts are considered minimally to specify the conversations (or agreements) two
organisations agree to execute, the execution of which be a ected by legal requirements.
This thesis assumes legal requirements a ecting the business level definition and ex-
ecution of a conversation are translated into specific business requirements (e.g., if a
response is legally required within a certain time period, this can be translated to an
appropriate deadline requirement) or are otherwise incorporated into the implement-
ation of an organisation’s business services (e.g., laws a ecting time periods for data
retention). To avoid confusion, only the terms ‘conversation’ and ‘agreement’ will be
subsequently used with the focuses described in this section.
2.2 Levels of Abstraction
Section 1.1 defined two key aspects to enabling (and supporting) the execution and reg-
ulation of B2B interactions. Specifically, high-level mechanisms allowing the definition
of conversations specifying how participants must be observed to behave and low-level
mechanisms enabling their realisation. That is, the satisfaction of requirements and
properties enabling their execution and regulation by being able irrefutably prove that
expected behaviour was observed, or indicate where expected behaviour was deviated
from. These high and low levels can be more descriptively defined:
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Business Level The business (high) level comprises the implementation of business ser-
vices by an organisation and a specific set of B2B standards (e.g., ebXML) under
which the services are designed. That is, an ebXML business service is implemented
capable of supporting ebXML conversations through the exchange and processing
of ebXML messages. This level deals in business abstractions (e.g., business doc-
uments, business messages and business conversations) enabling a business service
to be constructed with details such as formats, protocols and transports abstracted
by the lower levels.
Technical Level The technical (low) level comprises enabling technology allowing the
business level standards and services to operate. This includes all formats, pro-
tocols and transports necessary to physically deliver the message from one parti-
cipant to another, allowing them to process it at the business level and sanction
an appropriate response. B2B standards may mandate the use of specific technical
level technologies (e.g., RosettaNet mandates MIME message format and HTTP
transport protocol) to satisfy their own business level requirements, but they still
maintain the business and technical abstractions.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the layers in a generic B2B stack, indicating which layers belong to
which level of abstraction. This layered stack is similar in approach to layered network
stacks such as the OSI and TCI/IP models [Tan03].
The points in the following list correspond to the numbering on the layers shown in
Figure 2.1:
1. A’s business service is implemented to participate conversations defined by a B2B
standard (e.g., RosettaNet), the chosen B2B standard dictates the contents and
the formatting of the business messages to be exchanged, facilitating the execution
of agreed upon conversations.
2. Messaging standards provide a general message format used to encapsulate all
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A's$Business$Service
B2B$Standard
Messaging$Standard
Business
Level
Technical
Level Transport$Standard
Physical$Delivery
A's$Stack
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Figure 2.1: The components of A’s B2B software stack.
of the business level information ready for transport. For example, RosettaNet
messages are encapsulated as MIME messages.
3. Messages ready for delivery can be transmitted across a number of di erent trans-
ports, matching specific requirements. For example, RosettaNet specifies that
MIME messages be transmitted using HTTP or HTTPS where transport security
is required.
4. With messaging standards and transports chosen, the physical delivery of a mes-
sage to its recipient can occur, typically using TCP/IP or UDP.
Some Message oriented Middleware (MoM) standards specify their own wire-format
[AMQ09]. That is, they define the messaging and transport layers (3 and 4) as shown
in Figure 2.1.
It is important to note that while B2B standards may mandate technical level elements,
these are kept abstracted from the business level elements. Where technical elements
are mandated, it is for the reasons of satisfying specific requirements supported by the
B2B standards. For example, RosettaNet allows a message to specify it requires secure
transport, HTTPS is mandated as a technical requirement to guarantee a business level
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notion of transport security. Conversations defined in RosettaNet need not be aware
that HTTPS is being used, they simply know their security requirement is being fulfilled.
This mirrors the approach taken by support middleware designed in this thesis. That
is, additional supported requirements are declared functionally, satisfied transparently
by lower level elements to maintain the appropriate abstractions.
The survey in Section 2.7 will demonstrate that B2B standards represent concretisa-
tions of the general stack shown in Figure 2.1 where certain technical level aspects are
specified to satisfy supported business level requirements (and the execution of conversa-
tions). It follows then, that two organisations interacting using the same B2B standard
will both implement B2B stacks containing a minimally required group of the same
components (i.e., they will both feature agreed upon elements of 1-4 as shown in Figure
2.1).
2.2.1 Message and Signal Types
Using these levels of abstraction, we define two message and signal types:
Business Message: Amessage whose contents and metadata drive operation at the busi-
ness (high) level of abstraction. Business messages are exchanged and processed
by business services.
Technical Message: A message whose contents drive operation at the technical (lower)
level of abstraction, such as individual protocol messages. Technical messages
are exchange and processed by technical level elements. Technical messages are
associated with business messages (e.g., a technical message facilitating protocol
execution related to a specific business transmission) and may contain parts of
business messages, to be reassembled before being passed to the business layer.
Business Signal: A signal indicating an event at the business level of operation (e.g.,
the acknowledgement of receipt of a business message, the rejection of contents of
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a message or an indication of readiness to receive a business message).
Technical Signal: A signal indicating an event at the technical level of operation (e.g.,
the acknowledgement of receipt, the completion of a protocol or the indication of
some exceptional circumstance).
All technical level elements are related to some business level elements. For example, a
technical signal may refer to a technical message which is part of some protocol execution
associated with the delivery of a business message or signal. The associations and their
multiplicities are discussed in Section 4.6.1. This thesis will refer to messages where the
distinction is irrelevant, otherwise technical- or business- prefixes will be used to indicate
the applicable scope.
2.2.2 Conversation Outcome Types
The previous abstractions allow the definition of three outcomes for all B2B interactions:
Business Success: A business success (BizSucc) outcome indicates that all business in-
teractions were successful and the desired business outcome was achieved.
Business Failure: A business failure (BizFail) indicates a problem at the business level
of operation. For example, unexpected, malformed or erroneous business messages,
rejection or failure due to deadlines or the inability to supply an order.
Technical Failure A technical failure (TechFail) indicates a problem at the technical
level of operation. For example, unexpected, malformed or corrupt technical mes-
sages, technical incompatibilities or failures in communication, processing and stor-
age.
Technical failures are di cult to deal with due to their potential impact on the business
level, easily giving rise to business failures (e.g., a broken connection leading to a missed
business deadline). These abstraction and outcome types are used in Section 2.5.5 and
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4.6 when discussing the consistency of conversation outcomes and events whose e ects
cross layers of abstraction.
2.3 B2B Support Service Types
Steinauer et al. discussed the role of third parties in electronic commerce (E-Commerce)
as trust enhancers, independent of and trusted by both participants in an interaction
[SWR97], these trust enhancers were envisioned to provide additional guarantees or
alleviate concerns regarding trusting interactions and their participants. They identify
support of regulation through accountability and fairness as key concerns that can be
addressed by the involvement of trusted third parties.
Subsequent work at Hewlett-Packard [BBMS01] went on to propose an ecosystem of
security services to support E-Commerce. They envisaged the emergence of security
service providers o ering security services for a number of useful B2B roles including:
identity, authorisation, guaranteed message delivery, notarisation, storage, audit, receipt
generation and time-stamping. Desirable requirements for these services were identified
including: ease of use to emphasise ease of integration and composition, survivability
(long-lived availability and reliability), confidentiality and privacy including protection
against insider threats at the service provider.
The constituents composed into IntA, IntB and “Intermediary Accountability Sup-
port” as discussed in Section 1.4 are examples of composed security services capable of
providing support to B2B interactions.
The above allows the specification of di erent types of services involved in B2B inter-
actions and their support. These types indicate domains of responsibility (separation of
concern) and define specifically the type of service this thesis implements:
Business Services are constructed using B2B standards such as RosettaNet and ebXML
to enabled the execution of agreed upon conversations allowing business to be
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conducted between organisations. These services create and process only business
messages.
Security Services aid the execution and regulation of interactions conducted by business
services. These security services may render their support transparently (as in this
work) or be explicitly involved in them (e.g., the use of a payment processing service
between two participants)1.
Both of these service types require infrastructure to enable their operation, prompting
the consideration of another service (and provider) type:
Infrastructure Services provide computation, storage and communication as a service.
When infrastructure services are supplied by cloud providers, consumers pay for
only the resources they consume (i.e., bandwidth, storage space and CPU cycles)
and can be freed from provisioning their own hardware.
The definition of an ecosystem and security services allow functional properties to be
satisfied by their sensible composition (e.g., time-stamping, receipt generation, fair ex-
change and evidence storage could be composed to provide a type of accountability).
The design and implementations in Chapter 4 and 5 will make use of the composition
of component security services when satisfying the functional properties it supports, to
reduce redundant implementation of supporting features.
Each of the service types here has an associated service provider whose responsibility
it is to satisfy the expertise and infrastructure requirements of operating their service.
Business services are the responsibility of their respective organisation participating in
B2B interactions, security services are the responsibility of the security service provider.
In this thesis, we assume the role of one or more security service providers, develop-
ing component security services and composing them to provide intermediary support
1In the course of its transparent operation, intermediary support may explicitly interact with security
services. However, business level transparency will always be maintained to participants.
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capable of supporting B2B interactions by transparently satisfying multiple functional
properties. This thesis makes no assumption about the infrastructure services used by
organisations or other security service providers to enable their business and security
services, they may use cloud computing, private hosting or combinations thereof.
Where external infrastructure services are used by the security services developed in
this thesis, they will be provisioned by cloud providers (e.g., Amazon Web Services), the
use and impacts of which are discussed specifically in Section 2.11 and 4.11.
2.4 Assumptions
Before continuing with discussion on the concerns associated with B2B interactions, and
technical protocols to address them, this section will state the assumptions upon which
the work in this thesis is developed.
2.4.1 Business Level Assumptions
As stated in 2.1.1, organisations are assumed to use a su ciently unique identity, repres-
ented by a mechanism such as X.509 infrastructure certification [SHF02]. Organisations
are assumed to retain autonomy and be responsible for the internal assignment of such
identities.
We assume all B2B interactions can be described in terms business level and technical
level abstractions as discussed in Section 1.1 and 2.2 such that messages and signals may
be classified as discussed in Section 2.2.1 and outcomes may be classified as discussed in
Section 2.2.2.
Organisations are assumed to trust a critical subset of the intermediary support com-
ponents acting on their behalf. This includes components responsible for generating
and exchanging cryptographic data on behalf of an organisation and any other trusted
third parties involved in the provision of support (e.g., a TTP ensuring fairness in the
execution of a Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol execution). This thesis assumes
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existing techniques for establishing or verifying trust, or mitigating risk, such as those
discussed in [Sv10, BBMS01, JsIB07, SGR09] could be adapted to the work presented
in this thesis.
For the mapping of functional properties (e.g., fairness and accountability) to tech-
nical protocols providing their satisfaction (e.g., non-repudiation), such as in Section
3.3.3 and 3.3.2, we assume formal modelling could be applied to verify the mappings
(e.g., su cient coverage of characteristics). Similarly, we assume that declarations using
business level to infer functional properties (e.g., using ebXML non-repudiation require-
ment to infer accountability) can be verified or validated in the same way. This thesis
develops middleware capable of realising provided mappings and declarations, applying
methods for verification and validation of these is considered beyond scope.
2.4.2 Technical Level Assumptions
We assume two failure types regarding communication channels and nodes (i.e., all
business services and intermediaries) [MJSC07]:
Permanent Failures: Communication channels do not heal and nodes do not recover
their execution.
Temporary Failures: Communication channels will eventually heal and nodes will even-
tually recover their processing.
In the face of permanent failures, neither support or execution of B2B interactions can
be guaranteed to complete, thus the following assumptions are made:
• The communication channels between well-behaved nodes provide eventual mes-
sage delivery. That is, we assume channels are susceptible to temporary failures
and there is a known bound on the number of temporary failures experienced by
well-behaved parties.
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• Well-behaved nodes have persistent storage for messages and ensure that messages
are available for as long as is needed to fulfil obligations to activities in which they
are engaged. That is, nodes are susceptible to temporary failures but may recover
their execution.
• Well-behaved participants only send and process messages that comply with the
specification of activities in which they are engaged (e.g., at the business level only
messages complying with supported conversations are exchanged and processed
and at the technical level all messages adhere to executing or supporting B2B
interactions).
Trusted third parties involved in intermediary support are well-behaved by definition.
There is no assumption (or restriction) regarding the number of misbehaving nodes.
By assuming temporary failures on communication channels, and the use of su ciently
unique message identifiers for all business and technical messages we can assume at-least-
once delivery for messages and at-most-once processing for messages (on well-behaved
nodes). Asynchronicity is assumed in the exchange and processing of messages such that
channels and nodes do not need to be online at the same time but they are assumed to
eventually be online.
For the modelling of protocol execution, I adopt the model formalised in [CD04]. The
model is based on a modification of the Dolev-Yao model [DY83] in which intruders are
non-blocking. Participants in protocol executions may misbehave (and collaborate) but
eventually messages between well-behaved participants will be delivered. It is assumed
intruders are capable of eavesdropping and replaying on any channel, the cryptographic
primitives and capabilities described in Section 2.6.1 are used to secure transmissions
across insecure channels where required.
34
2.5 Concerns when Supporting B2B Interactions Chapter 2
2.5 Concerns when Supporting B2B Interactions
Section 2.1 through 2.3 defined concepts, classifications and assumptions relevant to the
work undertaken. This section motivates supporting the execution of B2B interactions,
discussing trust, fairness, accountability and consistency concerns.
2.5.1 Trust Concerns
Section 1.4 introduced the notion of classifying the level of trust between interacting
organisations. This has an impact on what guarantees must be enforced when they
interact. To this end we use three classifications of trust as described in [FR97]:
Trusted parties are assumed to behave at all times and will be honest about their
responsibilities when compliance is broken (e.g., if they miss a deadline, they will
admit to doing so)
Semi-trusted parties are assumed to be able to misbehave individually, but will not
conspire with others to do so.
Untrusted parties are assumed to be able to misbehave individually and in collaboration
with others.
From intermediary support’s point of view, semi-trusted and untrusted parties are clas-
sified as untrusted. That is, fairness guarantees should only be relaxed when complete
trust is present. Interacting organisations may be classified as semi-trusted in that they
may privilege their own interests ahead of others, as described in Section 1.2.
This thesis does not require or assume any specific trust relationship between organ-
isations, characteristics will be defined for fairness and accountability properties allowing
the relationship between two organisations to be expressed.
Importantly, we assume that trust relationships change over time. The intermediary
support will take this into account and use the trust relationship at the time of trans-
mission when choosing the best protocol to satisfy the required properties. Section 3.3.1
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and 3.4 discuss how intermediary support characterises the trust relationship between
participants, a ecting the satisfaction of fairness and accountability properties.
It is required that an organisation trusts its own intermediary and TTPs engaged by
its intermediary. For example, A trusts intermediaries acting on its behalf and all TTPs
engaged with to provide extra guarantees (e.g., deterministic fairness). Components
requiring trust will be kept to a minimum, discussed in Section 4.9.
2.5.2 Fairness Concerns
We begin with the following definition:
Fairness: For a fixed quality communication channel, at the end of an exchange protocol,
either all involved parties obtain their expected items or none, even a part, of the
information to be exchanged is revealed. [MGK02].
Informally, we are expressing a desire that no participant is placed at a disadvantage as
a result of having co-operated with agreements in place. That is, there is no benefit to
deviating from the expected behaviour for participants who choose to do so.
Various work on fairness has defined some important characteristics regarding how it
is guaranteed [MGK02, Aso98, FR97, PVG03]:
Strong: The requirement that fairness is never violated during an exchange
Weak: Allows fairness to be violated during an exchange with assurances that it can be
re-established
Optimistic: The guarantee that TTPs will not become involved in an exchange unless
absolutely required
Transparent: The guarantee that where TTPs are involved, their involvement cannot
be detected by the participants
36
2.5 Concerns when Supporting B2B Interactions Chapter 2
Weak fairness is intended for situations in which the overhead of providing strong fairness
is deemed unsuitable. For example, if the value of an interaction were su ciently low or
the cost of support too high.
The most desirable combination of these characteristics, for supporting fairness in
B2B interactions is strong, optimistic and transparent. That is, TTPs will only become
involved when absolutely necessary to maintain strong fairness and their intervention
remains undetectable to the participants. Transparency in TTP involvement protects
against situations in which detecting the involvement of a TTP (e.g., in generated evid-
ence) may harm the reputation of participants.
Section 3.3.2 discusses a mapping of Fairness as a property to a number of protocols
providing its satisfaction under the characteristics discussed in this section. As an aside,
various work has demonstrated that a TTP is required to guarantee deterministic fairness
in an exchange [PG99, EY80, Sch00].
If fairness is not guaranteed for an exchange, either participant can gain an unfair
advantage over the other, Figure 2.2 illustrates two examples, the first in which A o ers
proof of origin (PoO) alongside the message it delivers and B is supposed to respond
with proof of receipt (PoR). In the second conversation B o ers PoR as a show of good
faith before A is supposed to divulge PoO.
!Message,!PoO
A B
PoR X
!Message
A B
PoR
PoOX
Figure 2.2: Two flows in which a participant gains an unfair advantage.
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In the first exchange, B gains an unfair advantage in that it can choose to withhold
proof of receipt from A and A has no irrefutable recourse. Similarly, B is placed at a
disadvantage in the second exchange by A’s decision to withhold proof of origin from
B. These examples describe the selective receipt problem [Aso98]. Fairness will be
used in this thesis to protect participants during their interactions, that is, they are
able to interact under the assumption that their interests are protected in the face of
misbehaviour by other participants.
2.5.3 Accountability Concerns
Accountability, as defined by [YC04], denotes “assurances of semantic behaviour that
extend beyond basic perimeter security and the mechanisms for message authentication,
encryption, and integrity”. That is, the behaviour, state, and actions of accountable
systems should be:
Undeniable: Actions of an accountable actor are provable and non-repudiable. That is,
a service or its clients cannot plausibly deny their actions, and those actions may
be legally binding.
Certifiable: A client, peer, or external auditor may verify that an accountable service is
behaving correctly, and prove any misbehaviour to an arbitrary third party. For
example, a service may be prompted to prove cryptographically that its actions
are justified by the sequence of operations issued by its clients, in accordance with
its defined semantics.
Tamper-evident: Any attempt to corrupt the service state incurs a high probability of
detection. In particular, an external auditor may determine if the internal state
could or could not result from the sequence of operations issued on the service.
Thus, accountability can be satisfied by the generation, exchange and storage of evidence
satisfying these properties for all B2B interactions. We begin by defining two kinds of
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evidence as discussed in [CS96, ZG96b, ZG97b, KMZ02]:
Proof of Origin and Contents binding a message’s origin and contents to a participant
(the sender)
Proof of Receipt binding a message’s receipt to a participant (the recipient)
Additional kinds of evidence may be generated in the creation of an audit trail used to
irrefutably demonstrate accountability [Zho01, Coo06], including:
Proof of Submission evidence that a message was submitted to some delivery agent for
onward delivery to its recipient, usually generated by some delivery intermediary
or TTP.
Proof of Delivery evidence that a message was ultimately delivered to its intended re-
cipient, again usually generated by some delivery intermediary or TTP.
These evidence types bind the associated action to an identity such as those discussed in
Section 2.1.1. Such evidence allows participants and/or auditors (e.g., TTPs) to render
transmissions undeniable, certifiable and tamper-evident as previously described. Evid-
ence satisfying these properties allows the irrefutable demonstration of compliance with
agreements (i.e., conversations) in place, without it, agreements become unenforceable.
There is generally an agreed upon period of time for which accountability evidence
should be stored, usually some number of years [OAS07b, Ros02]. The potential longev-
ity of this evidence highlights an issue regarding its validity as generation of these evid-
ence types relies on the use of cryptographic operations. Cryptographic keys used to
generate this evidence may be revoked at any time, rendering evidence unusable if its
associated keys are no longer valid.
The issue becomes demonstrating that evidence was valid at the time of generation
(or some witnessed time before key revocation). Without such guarantees, a system is
vulnerable to key revocation [Coo06].
39
2.5 Concerns when Supporting B2B Interactions Chapter 2
Section 2.6.2 discusses time-stamping authorities, designed to irrefutably witness in-
formation at a given time, ensuring its validity against subsequent key revocations.
The specific protocols used to achieve accountability , discussed in Section 2.6.3, may
interact with TTPs and TSAs to ensure that generated evidence is protected against
selective receipt and key revocation.
2.5.4 Accountability and Fairness: Why Both?
A valid question may be why guarantee accountability for exchanges where strong fair-
ness can be guaranteed. The critical issues are the following:
1. An exchange is not the smallest unit of B2B interaction that can occur
2. Strong fairness only protects participants during an exchange, it is not su cient
to ensure agreements remain irrefutably enforceable
Section 2.1 defined incremental building blocks for composing conversations: transmis-
sions, exchanges and conversations. A conversation is a sequence of transmissions (which
have no response) and exchanges (request transmissions with corresponding response
transmissions). The smallest unit of business communication we can assume between
two participants is a single transmission.
The issue here being that fairness as defined in Section 2.5.2 is only applicable to
exchanges. That is, there must be at least one piece of information, per participant,
to be exchanged to be able to guarantee fairness by the definition that everyone is
guaranteed their desired information, or nobody is.
If we consider that accountability is satisfied by the exchange of evidence, irrefutably
binding participants to the actions they take, a business level transmission can be sup-
ported at the technical level as an exchange of a message and its associated proof of
origin for proof of its receipt. In doing so, business level transparency is maintained for
the smallest unit of business interaction (i.e., a transmission) while allowing fairness and
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accountability to be provided. Section 3.5 will discuss this in details.
The second point above stated that strong fairness only protects during an exchange
and is not su cient to ensure agreements remain irrefutably enforceable. What we mean
here is that, without accountability evidence to irrefutably bind participants to their
actions, it cannot be demonstrated whether a participant complied with agreements in
place for their interactions. Thus, accountability is required to protect participants after
interactions while fairness protects them during an exchange by ensuring that messages,
signals and associated evidence aren’t released prematurely, granting anyone an unfair
advantage.
2.5.5 Consistency Concerns
The B2B interactions considered in this thesis are executed via the asynchronous ex-
change and processing of messages. This asynchronicity can lead to unpredictable delays
in processing and communications and lead to situations in which participants have con-
flicting views of state. Figure 2.3 illustrates a conversation in which A and B terminate
with conflicting views of the outcome.
!Order
A B
Ack
Accept
!Ack
LATE
!Time
!Biz!Success Biz!Fail
Figure 2.3: A and B terminate in di erent states.
The problem demonstrated in Figure 2.3 is an instance of the last-ack (or two gen-
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erals) problem [Tan03, MJSC07]. The red brackets represent deadlines by which an
acknowledgement is expected to be received for some previously sent message. The final
acknowledgement from A to B is seen to arrive beyond the end of the second deadline,
meaning A believes the conversation terminated successfully (a business success in terms
of the outcomes discussed in Section 2.2) whereas B treats the late arrival as a failure
to meet a business deadline and assumes the outcome is a business failure.
Based on the above, we define two levels of consistency for use in this work:
Total Consistency: The requirement that all participants are prevented from entering
conflicting states regarding ongoing interactions.
Outcome Consistency: The requirement that inconsistencies may arise during interac-
tions but the outcome is consistent for all participants.
Similarly to strong and weak fairness as discussed in Section 2.5.2, total consistency
would require additional complexity over outcome consistency. It may be permissible to
relax consistency requirements to apply only to outcomes, or even further depending on
factors such as the perceived value of an interaction.
B2B standards acknowledge that inconsistency may occur and a corrective approach
to the issue. Participants are able to notify others of failures regarding previous inter-
actions. The invocation of such mechanisms depends upon the eventual detection of
the inconsistency and will most likely result in corrective action being taken, potentially
at a cost of computation, reputation or money. For the above reasons, consistency is
desirable such that inconsistencies be prevented from manifesting at the business level.
Consistency is discussed as a proof of concept that properties beyond fairness and
accountability can be satisfied by the intermediary middleware designed in this thesis.
Section 2.6.4 and 3.3.4 will discuss how this could be achieved.
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2.6 Technical Protocols
The issues discussed in Section 2.5 are not without technical solutions. However, these
solutions incur expertise, infrastructure and integration requirements as discussed in
Section 1.5. This section discusses technical protocols and techniques that will be used
to address the concerns of fairness, accountability and consistency. Protocols providing
fairness and accountability will be mapped with functional properties in Chapter 3,
specifying how the properties (with varying characteristics) are satisfied.
2.6.1 Primitives and Capabilities
For the protocols discussed in the remainder of this thesis, here we define supporting
notation, primitives and capabilities including secure hash functions, digital signature
schemes, secure pseudo-random sequence generators [Sch96, Gol99].
Secure hash functions have the following properties:
Ease of Computation: Given x, it is easy to compute hash (x)
Compression: Given an arbitrary string, the function produces a fixed length string as
output (a.k.a a message digest)
Preimage Resistance: Given h, it is computationally infeasible to find x such that h =
hash (x)
Second Preimage Resistance: Given x and hash (x) it is computationally infeasible to
find y ”= x such that hash (x) = hash (y)
Collision Resistance: If hash (x) = hash (y), then x = y with an e ective probability of
1
Public key cryptography pairs together public and private keys to be used for asymmetric
cryptographic operations. These key pairs have the following properties:
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• It is computationally infeasible to compute a private key from its corresponding
public key
• Cipher-text generated using a public key can only be decrypted using the corres-
ponding private key
• Cipher-text generated using a private key can only be decrypted using the corres-
ponding public key
The final of these properties supports digital signature schemes comprised of two al-
gorithms:
1. The signing algorithm where some data is encrypted using a private key to generate
a verifiable signature and
2. The verification algorithm which uses the corresponding public key to decrypt the
received signature
Verification allows a participant to confirm that only the signing participant’s private
key could have been used to generate the signature.
Secure pseudo-random sequence generators generate sequences of bits with the follow-
ing properties:
Pseudo-randomness: The generated sequence is statistically random
Unpredictability: Given complete algorithmic, hardware and previous generation know-
ledge it is computationally infeasible to predict the next bit of the sequence
Following these properties, we can specify the following notation used by protocols ref-
erenced in this thesis, shown in table 2.1.
For the involvement of public key cryptography we assume the existence of some
certificate authority (CA) and some public key infrastructure (PKI ) allowing identity
certificates, key-pairs and public keys to be issued, validated, revoked and distributed
as discussed in this section and in Section 2.1.1.
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Notation Description
h (x) A secure hash of x
sigP (x)
Participant P ’s signature over x using P ’s private
key
encP (x) Encryption of x with P ’s public key
rn[P]
A secure pseudo-random number with optional
identity of participant P who generated rn
Tg Time of generation of some information
P æ Q : x The transmission of x from P to Q
x, y, z The concatenation of x, y and z.
Table 2.1: Cryptography and Communication Notation
2.6.2 Time-stamping: Time-stamping Authorities
Section 2.5.3 discussed the notion of key revocations subsequent to the generation of
evidence rendering them invalid. For this reason we consider the involvement of a spe-
cialised kind of TTP known as a Time-stamping Authority (TSA) . TSAs serve to act
as a witness to information presented to them at some time T . Specifically for account-
ability, TSAs are used to witness the time of generation (Tg) of accountability evidence
[ZG97b]. Revocations will be executed authoritatively by CAs and thus, all evidence
witnessed before the time of revocation can be irrefutably demonstrated as valid. Table
2.2 describes and defines notation for interacting with TSAs to witness information.
Interaction with TSAs may be in-line (all interactions between nodes passes through
the TSA) or on-line (nodes consult the TSA but not all messages are required to pass
through it), illustrated in Figure 2.4.
The existence of TSAs and the consistency issues discussed in Section 2.6.4 assume
there is a global time base from which clocks are synchronised to a reasonable (known
and bounded) accuracy.
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Notation Description
tsTSA (x)
The time-stamp on x generated by TSA to witness
the generation, Tg, of x
Notation Definition
tsTSA (x) {Tg, sigTSA (x,Tg)}
Table 2.2: Time-stamping Authority notation
A TSA
x
Inline&Interac+on
Bx,'tsTSA(x) ATSA
x
Online&Interac,on
Bx,'tsTSA(x)
x,'tsTSA(x)
Figure 2.4: Styles of interaction with a TSA.
2.6.3 Accountability: Non-repudiation Protocols
The accountability example in Section 1.3 introduced the notion of using non-repudiation
protocols for the satisfaction of accountability as a property. Non-repudiation is defined
to be the inability to subsequently deny an action or event. ISO 7489-2 identified non-
repudiation as a primary security concern alongside four others (authentication, access
control, confidentiality and data integrity) [ISO89]. Kremer et al. conducted an intensive
survey of non-repudiation protocols and classified them in terms of their requirements
and the properties they provide [KMZ02].
For each of the evidences detailed in Section 2.5.3 (proof of origin, receipt, submis-
sion and delivery) the non-repudiation specific counterparts are similarly named non-
repudiation of origin (NRO), non-repudiation of receipt (NRR), non-repudiation of sub-
mission (NRS) and non-repudiation of delivery (NRD).
They classify the following fairness properties:
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Probabilistic at the end of an exchange there is some probability, p, that a message and
its NRO were fairly exchanged for its NRR
Strong Fairness states that at the end of an exchange a message and its NRO are guar-
anteed to have been fairly exchanged for its NRR or no valuable information has
been obtained by either participant. A TTP must be available to deterministically
guarantee fairness [PG99] but they may not be required to intervene in all cases
True Fairness states that strong fairness must be provided and, at the end of an ex-
change, it is indistinguishable from the evidence and execution whether the TTP
intervened or not
Alongside there fairness properties, they classify TTPs as having three modes of inter-
action for the execution of non-repudiation protocols:
Inline in which all communication between nodes engaged pass through the TTP
Online in which a TTP is involved in every execution of a protocol but all communica-
tion between nodes does not pass through it
O ine in which a TTP is only engaged when necessary to guarantee a protocol termin-
ates and fairness is guaranteed
Transparent in which is it indistinguishable when an o ine TTP becomes involved in
a protocol execution from when it does not
O ine and transparent TTPs are synonymous with optimistic and transparent modes
of operation from the fairness discussion in Section 2.5.2.
Communication channels are classified as:
Unreliable channels are able to permanently fail or entirely lose messages
Resilient channels may temporarily fail, but will eventually heal and deliver messages
with an unknown but finite delay
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Operational channels guarantee delivery with a known delay
Table 2.3 selects protocols for di erent modes of TTP interaction from [KMZ02]. For
multiple protocols satisfying the same kind of TTP interaction, the protocol chosen
is the one guaranteeing timeliness alongside having the lowest communication channel
requirements (i.e., unreliable < resilient < operational).
Protocol Fairness TTP Channel
Co ey-Saidha[CS96] Strong Inline Resilient
Zhou-Gollman [ZG96a] Strong Online Resilient
Kremer-Markowitch [KM00] Strong O ine Resilient
Markowitch-Kremer [MK01] True Transparent Resilient
Mitsianis [Mit01] Probabilistic None Unreliable
Table 2.3: Non-repudiation protocols, their characteristics and channel requirements
Voluntary exchange is omitted from this table as the survey cited details only ex-
change protocols that guarantee some level of fairness (even probabilistic). Voluntary
exchange has no channel requirements (i.e., unreliable), involves no TTP interaction and
guarantees no fairness.
Each of these protocols is used to provide accountability with di erent characteristics,
Section 3.3.3 will define the characteristics and provide a complete mapping of account-
ability to all available protocols able to satisfy it. As previously discussed, voluntary
exchange is only suitable when a participant has complete trust in the recipient. In all
other circumstances one of the protocols in table 2.3 providing deterministic fairness
guarantees will be used.
In terms of the best protocol to use to guarantee fairness where required, the Markowitch-
Kremer protocol is the theoretical best, providing strong fairness through an o ine TTP
acting transparently. Transparency is cited as an important concern in the execution of
non-repudiation protocols and the generation of their evidence as being able to discern
when a TTP had to intervene versus when it did not may have an adverse a ect on the
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reputation of participants [KMZ02, VPG99].
In reality, complexity trade-o s such as performance, message and computational may
make di erent fairness guaranteeing protocols suitable under di erent conditions. Full
protocol definitions are omitted from this section for brevity although Chapter 5 will
detail non-repudiation protocols implemented to provide accountability. Importantly,
the middleware design in Chapter 4, and constructs presented in Chapter 3 provide a
framework in which any non-repudiation protocol can be implemented and executed to
provide accountability while still maintaining business level transparency.
The intermediary accountability support example showed only two intermediaries,
acting on behalf of their respective organisations, communicating with each other to ex-
ecute non-repudiation protocols to provide accountability. In reality, TTPs (and other
security services such as TSAs and CAs) will be engaged with during the execution of
technical protocols. That is, the composition of intermediaries acting on behalf of organ-
isations and security services is used to satisfy some support property as an abstraction
like accountability. Figure 2.5 illustrates an example TTP being possibly involved in the
execution of a non-repudiation protocol.
A
Messages
Intermediary+Support
B
Messages
IntA IntB
NR#Protocol#Execu.on
TTP
Figure 2.5: Non-repudiation execution possibly engages a TTP to guarantee fairness.
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2.6.3.1 Protecting Against Key Revocation
TSAs o er protection against key revocation in non-repudiation protocols regardless of
the type of interaction with the TTP, the survey of non-repudiation protocols discusses
alternative schemes that either are not applicable to all modes of TTP interaction or
add complexity that does not contribute to the aims of this thesis. That is, the ability
within the intermediary support to safeguard evidence from key revocations is enough.
As such, where required unless otherwise specified, TSAs as described in Section 2.6.2
will be engaged to witness the generation of evidence and protect it against subsequent
key revocation.
2.6.4 Consistency: Synchronisation Protocols
Section 2.5.5 demonstrated that participants in B2B interactions may obtain inconsistent
view of state. Synchronisation can be used as a preventative approach in which incon-
sistent views are prevented from manifesting at the business level. Using the outcomes
defined in Section 2.2.2, any interaction can results in a business success, a business
failure or a technical failure. These outcomes are assigned the following precedence:
TechFail > BizFail > BizSucc
That is, failures take precedence over a success and technical failures are more severe
than business failures. This allows a framework to be established for synchronising the
outcomes of B2B interactions [MJSC07]. By performing a three-way handshake, two
participants can obtain a consistent view on the state of an interaction (using the above
precedence).
In doing so, inconsistent views can be prevented from manifesting at the business level.
BizSucc outcomes are never propagated to the business level where any participant is in
a failure state. Similarly, a BizFail outcome is never propagated to the business level if
any participant is in the TechFail state.
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Molina et al. augmented existing RosettaNet interactions to provide synchronisation
of outcomes while also maintaining business level autonomy and transparency [MJSC07].
This is done through the implementation of a conversation management layer (CML) at
lower levels, each participant is equipped with a CML that acts on their behalf. The CML
ascertains its organisation’s view on the outcome of an interaction and performs a three-
way handshake with other CMLs to ensure that a consistent outcome is propagated.
Figure 2.6 illustrates an example B2B interaction with the additional synchronisation
steps taken at the end of the interaction.
!Invoice
A CMLA B
Ack
Accept/Reject
CMLB
!Invoice !Invoice
Accept/Reject
Ack
Accept/Reject
Handshake
Propagate Propagate
Synchronisa>on
Ack Ack
Ack
Figure 2.6: Synchronisation of outcomes by CMLs on behalf of A and B
Molina et al. use the outcome of a conversation as the chosen point of synchronisation.
By choosing other points of synchronisation, it may be possible to obtain a stronger level
of consistency guarantee such as total consistency as discussed in Section 2.5.5.
This approach to synchronisation is an instance of consensus within a distributed
asynchronous system, the desire is to reach consensus in a finite time in the face of
temporary failures. However, it must be considered that if nodes are prone to failure,
reaching consensus in finite time in an asynchronous system can be impossible [FLP85].
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Even assuming nodes never fail but communications may temporarily fail, it may still
be impossible to establish consensus in finite time (two-army/last-ack problem)[Tan03].
There is a small risk that, by assuming temporary failures, an agreed outcome cannot
be reached, this risk can be arbitrarily reduced by increasing the timeouts used for all
communications [MJS06].
This thesis will not implement support for the consistency property. However, it
will be considered as proof that additional capabilities could be implemented such as
consistency support through synchronisation/consensus. Section 3.3.4 will discuss a
possible example consistency property and some of the complexities of supporting it
while ensuring support remains decoupled from specific B2B standards.
2.7 Survey of B2B Standards
While the proposed support o ered to B2B interactions in this thesis will be done so
independent of specific B2B standards, this following sections will survey existing B2B
standards in order to better generalise message exchange patterns, supported require-
ments and technical level elements discussed later in the thesis. The survey will ensure
the support o ered has a real world grounding and, with the rest of the work presented
in this chapter will be used to address the challenges identified in Section 1.5.
ebXML is surveyed as the general case for defining B2B interactions and their re-
quirements, RosettaNet and Open Travel Alliance will be surveyed as a subset of what
is expressible using ebXML and where they di er (or refine) ebXML specifications for
their own purposes.
The survey will discuss the following areas:
• A general overview discussing the aims and target audience of standard and relating
domain specific terminology to the general definitions in Section 2.1.
• An illustration of the standard’s B2B stack as a concretisation of the general B2B
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stack in Section 2.2, indicating any required technical level elements.
• What messages exchange patterns are used or supported in the construction of
conversations?
• What support is o ered for the following requirements and how well are the re-
quirements satisfied?:
– Security for messages and their delivery.
– Reliability for the reliable delivery of messages to their recipients.
– Accountability to ensure participants are bound to their actions.
– Fairness guarantees for all participants.
• How are the supported requirements specified for messages and conversations?
• Can business level requirement support be improved and if not, how can interme-
diary middleware better support the standard.
The survey will finish with a summary, demonstrating the suitability for a lower level
approach.
2.7.1 Surveyed Documents
The surveyed ebXML documents are:
1. ebXML Messaging Services 3.0 [OAS07b]
2. ebXML Business Process Specification Schema [OAS01a]
3. ebXML Messaging Services 3.0 Conformance Profiles [OAS07a]
4. ebXML Collaboration Protocol Profile and Agreement Specification [OAS02]
The surveyed RosettaNet documents are:
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1. RosettaNet Implementation Framework 2.0 [Ros02]
2. RosettaNet Partner Interface Process [Ros09]
The surveyed Open Travel Alliance documents is:
1. OpenTravel Schema 2011B [Ope11b].
2.8 Survey: ebXML
ebXML comprises a set of standards designed to allow the definition of arbitrary con-
versations and the processing of messages facilitating their execution. It makes recom-
mendations for how some business level requirements may be satisfied leaves imperative
details as a matter of conformance profiles [OAS07a]. Standards such as RosettaNet
and Open Travel Alliance can be represented as an agreed upon set of ebXML conversa-
tions and a conformance profile dictating how conversations are executed and supported,
discussed in Section 2.9.
Conformance profiles specify details relating to handling of business messages includ-
ing transports to use (e.g., HTTP), general messaging versions (e.g., SOAP 1.x) and
how requirements are supported (e.g., WS-Reliability for reliability, HTTPS for trans-
port security or algorithms for generating non-repudiation evidence). The separation of
functional and imperative concerns allows ebXML to be adapted to new situations are
required. Section 2.8.8 briefly discusses conformance profiles.
Collaboration profiles allow organisations to provide a profile of all of the ebXML
capabilities they support (e.g., conformance profiles). A collaboration profile agreement
is an agreed upon intersection of two collaboration profile documents, allowing organ-
isations to agree on what capabilities conversations they define can make use of. These
specified mechanisms allow organisations to quickly agree upon a on a common base of
understanding and begin developing conversations [OAS02].
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2.8.1 Terminology and Stack
ebXML’s terminology is similar to that introduced in Section 2.1, participants in may
be referred to as partners, business messages may also be called ebXML messages and
conversations are called business processes, still composed of sequences of exchanges.
Figure 2.7 relates the ebXML stack to the general B2B stack in Figure 2.1, the subsequent
list points correspond to their element in the figure.
A's$Business$Service
ebXML$Standards
SOAP$
with$A9achments
Business
Level
Technical
Level Transports
Delivery
A's$ebXML$Stack
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Figure 2.7: ebXML’s concretised B2B stack.
1. The ebXML Messaging Service and Business Process Specification Schema stand-
ards provide functional definitions for conversations and their requirements. Con-
formance and collaboration profiles allow organisations to agree upon how conver-
sations are executed and requirements supported.
2. All ebXML messages are encapsulated as SOAP messages (specifically SOAP with
Attachments [Wor00]). Conformance profiles dictate the version of SOAP (1.1 or
1.2 recommended). Their processing supports the use of any standards and tech-
niques applicable to SOAP messages, pending agreement with other participants
through collaboration profiles.
3. The ebXML Messaging Service standard abstracts away specific transport stand-
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ards and categorises all transports as one-way (e.g., SMTP) or two-way (e.g.,
HTTP). The use of HTTP, SMTP, FTP and even IIOP are discussed but ulti-
mately a result of conformance and collaboration agreements.
4. As with the transport layer, ebXML abstracts away specification of physical de-
livery as a matter of conformance and collaboration profile, or possibly a natural
consequence of the transports in use (e.g., HTTP over TCP/IP). TCP/IP and
UDP are highlighted as the most likely choices [OAS07b].
The ebXML Standards layer in Figure 2.7 can be further decomposed to illustrate how
the ebXML Messaging Service standard abstracts away messaging details, shown in
Figure 2.8 with subsequent discussion:
A's$Business$Service
Message$Service$Interface
ebXML
Messaging
Service
ebXML&MS&Components
(1)
(2)
(3)
Message$Processing
Transport$Interface
ebXML$BPSS
Figure 2.8: Layers of the ebXML Messaging Service.
1. The Messaging Service Interface marks the point at which a full formed ebXML
business message is passed from a business service for processing and delivery.
2. Message Processing involves extra processing required by the message, this may in-
volve the generation of signatures and receipts, encryption of contents or additional
SOAP-style operations on the ebXML message supported by WS-* standards.
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3. The Transport Interface provides a transport independent mechanism for ebXML
messages to be dispatched for delivery, a binding from the transport interface onto
specific standards such as HTTP, SMTP or FTP enables their use by ebXML
messaging.
Elements (3) and (4) of Figure 2.7, and elements (1), (2) and (3) of Figure 2.8 are spe-
cified by conformance and collaboration agreements between organisations. The ebXML
Messaging Service and ebXML Business Process Specification Schema abstract away
the imperative details of conversation execution and requirement support from their
specification.
2.8.2 Message Exchange Patterns
Conversations specified using ebXML are created by interacting organisations to suit
their specific needs. Their specification may be informed by documents such as the
ebXML catalog of common business processes, discussed later, but ultimately are the
responsibility of the interacting organisations. As with the general definitions in Section
2.1.2, conversations are defined as sequences of exchanges. The constituent exchange
patterns in ebXML consider two aspects:
Response required? Is any kind of response correlated to the original request required?
Push, Pull or Synchronous? Is the exchange categorised as push, pull or synchronous?
Based on these two aspects, ebXML considers the following exchange patterns: one-way
push, one-way pull, two-way push-then-push, two-way push-then-pull, two-way pull-then-
push and two-way synchronous. Two-way patterns can be considered in terms of the
one-way patterns:
For one-way push exchanges, some sender transmits a business message to a receiver
and the receiver responds with some kind of signal (e.g., acknowledgement of receipt,
proof of receipt or an exception).
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Business'Message
Business'Signal
A
Sender
B
Receiver
One$way(push
A
Sender
B
Receiver
Pull$Signal
Business(Message
Business$Signal
One$way(pull
Figure 2.9: One-way push and one-way pull exchange patterns.
For a one-way pull exchange, the receiver makes aware the sender that it is ready to
receive a business message. The sender then transmits its business message to the re-
ceiver who responds with a signal as in the one-way push exchange. Importantly, ebXML
requires that the pull signal and business message occur over the same connection.
That is, a two-way connection (e.g., HTTP), as discussed in Section 2.8.1 is required.
The supported two-way exchanges are compositions of the one-way patterns (i.e., push-
then-push, push-then-pull and pull-then-push). ebXML distinguishes two-way exchanges
by specifying that the second business message must make explicit reference to the first
(using its message identifier).
Request'Message
Business'SignalA
Ini$ator
B
ResponderResponse'Message
Business'Signal
Two$way'push$push
Figure 2.10: Two-way push-push exchange pattern.
Figure 2.10 illustrates a two-way push-then-push exchange, a composition of two one-
way push operations, the response message from the responder must contain an explicit
reference to the request message. The figure also indicates an association between the
first business signal (indicating the responder’s reaction to the request message) and the
58
2.8 Survey: ebXML Chapter 2
response message. ebXML states that the signal from the responder to initiator may
be piggy-backed on the response message, conformance and collaboration profiles can
strictly prohibit this behaviour if desired.
This optimisation may also be applied to the two-way pull-then-push pattern shown
in Figure 2.11 but not the push-then-pull pattern. The intervening pull signal from
initiator to responder prevents the business signal being piggy-backed onto the response
message.
Request'Message
Business'SignalA
Ini$ator
B
Responder
Response'Message
Business'Signal
Pull'Signal
Two$way'pull$push
Request'Message
Business'Signal
A
Ini$ator
B
Responder
Response'Message
Business'Signal
Pull'Signal
Two$way'push$pull
Figure 2.11: Two-way pull-push (left) and push-pull (right) exchange patterns.
The two-way synchronous exchange pattern is a synchronous execution of the two-way
push-then-push exchange, requiring the initiator to transmit its request message and
block its execution until the responder returns a response message and signal piggy-
backed together.
2.8.3 Security
The ebXML messaging service defines the format for ebXML business messages as an
extension to the SOAP with Attachments specification. As such, all applicable SOAP
security standards can be applied to ebXML messages. Additionally, all information
within an ebXML message, except that required to facilitate delivery to the intended
recipient, may be encrypted.
Messages are allowed to specify binary parameters requiring content security and
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transport security. Characteristic of ebXML’s approach, how this is achieved is left as
a matter of conformance and collaboration profiles. Standards such XML Encryption,
XML Signatures and HTTPS are discussed as suitable examples [Wor02, Wor08].
2.8.4 Reliability and Timeliness
ebXML discusses multiple methods for achieving reliable delivery including an ebXML
Reliable Messaging protocol and existing technologies designed to reliably deliver SOAP
messages. A message can specify that is requires reliable delivery alongside four para-
meters regarding the delivery and processing:
Time to Acknowledge Receipt: A deadline within which receipt of the message must
be acknowledged.
Time to Acknowledge Acceptance: A deadline by which the message must have fin-
ished processing and been acknowledged as such.
Time to Perform: A deadline by which a response message must be received for a re-
quest message and is measured from when the original message is successfully
transmitted.
Retry Count: The maximum number of times redelivery of a message may be attempted
in the face of timeouts and expired deadlines.
Retry count specifies may rather than will for redelivery as it may not be appropriate to
retransmit the original messages. For example, if a message has been acknowledged as
received but not as processed. The correct action here may be to abandon the interaction
altogether if some critical window of opportunity has expired, but this is a business level
decision.
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2.8.5 Accountability Support
ebXML allows messages to specify boolean parameters that they require non-repudiation
of origin, receipt or both. These parameters default to false. ebXML specifies that non-
repudiation of origin be attached to the outgoing message and must contain some form
of signature over it. The non-repudiation of receipt must contain a signature over the
original message and be returned in a signal indicating acknowledgement of receipt of
the message, possibly piggy-backed onto a response business message or signal.
By specifying that evidence must be attached to messages and responses, non-
repudiation support in ebXML is vulnerable to selective receipt as discussed in Section
2.5.2. The evidence generated may be susceptible to key revocation if conformance and
collaboration agreements in use do not mandate the involvement of a time-stamping
authority to witness evidence as discussed in Section 2.5.3.
2.8.6 Fairness Support
ebXML has no notion of fairness at the business level. Conversations could be designed
such that their flow guaranteed fairness but this places an expertise requirement on
participants, abandons separation of concern (the conversation itself implements fairness
as opposed to specifying it as a requirement) and will break business level transparency.
This does not preclude the use of lower level techniques to guarantee fairness, but such
support must maintain business level transparency.
ebXML does mention that TTPs may be involved in the execution of B2B interactions
but makes absolutely no assumptions to what extent and how this would be achieved.
The mechanisms for doing so are stated as entirely proprietary between interacting
organisations, there is no mechanism within conformance and collaboration profiles to
regarding TTP involvement.
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2.8.7 Extensibility Support
ebXML aims to be completely extensible in that new conformance and collaboration
profiles may be created and agreed upon by organisations. However, the lack of a
functional consideration for fairness, and the inability to specify TTP (specifically, TSA)
involvement means that conformance and collaboration profiles cannot protect against
issues including selective receipt and key revocation.
Furthermore, the adoption of new conformance profiles would require organisations to
commit to new conformance and collaboration agreements, possibly impacting existing
interactions specified using ebXML, this thesis aims to transparently support all existing
and new B2B interactions independently of specific standards, rendering this approach
entirely unsuitable.
2.8.8 Summary
ebXML leaves significant amount of room for organisations to agree on how best ex-
ecute conversations and support their requirements. However, the requirement that
non-repudiation evidence be attached to messages and the inability to specify TTP in-
volvement mean regardless of conformance profile in e ect, ebXML exchanges will always
be susceptible to selective receipt and key revocation.
The specification of certain business level requirements in functional terms (e.g., re-
quirement for non-repudiation of origin/receipt or requirement for secure transport)
is useful for inference in that functional requirements from ebXML can be aligned with
functional properties provided by support middleware, this allows domain specific know-
ledge to be capitalised upon and is discussed in Section 3.4 and 3.6.
Critically, however, is the possibility that all information in an ebXMLmessage (except
that required to deliver it to its intended recipient) may be encrypted. Intermediary
support must be able to provide the support it o ers to transmissions whose contents
are completely opaque to it. A message’s sender, recipient and unique identifier are left
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in the clear such that intermediaries are able to deliver messages onwards to their final
destination [OAS07b].
It is useful to consider o cial ebXML conformance profiles as they may indicate a
suitable set of transport protocols to support. AS4 represents the most recent o cial
conformance profile [OAS11] and it supports the use of transports including HTTP,
HTTPS and SMTP, these transport choices are also supported by RosettaNet and Open
Travel Alliance, discussed in the subsequent sections.
2.9 Survey: Domain Specific B2B Standards
RosettaNet and Open Travel Alliance (OTA) represent two domain specific B2B stand-
ards, designed to be completely prescriptive about all possible conversations between two
participants, how these conversations must be executed and how their requirements are
satisfied. These specifications allow organisations within a business domain to quickly
enable interactions with other compliant partners.
2.9.1 Terminology and Stack
OTA uses exactly the same terminology as ebXML while RosettaNet refers to par-
ticipants as (RosettaNet) partners. Messages are distinguished as either RosettaNet
messages or general messages and exchanges and conversations are termed activities
and Partner Interface Processes (PIPs) respectively. Figure 2.12 illustrates the Roset-
taNet stack as a concretisation of the general B2B stack described in Figure 2.1, with
subsequent list points discussing their corresponding element in the figure.
1. The RosettaNet Implementation Framework and Partner Interface Process stand-
ards [Ros02, Ros09] define fully a set allowed conversations and their requirements,
the syntax for conversations and messages and how the conversations and their re-
quirements must be executed.
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Figure 2.12: RosettaNet’s concretised B2B stack.
2. RosettaNet specifies that all RosettaNet content will be encapsulated using the
MIME message format, possibly Secure MIME (SMIME) if message security is
required.
3. RosettaNet specifies that compliant implementations should prefer to use HTTP
transport, possibly HTTPS if transport security is required. The use of SMTP is
also supported but due to SMTP secured using TLS being an ad-hoc combination,
HTTP should be preferred by organisations implementing their business services
to use RosettaNet.
4. RosettaNet assumes that TCP/IP is used to enact the delivery of messages, it does
not mandate it but says the semantics are undefined if transports use alternatives
for their delivery.
OTA specifies the same technical level elements of the stack as RosettaNet, OTAs equi-
valent of the RNIF and PIPs standard is the single OTA 2011B document [Ope11b].
Any organisation wishing to be interact using RosettaNet or OTA or will implement its
services using the chosen B2B standards and support their execution through the use of
the required technical level requirements (e.g., MIME, HTTP, SMTP and TCP/IP). All
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stack elements for RosettaNet and OTA can be expressed using ebXML conformance
and collaboration profiles.
2.9.2 Message Exchange Patterns
As with ebXML, conversations in RosettaNet and OTA are broken down into sequences
of exchanges. These exchanges fall into a number of predefined patterns. RosettaNet
specifies four exchange patterns of which all its conversations are composed. They are
classified by two factors:
Synchronicity Is the exchange synchronous or asynchronous?
Substantive Response Is there a substantive response to the initial business message
(i.e., a corresponding business message in response to the original request)?
These two factors lead to the definition of four exchange patterns: (1) synchronous one-
way, (2) synchronous two-way, (3) asynchronous one-way and (4) asynchronous two-way.
One-way exchange patterns constitute a business message being sent from some sender
to a recipient and the optional transmission of a business signal acknowledging receipt
of the message back to the sender. In the synchronous variant, the sender blocks until
the recipient responds.
Two-way exchange patterns constitute a sequence of two one-way exchanges (request
and response, performed synchronously or asynchronously). As with ebXML the re-
sponse must explicitly reference the request. If a response business message is trans-
mitted back to the initiator, it provides a signal acknowledging receipt of the response
message back to the responder.
OTA supports the same one-way and two-way exchanges except it does not allow
synchronous blocking. That is, it conversations may only be composed using asynchron-
ous one-way and two-way exchange patterns. RosettaNet specifies that synchronous
exchanges should only be used they can be completed quickly (within seconds).
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2.9.3 Security
RosettaNet messages comprise three header sections and a business payload. The pay-
load contains business documents (and optional attachments) being transmitted from
one participant to another. RosettaNet messages are constructed as a MIME Multi-
part/Related messages [Lev98] and may only be transmitted using HTTP, HTTPS or
SMTP [FGM+99, Res00, Kle01].
The header sections are separated by duty:
Preamble Header: identifying the version of RosettaNet in use
Delivery Header: identifying the sender, recipient, whether secure transport is required,
a timestamp for message creation and a unique message identifier
Service Header containing process context for a message including which specific PIP is
being executed, information about the transmitting and receiving business partner
and unused (as of the latest RNIF version) quality of service negotiation informa-
tion.
As with ebXML, all elements of a RosettaNet message apart from the Preamble and
Delivery headers may be encrypted. All RosettaNet messages are multipart MIME
messages and security is achieved using secure MIME (SMIME) [Lev98] and HTTPs
[Res00] where required. A secured version of SMTP exists [Hof02] but RosettaNet makes
no mention of it and does not support its use.
OTA uses the same messaging format as ebXML. That is, all OTA messages are SOAP
messages (SOAP with Attachments, specifically) to be transported using HTTP, HTTPS
or SMTP. The same techniques described in 2.8.3 are used to secure OTA messages and
their transport.
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2.9.4 Reliability and Timeliness
RosettaNet provides a subset of the reliability and timeliness parameters specified by
ebXML, with slightly restricted semantics:
Time to Acknowledge specifies a deadline within which a partner must acknowledge
the receipt of a message. This deadline begins counting down when a message has
successfully been transmitted.
Retry Count specifies the maximum number of times a message may be retransmitted
beyond the initial attempt, such a retransmission would occur if the Time to
Acknowledge deadline expired.
Time to Perform specifies a deadline within which an activity must be performed by
a receiving partner. That is, for any business document requiring a correspond-
ing response document, the deadline by which that response must be received at
the initial sender after the initial message has been acknowledged and processed.
For business documents requiring only acknowledgement (i.e., no corresponding
response document) this parameter will be ignored.
For RosettaNet’s synchronous actions, Time to Acknowledge and Time to Perform are
expected to be identical and no longer than an acceptable timeout for a typical HTTP
request. Retry Count is expected to be set to 0 as the synchronous connection blocks
until a response (valid or exceptional) is received or the connection breaks.
OTA supports the same reliability and timeliness parameters as ebXML, discussed in
Section 2.8.4, but it prohibits the use of ebXML’s reliable messaging capabilities.
2.9.5 Accountability Support
Accountability support in RosettaNet and OTA consists of the voluntary exchange of
non-repudiation evidence, exactly as with ebXML. Messages may specify boolean para-
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meters that they require non-repudiation of origin, receipt or both. These parameters
default to false.
The generation of the evidence is completely specified, using S/MIME message signa-
tures [Lev98] for RosettaNet and XMLSIG and XMLENC [Wor08, Wor02] without the
use of a TSA to protect against key revocation. Non-repudiation of receipt evidence must
contain an MD5 or SHA-1 digest of the original message. These pieces of evidence are
expected to be stored at each participant for an agreed upon amount of time (typically
three to seven years according to the ebXML, RosettaNet and OTA documents).
As per discussions in Section 2.5 and2.8.5, voluntary exchange and the lack of a TSA to
witness evidence renders the accountability support in RosettaNet and OTA susceptible
to selective receipt and key revocation.
As a final note the RosettaNet indicates that it intends to support an additional kind
of evidence demonstrating non-repudiation of routing by intermediaries in the future.
As of now, “hubs are responsible for solving this in private ways.”.
2.9.6 Fairness Support
RosettaNet and OTA have no notion of fairness at the business level, participants cannot
be guaranteed deterministic fairness by use of either standard. Any deviation from ex-
pected behaviour would constitute both non-compliance and break business level trans-
parency.
Additionally, the prescriptive nature of RosettaNet and OTAmeans it is not possible to
define a conversation whose explicit flow guarantees fairness, even though the approach
is unsuitable as per discussion in Section 2.8.6.
2.9.7 Extensibility Support
RosettaNet and OTA are fully prescriptive in the syntax and semantics of all aspects of
interaction including formats, protocols, transports and even cryptographic algorithms
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(i.e., how evidence is generated). In order to remain compliant, the observed behaviour
at the business level cannot deviate from what compliant participants expect as defined
by RosettaNet or OTA. Following the above, RosettaNet and OTA are not extensible
and no extra support can be provided at the business level without modifications to
the B2B standards themselves, motivating a lower level approach that can be applied
independent of specific B2B standards or versions.
2.9.8 Summary
Domain specific standards such as RosettaNet and OTA succeed in being prescriptive
in their definitions of possible conversations and exactly how these should be executed.
However, there remain issues such as those discussed in [HKVO07] relating to the het-
erogeneity that occurs even within predefined message formats. Optional parameters
can lead to situations in which organisations cannot be sure (or must otherwise agree)
on which subset of optional parameters they will both support. This extra agreement
is in direct contrast with the aims of removing all ambiguity. Haller et al. also high-
lighted RosettaNet’s lack of support for indicating the units of some parameters (e.g.,
currency) in their work, they attempt to solve this using an intermediary driven ap-
proach employing ontologies to automatically transform RosettaNet messages between
participants.
The lack of extensibility, susceptibility to selective receipt and key exchange motivate
the pursuit of a lower level approach, such as the intermediary middleware designed by
this thesis. By operating as transparent, decoupled intermediaries, stronger (and new)
kinds of support (e.g., fairness and accountability) can be o ered seamlessly to existing
and new domain specific B2B standards.
As a final comment on the ability of RosettaNet and OTA to be expressed as a subset
of ebXML, both domain specific standards make use of ebXML file formats for the
definition of all of their conversations. That is, all OTA and RosettaNet conversations are
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specifies in ebXML Business Process Specification files. Domain specific standards were
surveyed here to demonstrate that they share common concerns with general standards
for supporting their B2B interactions.
2.10 Summary of B2B Standards Survey
Section 2.8 and 2.9 demonstrated that while B2B standards acknowledge and attempt to
address common business level requirements, the mechanisms for doing so vary between
standards and may not adequately address concerns such as fairness and accountability,
demonstrated to be vital in supporting the regulation of B2B interactions in Section 1.2
and 2.5. The support for non-repudiation in ebXML, RosettaNet and OTA is specified
in such a way that does not protect against key revocation or selective receipt. These
issues motivate the pursuit of a lower level approach, such as transparent and decoupled
intermediaries designed and implemented in this thesis.
The most useful aspects of the survey are in the discovery of common transport proto-
cols, messaging formats and message exchange patterns. Chapter 3 and 4 will generalise
and integrate these findings into the middleware design such that the support remains
transparent, decoupled and asynchronous while supporting a useful range of B2B stand-
ards (e.g., by supporting common transports such as HTTP, HTTPs and SMTP and
understanding SOAP and MIME messages where possible).
While the contents of intercepted messages may be completely opaque (through con-
tent or transport security), there may be instances in which additional information con-
tained within a message is available to support intermediaries. The knowledge learned
from surveying specific standards can be used to enrich the functionality provided by
intermediaries (e.g., by allowing B2B standards level requirements to infer functional
properties o ered by intermediary support).
Briefly, surveying current B2B standards yielded a list of general message exchange
patterns, useful transports to facilitate transparent interception, common requirements
70
2.11 Cloud Computing Chapter 2
for supporting B2B interactions and demonstrated that a lower level approach is suitable
for providing stronger and additional guarantees to a range of existing B2B standards.
2.11 Cloud Computing
Section 2.3 discussed business services and security services and that providers of these
services are responsible for satisfying their infrastructure requirements. These infrastruc-
ture requirements can be broadly broken down into processing, storage and communic-
ation requirements. Service providers (e.g., security service providers) can use cloud
computing to provide any or all of these requirements, alleviating them from having to
deploy and maintain their own hardware. Cloud computing allows services to be de-
livered to cloud users (e.g., business and security service providers in this thesis) under
three models [AFG+10], listed in increasing level of abstraction:
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) where a provider o ers infrastructure level resources
(e.g., virtual machines, block storage and networks), on demand. The cloud user is
responsible for configuring OSs and execution environments of the infrastructure
provisioned to them.
Platform as a Service (PaaS) where a provider o ers a pre-configured platform (or exe-
cution environment) into which cloud users can deploy and execute their service(s).
The infrastructure underlying the provisioned platform is automatically scaled to
match demand such that the cloud user does not have to manually request and
allocate resources from the cloud provider.
Software as a Service where application software is provided to cloud users as a service
and the underlying platform and infrastructure are managed by the cloud provider.
The work carried out in this thesis is concerned with the use of IaaS and PaaS as an
enabler for deploying and executing security services which are composed to provide
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intermediary support. Security and Business services as described in Section 2.3 may
be provided under the SaaS model but where I am concerned with provisioning security
services, IaaS and PaaS are the only suitable methods for doing so in the cloud.
The benefits of using cloud computing include alleviating physical deployment require-
ments from a service provider, allowing services to be operated to a cost of only what
they consume (e.g., computation, bandwidth and storage), on demand scaling (in all
models of delivery) and elasticity. Elasticity refers to the ability to scale up and down
across all tiers of an application, that is, any part of the software may be scaled up and
down as needed independently of another. The ability to scale down is vital to prevent
underutilization and ensure cloud users are not charged for resources they do not need
or utilise. That is, when elements are scaled up to cope with a surge, they do not remain
scaled up longer than required at a cost to the cloud user.
Enabling elasticity depends on the model of cloud computing in use, under IaaS the
cloud user can simply request more virtual machines or increasingly powerful virtual
machines but this does not automatically software deployed on them will scale in the
manner required. Under PaaS elasticity can be more automated as the infrastructure
underlying specific aspects of the platform can be automatically scaled up and down as
required.
2.11.1 Trust, Privacy and Compliance
Santos et al. discussed the trust concerns users may have in deploying and developing
their applications to leverage cloud computing [SGR09]. The main concerns regard trust
in the cloud environment even against insider threat. That is, can a cloud user trust that
their execution environment within the cloud is secure (and trusted)? Privacy concerns
also factor in to critical data which at some point may exist unencrypted within the cloud
either in the memory of a virtual machine or stored on some cloud storage. Chapter
6 discusses work and approaches taken to securing execution environments within the
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cloud and addressing issues of trust.
Beyond trust and privacy concerns, cloud users deploying services within the cloud
must be aware of compliance issues. Legal issues regarding the storage and processing
of data (e.g., Payment Card Information Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) and Data
Protection Acts (DPA) in Europe and Health Information Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US) may a ect to what extent cloud
computing may be leveraged or how it is used [SW07].
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide solutions catering to specific compliance
legislation but the existence of such legislation makes required that hybrid approaches
must be available. That is, approaches in which elements of infrastructure are hosted
by a service provider or organisation. The design presented in Chapter 4 discusses
deployment and composition configurations for intermediary support allowing for these
hybrid approaches.
2.12 Related Work
2.12.1 Law Governed Interaction
Minsky and Ungureanu developed a system described as Law Governed Interaction (LGI)
representing one of the earliest attempts at to support regulation between autonomous
organisations [MU00]. Under this system, all organisations have their messages routed
through trusted controllers. These controllers contain a set of rules, machine readable
representations of some law to be enforced among the controllers.
When organisations (or agents, in their terminology) dispatch messages for delivery,
a controller intercepts the message and ensures that its contents and delivery will not
violate the defined rules and takes the appropriate action (the rules are captured as
event-condition-action statements). Thus, misbehaviour (against some globally agreed
upon laws) is prevented by the actions of the trusted controllers.
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The work enforces specific message formats, transports and a language for the expres-
sion of rules representing laws (a restricted form of Prolog). Critically, it requires all
possible state transitions (events) to be know such that event-condition-action rules can
be programmed for each event. While the work is not aimed specifically at supporting
conversations or B2B interactions, the principles of satisfaction (or enforcement) of re-
quirements by intermediaries acting on behalf of participants is similar to the technique
explored in this thesis.
The LGI implementation assumes one global set of laws to which everyone must ad-
here. Controllers facilitate this by storing control states (CS) for each agent. The CS for
each agent represents the actions they are allowed to take from their current state. Crit-
ically, the requirements apply to all participants and there is no capability for expressing
individual requirements per participant.
A Messages LGA
Organisa-on/A
Gateway/Provider
Laws:
Events
Condi+ons
Ac+ons
C Messages LGC
Organisa-on/C
DMessagesLGD
Organisa-on/D
BMessagesLGB
Organisa-on/B
Figure 2.13: Each LG gateway acts to ensure only legal (valid) actions on behalf of its
organisation.
The intermediary support in this thesis supports organisations both individual require-
ments and decoupled operation. That is, organisations are free to use whichever B2B
standard(s) they desire (and associated messaging and transport standards) and express
their own requirements about how their interactions are supported. Additionally, the
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support can be provided without the requirement for prior knowledge about all possible
interactions. Section 3.6 will demonstrate that any interaction can be supported without
any requirement of knowledge regarding the conversation it belongs to.
2.12.2 Conversation Support for Business Process Integration
Hanson et al. commented on the value of supporting B2B interactions at lower levels
of abstraction, specifically that organisations be allowed to retain autonomy and “sov-
ereignty” in their business level operations [HNK02]. Their work expresses business
conversations (including converting existing conversations) as state machines known as
conversation policies (CPs), these policies are described as machine readable repres-
entations of message exchange patterns. Similarly to Section 2.2 they identify B2B as
consisting of separate layers including high (business) and low (support) levels.
Gateways are provisioned to act on behalf of interacting organisations, messages flow
through these gateways who act to enforce the expected flow of a CP (i.e., that attempted
state transitions are allowed). The gateways enable interoperability and interworking
by allowing organisations to engage in conversations over di erent transports and B2B
standards. In a sense, the work functions as an enterprise service bus through which
all messages pass and conversation flow is enforced for the participants. Messages not
adhering to the expected flow will never propagate to the business level. Figure 2.14
illustrates the approach, showing that only valid and expected messages are passed back
to A.
The desire to allow organisations to retain autonomy is beneficial as they are freed
to use the most suitable standards and conversations supporting their interactions. The
o ered interoperability and interworking across multiple transports and B2B standards
is theoretically an enabler for collaboration between organisations. However, the require-
ment that all conversations must be translated into a corresponding CP representation
represent integration and expertise requirements upon interacting organisations. For ex-
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Figure 2.14: CPa acts on behalf of A to prevent it from seeing late or unexpected business
messages.
ample, they would have to ensure that CPs representing conversations were valid, that
the same conversations using di erent B2B standards resulted in the same generation
of the same CP and ensuring CPs are updated whenever conversation definitions are
modified.
The CPs in the work presented allow the contents, order and delivery deadlines for
messages in a conversation to be defined but do not support the expression of other
business requirements. This means the gateways do not allow an individual organisa-
tion’s requirements to be supported. The work focuses purely on ensuring the expected
order (and timing) of conversations by preventing unexpected or late messages from be-
ing propagated to the business level. Requirements such as fairness, accountability and
consistency are not supported or discussed.
Additionally, the functionality of the gateways relies completely on the ability to
understand the contents of intercepted messages such that the state of a conversation can
be discerned. This requires that some contents of the business message are unencrypted
(or can be decrypted). The intermediary support middleware developed in this thesis
enables support for all B2B interactions including transmissions whose contents are
opaque. However, where the contents of a transmission are available, domain specific
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knowledge will be capitalised upon in order to improve support.
In summary, the approach enforces transparency and allows the underlying B2B stand-
ard, messaging formats and transport protocols to be abstracted away. The caveat is
that the gateways are not decoupled in so much as they require the contents of a message
to be both available and understood to discern conversation state and prevent invalid
messages and actions.
The support o ered in this work is improved over LGI, discussed in the previous sec-
tion, in that individual supports for organisations can be addressed. That is, the CPs
used are specific to the message flow expected in and out of the supported organisa-
tion. This thesis will further improve support by enforcing decoupling, allowing opaque
transmissions to be supported, and by allowing intermediaries to provide other kinds of
support (e.g., fairness and accountability).
2.12.3 FIDES Fair Exchange System
The FIDES system represents a bespoke client-server based approach to implementing
non-repudiation between organisations [NZB04], completely abandoning transparency
and automation in favour of providing strong fairness guarantees. Each organisation
deploys a FIDES server within their own infrastructure and FIDES client software within
their business level. The FIDES client provides an interface into which items can be
uploaded and their recipient designated. The recipient must also use the FIDES system
and have their own FIDES servers and clients configured.
The FIDES client will engage an organisation’s local FIDES server to communicate
with the recipient’s FIDES server to execute some protocol (engaging with FIDES TTP
servers to guarantee fairness where required) to non-repudiably transmit information
from sender to recipient. The specific non-repudiation protocols employed by FIDES
produce transparent evidence, discussed in Section 2.6.3, avoiding situations in which
ascertaining TTP involvement may cause inadvertent discrimination again a participant.
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Figure 2.15: Organisations employ FIDES clients, servers and TTPs to facilitate non-
repudiable exchange of information.
A drawback to this approach is that no modes of interaction with the FIDES servers
are o ered except the FIDES client application. This makes it impossible to integrate
FIDES into an automated B2B flow. Manual intervention would be required to load each
document generated by a business service into the FIDES client, specify its recipient
and then invoke the exchange. Similarly, the recipient would have to take the received
document and feed it into their receiving business service. This breaks business level
transparency and introduces potentially redundant information. For example, a business
document will contain information about its recipient, this information must then be
(correctly) duplicated in the FIDES client interface in order to deliver the document to
its intended destination.
FIDES uses the Java Messaging Service (JMS) standard for all of its communication
within and between organisations, Section 5.3 contains a detailed summary of why JMS
is ill-suited to facilitating communication between di erent organisations. Specifically,
it lacks a standardised remote addressing mechanism and specifies no transport or wire
level format, meaning two vendors’ implementations of the same JMS reference API will
be incompatible, causing tight coupling between organisations wishing to employ the
non-repudiation support o ered. Furthermore, it does not render all JMS deliveries non-
repudiable, it simply uses JMS to facilitate its own application level messages resulting
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in the non-repudiable delivery of some business item(s) from sender to recipient. This
thesis will extend on FIDES by supporting automation, provision of support independent
of specific B2B standards, asynchronous operation and the use of multiple messaging
standards
2.12.4 Interceptor Based support for Non-repudiation Protocols
Cook [Coo06] (and Cook et al. subsequently in [CRS06]) developed interceptor-based
support to execute non-repudiation protocols in the delivery of SOAP and Java En-
terprise Edition 2.0 (J2EE) messages. Di erent non-repudiation protocols are used to
render service invocations and updates to shared information non-repudiable. The sys-
tem employs one interceptor per participant, responsible for execution NR protocols
and engaging with TTPs where required). Under this work all components of an or-
ganisation’s intermediary are co-located with their business services and the interceptor
components are configured as part of the organisation’s J2EE or SOAP stacks.
In addition to the execution of non-repudiation at lower levels, allowing organisations
to retain autonomy at their business level operation (and ensuring business level trans-
parency), business level validation results may be fed into the lower level non-repudiation
support to trigger early protocol termination when a business level failure has occurred.
Mechanisms for doing this are provided specifically for the technologies used in the imple-
mentations (SOAP and J2EE), Section 4.6 discusses similar aspects in the consideration
of how to deal with events that cross layers of abstraction and whether these should be
hidden, passed up or invoke other actions.
The support o ered by the interceptors functions in a synchronous manner and inter-
mediaries acting on behalf of organisations must all be online at the same time to execute
the non-repudiation protocol. In a sense, the work acts to guarantee non-repudiation for
object invocation middleware (it renders the invocations non-repudiable). The work was
specifically written to deal with J2EE and SOAP messaging although the design can be
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Figure 2.16: Intermediaries deployed within organisations interact (synchronously) to
execute non-repudiation protocols for service invocations.
adapted to other technologies. The intermediary support in this thesis is designed such
that additional properties can be provided to multiple messaging and transport formats
and standards, presuming interactions using them can be intercepted. Chapter 3 and 4
discuss these issues in more detail.
Cook’s work represents an improvement over the FIDES work in that it supports
automated operation in existing and new B2B interactions and the use of more than
one non-repudiation protocol to address di erent situations (non-repudiable service in-
vocation vs non-repudiable updates to share information). Cook’s work was used as
a starting point for this thesis, we seek to expand upon the approach by providing a
generalised middleware in which the previous work can be expressed as a mapping of
functional properties (e.g., accountability) to a set of protocols (e.g., non-repudiation).
Section 4.12 demonstrates Cook’s work can be expressed as an instance of deployment
and composition within the middleware designed by this thesis. Beyond this, middle-
ware designed in this thesis will operate asynchronously and be constructed in such a
way that it can employed by an organisation simply by being placed in the delivery path
of its messages, as opposed to requiring integration into their B2B stack.
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2.12.5 Accountability as a Service for the Cloud
Yao et al. propose a solution to provide accountability as a service to interacting parti-
cipants [YCW+10]. The work defines two domains, the business service domain (BSD)
and the accountability service domain (ASD), referring to both domains as part of a
Trusted Service Oriented Architecture (TSOA). The ASD contains one or more ac-
countability services, supplied with accountability evidence for each action taken by all
participants. That is, for a message transmitted from A to B, A is expected to send
accountability evidence to accountability services within the ASD. All evidence is gen-
erated by the interacting organisations and there is an assumption that this evidence
is irrefutable but no discussion of how to achieve this. In the face of a dispute, one or
more accountability services within the same domain would reach consensus and provide
a decision on who was to be held account as a resolution of the dispute.
A Business(Messages
Accountability₁
Organisa4on(A
Accountability(Domain
CBusiness(Messages
Organisa4on(C
B
Organisa4on(B
Accountability₂ Accountability₃
Concensus
Evidence(Submission
Figure 2.17: Yao’s work
An issue here is the lack of fairness guarantees, all evidence submission is voluntary.
Any participant providing evidence during in an interaction is provided with no guar-
antees that others will do the same, in the case of a dispute it becomes impossible to
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say a participant who did not provide evidence specifically did misbehave (i.e., a lack
of evidence of behaviour does not constitute evidence of misbehaviour) and agreements
can become unenforceable. Work in this thesis seeks to address accountability and
fairness guarantees such that agreements always remain enforceable and well behaved
participants are never placed at a disadvantage as a result of correct behaviour.
When contrasted with the aims of this thesis in Section 1.5, the lack of transparency
requires that organisations augment their business level operation specifically to gener-
ate and emit the accountability evidence associated with every action they take. The
intermediary support designed in this thesis allows these operations to be undertaken by
intermediaries but also supports the use case that an organisation may wish to generate
and emit their own evidence (e.g., limited trust in intermediaries or wishing to retain
private keys used to generate accountability evidence), discussed in Section 4.10.
The approach taken by Yao could be encapsulated within the intermediary based
design developed in this thesis. In such a scenario, intermediaries acting on behalf
of participants would generate and submit evidence on their behalf to accountability
services. This would allow Yao’s system to be used transparently but does not address
the lack of fairness guarantees where other participants are not completely trusted.
Section 4.12 discusses the encapsulation of Yao’s work within the generalised design
proposed in this thesis.
Yao’s approach is useful in that the protocol execution is o oaded in a decoupled man-
ner and abstracted away from organisations (i.e., “as a Service”). Evidence is provided
to the accountability domain and decisions are emitted from the accountability domain
where required.
Work in this thesis goes a step further by supporting the case where the evidence
generation, submission and storage can be transparently encapsulated at lower levels
but still be available to organisations should they need it. In this sense, the technical
layer of the thesis can be considered the provision of supportive properties as services
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(e.g., accountability as a service, fairness as a service, consistency as a service), with
intermediaries serving to transparently encapsulate the invocation of these services on
behalf of interacting participants. Chapter 4 and 5 will discuss this approach to invoking
underlying support.
2.12.6 Extending Messaging with Application Conditions
Tai et al. propose an architecture in which conditions can be annotated onto outgoing
messages as metadata to be satisfied in the course of their delivery[TMRS02]. The
satisfaction of these conditions is performed and verified by one or more intermediaries
in the delivery of a message from its sender to recipient. This system is unique among
the surveyed related work in that it allows the sender of a message to express their
individual requirements on any outgoing message and have them satisfied by the lower
levels of the system. The strict use of only message oriented middleware (specifically
using only queues and topics for point-to-point and publish-subscribe communication
respectively) renders the approach asynchronous.
In the face of no intermediaries to provide additional support for the expressed con-
ditions, messages are delivered as they would have been normally with no additional
support available. I discuss the inclusion of this consideration in Section 4.4 when con-
sidering interaction with an organisation who does not employ intermediary support for
their B2B interactions. In such cases, strict transparency would dictate that interactions
continue unsupported (alternatives are also discussed in which an organisation may opt
not to continue interacting if properties cannot be guaranteed).
The work is not targeted specifically at B2B and as such, the example requirements
are proof of concept (examples include deadlines for delivery and ensuring a minimum
number of recipients). However, the design presents useful considerations for adding
support to existing message oriented systems while preserving transparency at higher
level of abstraction (e.g., business level transparency).
83
2.13 Summary Chapter 2
2.12.7 Summary of Related Work
The related work represents approaches that attempt to satisfy single properties [YCW+10,
CRS06, NZB04], use intermediaries to ensure established conditions are not violated for
observed interactions [MU00, HNK02] or allow individual messages to express additional
capabilities [TMRS02]. Yao’s work presents useful considerations for separation of sup-
port o ered (e.g., accountability as a service) from its invocation (e.g., an intermediary
whose purpose is to transparently encapsulate the invocation of services on behalf of
some organisation).
The middleware developed in this thesis will demonstrate that individual concerns
can be addressed by the mapping of functional properties to technical protocols within
middleware intermediaries. By addressing the challenges of transparency, loose coupling
and asynchronicity (as discussed in Section 1.5), the support will be demonstrated as
applicable to all B2B interactions and more generally, any message oriented interactions.
Section 6.3 will discuss applications beyond messaging middleware for future work.
2.13 Summary
This chapter introduced terminology, concepts and assumptions regarding the execution
and support B2B interactions and their regulation. Fairness, accountability and con-
sistency were demonstrated as useful concerns to address for B2B interactions alongside
technical protocols capable of satisfying these requirements. The B2B standards survey
motivated the lower level intermediary approach explored by this thesis.
The B2B standards survey and related work inform decisions taken in the theoretical
and practical elements of this thesis and serve as a base from which useful generalisations
can be made. These generalisations are discussed throughout Chapter 3 and 4.
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3 Generalisation of Survey and Background
to Enable Support
This chapter combines surveyed B2B standards, identified support concerns, technical
protocols and related work to generalise message exchange patterns, common require-
ments, example functional properties and declaration mechanisms. The generalisations
and mechanisms are used to design and implement the intermediary support middleware
in Chapter 4 and 5.
Section 3.1 generalises the exchange patterns that are characteristic of B2B conver-
sations expressed by the surveyed standards. These exchange patterns are decomposed
into the constituent units of communication when dealing with B2B interactions. By
supporting the smallest unit of interaction, support for bigger units of interaction can be
composed. Section 3.2 generalises the common requirements supported by surveyed B2B
standards. These generalisations are compared to the concerns of fairness, accountability
and consistency motivated in Section 2.5.
Section 3.3 proposes hierarchies mapping properties of fairness, accountability and
consistency to technical protocols that provide their satisfaction with varying character-
istics. These mappings will be realised by the implementations in Chapter 5.
Section 3.4 introduces the declaration mechanisms allowing the specification of when
supported properties (e.g., accountability) should be satisfied for intercepted interac-
tions. Two methods of declaration are discussed allowing individual transmissions to be
annotated with extra requirements and allowing the creation of decoupled rules ca be
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matched against any intercepted transmission to see if support should be satisfied.
Section 3.5 and 3.6 contain discussions around supporting individual business trans-
missions as the fundamental unit of business communication and the various ways in
which the declaration mechanisms may be used such that support can be o ered to
opaque transmissions, capitalise on business level information where available and even
support new B2B standards through the use of content matching.
3.1 Generalised Message Exchange Patterns
All surveyed standards classified one and two-way exchanges as the exchange of a single
business message or the exchange of two related business messages respectively. The
survey demonstrated that the two-way exchanges can be decomposed into two (related)
one-way associations. The one-way exchanges can be further decomposed into sequences
of transmissions. Figure 3.1 illustrates the decomposition:
A B
Request
Signal
Response
Signal
A B
Exchange21
Exchange22
A B
Transmission
Transmission
Transmission
Transmission
Conversa)on Exchanges Transmissions
Figure 3.1: Recursive decomposition of conversations and exchanges.
By supporting individual business level transmissions, support can be provided to
exchanges (as sequences of transmissions) and conversations (as sequences exchanges).
Section 3.5 discusses supporting individual transmissions and fairness and accountability
concerns.
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3.2 Generalised Business Requirements
The B2B standards survey demonstrated that supported conversations are allowed to
specify similar types of requirements addressing areas including reliability, security,
timeliness, non-repudiation and consistency. This section discusses those common re-
quirements such that the example properties for fairness, accountability and fairness
may be defined in Section 3.3, attempting to provide stronger guarantees where B2B
standards and generalised requirements fall short.
3.2.1 Reliability
Reliability concerns to messages and conversations are generally tackled in two ways.
The first is a binary requirement that a message should be ’reliably transmitted’, usually
involving the invocation of some reliable delivery mechanisms (e.g., ebXML reliable
delivery protocol) designed to achieve at-least-once message delivery.
To maintain business level transparency, underlying support intermediaries must use
transports compatible with the business level requirements of standards in use. Reliable
messaging protocols invoked at (or by) the business level remain a business level concern
and will ultimately be delivered to recipients as individual transmissions.
3.2.2 Timeliness
The timeliness of message delivery, acknowledgement and processing is facilitated by the
following parameters:
Timeout A timeout is the length of time after which a single delivery attempt of a
message should be considered to have failed
Deadlines for Acknowledgement defines a deadline by which the receipt of a message
must be acknowledged to the sender by its recipient
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Deadlines for Processing defines a deadline by which the recipient of a message must
have processed the contents of a message acknowledge this fact to its sender
Retry Count The retry count dictates the number of times attempted retransmission of
a message should occur in the face of timeouts or communication failures
Ignore Duplicates Repeated attempted delivery may result in the delivery of duplicate
messages to an organisation, this field indicates that duplicates should be dis-
carded, guaranteeing at-most-one processing of a message
The passing of deadlines or timeouts will result in the retransmission of a message until
the specified retry count has been reached.
These parameters are business level concerns but underlying support middleware must
be mindful that its functionality (e.g., the execution of additional protocols to provide
support) does not cause timeouts or deadlines to expire. Section 5.5.5 discusses typical
lifespans and deadlines of B2B conversations and compares them to timing measurements
taken from implementations to evaluate the impact of providing extra support to B2B
interactions.
3.2.3 Security
The end-to-end security of messages exchanged during interactions is ensured through
two means:
Content Security in which the partial or entire contents of a message are encrypted.
This allows their delivery over insecure channels without compromising their con-
tents. Where content security is in place, minimal information about the message
must be left unencrypted to facilitate its delivery. This minimal information com-
prises: the identity of the sender, identity of the recipient and the unique message
identifier.
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Transport Security is designed so that the contents of all transmissions across a channel
do not have their contents compromised. Where content security allows messages
to be transmitted over unsecured channels, transport security allows the transport
of unencrypted messages over secured channels without compromising their con-
tents. As with content security, the sender, recipient and message identifier of the
message are always known.
Intermediary support must be able to function using the minimal available information
for intercepted transmissions although other information may be used where available, to
enrich functionality. Section 3.6 discusses capitalising on available business information
while ensuring support can be o ered to all transmissions.
3.2.4 Accountability
All surveyed B2B standards acknowledge accountability and attempt to satisfy it using
non-repudiation evidence. All standards mandate this evidence is exchanged voluntarily
owing to the complexities of specifying TTP involvement and guaranteeing fairness. As
such, all standards support two binary properties:
Non-repudiation of Origin Required indicating whether a sender is expected to provide
evidence binding itself to the origin of a given message
Non-repudiation of Receipt Required indicated whether a recipient is expected to provide
evidence binding itself to the receipt of a given message
The surveyed standards (including real world ebXML conformance profiles) specify the
generation of evidence that is both susceptible to key revocation and exchange without
fairness guarantees.
Intermediary support in this thesis will consider the appearance of requirement for any
kind of non-repudiation evidence as an indication that accountability should be provided
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for both participants with the strongest guarantees necessary, protecting against selective
receipt and key revocation issues as discussed in Section 2.5.
3.2.5 Fairness
The surveyed B2B standards have no business level notion of fairness, this is due to the
complexity of guaranteeing fairness itself and the impacts it would have on allowable
conversations. That is, fairness for B2B interactions can be provided when there is at
least one transmission in either direction between two participants.
The importance of fairness, discussed in Section 2.5.2, prompts the discussion in Sec-
tion 3.5 about how fairness can be provided by individual transmissions. This is achieved
by maintaining the business level abstraction of an individual transmission while alter-
ing the operation at technical levels. Where insu cient levels of trust are expressed,
intermediary support will attempt to provide the strongest levels of fairness it is capable
of.
3.2.6 Consistency
As with fairness, the surveyed standards have no business level notion of consistency
requirements. However, they do acknowledge notifications mechanisms are required to
invoke corrective measures when problems (such as inconsistency) are detected.
Section 2.6.4 discussed that where consensus can be quickly and unambiguously es-
tablished, the time to detect failures or inconsistencies can be reduced or even prevented
from manifesting at the business level.
The cost of synchronisation means that the frequency with which it occurs may have
an impact on deadlines, timeouts and a conversation’s overall execution time. Section
3.3.4 discusses potential characteristics of consistency as a property to address these
issues.
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3.2.7 Summary of Generalised Requirements
Reliability and timeliness concerns prove di cult to provide additional support for as
they closely coupled to the business level. That is, the expiration of deadlines or timeouts
will generally trigger a business level redelivery of a message. From a technical level
perspective this constitutes an entirely new transmission and should be supported as
such.
Intermediary support should, naturally, attempt to minimise its impact on the delivery
of a message (e.g., avoid causing message delivery to fail), Section 4.5 more thoroughly
discusses the possible e ects of intermediaries on deadlines, timeouts and processing.
Similarly, little additional support can be o ered to the two security options for mes-
sages. If a message requires content security, it will have been encrypted before being
routed through the intermediary support, thus the intermediary needs only pass the
message onwards once it has finished processing the data (e.g., executed the required
protocols to satisfy the desired support). Where transport security is required, the
intermediaries must support the transport being used and allow its secure operation.
Fairness, accountability and consistency all represent concerns that can be aided by
intermediary support. Accountability and fairness can, notably, be provided to any
transmission even if the contents are encrypted. For the above reasons, accountability
and fairness properties are defined in the next section and implemented in Chapter 5.
Discussion of consistency as a property is included in the next section as an example of
how the design proposed in Chapter 4 could be extended to provide additional support.
3.3 Fairness, Accountability and Consistency as Functional
Property Hierarchies
Section 2.5 motivated the satisfaction of fairness, accountability and consistency when
supporting B2B interactions. The previous section demonstrated that intermediary sup-
91
3.3 Fairness, Accountability and Consistency as Functional Property HierarchiesChapter 3
port provides an ideal place to transparently provide support for these concerns. This
section defines hierarchies of functional properties for satisfying fairness, accountabil-
ity and consistency with varying characteristics and which protocols are used to satisfy
those combinations. Trust will be used as the determining factor for when fairness is
required (both as a property and as a characteristic of accountability).
3.3.1 Expressing Levels of Trust
This work uses the three levels of trust discussed in Section 2.5.1.
For the purposes of fairness guarantees, semi-trusted participants are considered un-
trusted. That is, fairness guarantees will only be relaxed in the presence of complete
trust. Semi-trusted means an entity is expected to misbehave on their own but will
not collaborate to do so, this reflects the concern that most organisations will privilege
protecting their own interests above engaging in an interaction.
Importantly, these trust properties are not symmetric, a sender may have complete
trust in a recipient while the recipient has no trust in the sender. The support for each
organisation to specify their own declarations allow this expression.
Table 3.1 defines the values representing the trust relationship between two parti-
cipants.
Characteristic Example
FullyTrusted Sender’s complete trust in recipient
SemiTrusted Sender’s semi-trust in recipient
UnTrusted Sender does not trust recipient
Table 3.1: Functional characteristics representing varying levels of Trust
Where unspecified, the default trust relationship between participants is assumed to
be UnTrusted, requiring be it explicitly established by declaration where complete trust
is present.
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It is possible that these three levels are too coarsely grained and a more suitable metric
for trust could be used. Potentially some probability 0 Æ p Æ 1 that a recipient can
be trusted, Section 2.4 and 6.3 discuss di erent possibilities for expressing trust metrics
between di erent participants.
3.3.2 Fairness Hierarchy
Figure 3.2 illustrates the hierarchy of fairness characteristics identified by this work.
These match the definitions provided in the discussion of fairness in section 2.5.2. Table
3.2 summarises the characteristics shown in the hierarchy.
Characteristic Description
Probabilistic No deterministic fairness guarantees, some p offairness after an exchange
Deterministic Fairness is guaranteed during or after an exchange
Strong Fairness is never violated during an exchange
Weak Fairness may be lost during an exchange but mustbe subsequently recovered
Transparent Involvement by TTP is indistinguishable
Optimistic TTP is only involved when required
Table 3.2: Characteristics for the Fairness property
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Fairness
FullyTrustedSemiTrustedUntrusted
Strong Weak Op7mis7c
Determinis7c Probabilis7c
Transparent
MPFE>Protocol
[ASW96]
P1
[VPG99]
P2,>P3
[VPG99]
P4,>P5,>P6
[VPG99]
P7,>P8
[VPG99]
Property(↑
Characteris0cs(↓
Protocols(↓
No#protocol#
required
Trust(→
Figure 3.2: Fairness property hierarchy
While omitted for clarity, some protocols from [VPG99] satisfy multiple deterministic
characteristics, summarised in the Table 3.3:
Protocol Characteristics Satisfied
P3, P5 Deterministic, Weak, Optimistic
P6 Deterministic, Strong, Optimistic
P7 Deterministic, Weak, Transparent, Optimistic
P8 Deterministic, Strong, Transparent, Optimistic
Table 3.3: Multiple characteristics satisfied by fair exchange protocols in [VPG99].
3.3.3 Accountability Hierarchy
Figure 3.3 illustrates the hierarchy of properties, characteristics and protocol mappings
for accountability.
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Figure 3.3 indicates the protocols used to satisfy accountability with varying charac-
teristics. Table 3.4 summarises the hierarchy.
Protocol Name Characteristics Satisfied
Co ey-Saidha UnTrusted or SemiTrusted, Fairness,
Deterministic, Strong(Inline)
Zhou-Gollman UnTrusted or SemiTrusted, Fairness,
Deterministic, Strong(Online)
Weak Protocol in [ZG97a] UnTrusted or SemiTrusted, Fairness,
Deterministic, Weak
Kremer-Markowitch UnTrusted or SemiTrusted, Fairness,
Deterministic, Strong, Optimistic
Markowitch-Kremer UnTrusted or SemiTrusted, Fairness,
Deterministic, Strong, Optimistic, Transparent
Mitsiani UnTrusted or SemiTrusted, Fairness, Probabilistic
Voluntary Exchange FullyTrusted, Voluntary
Table 3.4: Non-repudiation protocols and the Accountability characteristics they satisfy
The Zhou-Gollman protocol [ZG97b] is not indicated in Figure 3.3 for the sake of
space, it would occupy the same space as the Co ey-Saidha protocol. It would also be
possible to insert additional characteristics into the hierarchy to force the use of protocols
with Inline or Online TTP requirements.
The fairness hierarchy in Figure 3.2 can be seen within the accountability hierarchy
shown in Figure 3.3. This references the discussion in Section 2.5.4 where accountability
and fairness are guaranteed for transmissions to protect both during and after exchanges.
The implementations in Chapter 5 will default to providing deterministic strong fair-
ness where finer grained fairness characteristics are unspecified. That is, probabilistic or
weak protocols will only ever be used when explicitly specified.
This hierarchy serves as an example mapping of functional properties (and character-
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istics) to technical protocols, implemented in Chapter 5 to satisfy fairness and account-
ability requirements, acting as proof of concept of the approach to supporting multiple
B2B support properties specified in this manner.
3.3.4 Partial Consistency Hierarchy
Consistency presents an interesting discussion with regards to provisioning it within
intermediary support. Section 2.6.4 described the use of a three-way handshake on the
outcome of an interaction. Specifically, the synchronisation takes place to ensure the
outcome with the highest precedence (TechFail > BizFail > BizSucc) is the one that is
propagated to the business level.
This section considers a partial consistency hierarchy as an example of a direction
the intermediary support could be extended in. Table X defines the characteristics and
Figure Z illustrates the hierarchy.
Characteristic Description
Outcome The outcome of an interaction must be consistentfor all participants
Total Participants must maintain a consistent state at alltimes during interactions
Table 3.5: Characteristics for the Consistency property
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Consistency
OutcomeTotal
Unclear Three3way5
Handshake
[MJSC07]
Property(↑
Characteris0cs(↓
Protocols(↓
Figure 3.4: Consistency property hierarchy
The reason consistency is explored as an example property rather than implemen-
ted, as fairness and accountability are in Chapter 5, is that the approach specified by
[MJSC07] cannot be applied in a decoupled manner to intercepted transmissions. That
is, intermediaries would require that all messages be sent unencrypted, or could be de-
crypted and must also be able to discern which conversation is being executed and at
what stage the current execution is. This also implies that intermediaries are aware
of all possible conversations that can occur, where the aim of this thesis is to produce
intermediaries that can support transmissions independent of their B2B standard in-
cluding which conversation(s) are being executed with the optional ability to capitalise
on conversation definitions to enhance functionality.
An approach that provided consistency that could be applied independently to B2B
interactions, the characteristic of total consistency could be tackled by adding new points
of synchronisation. For example, after every transmission or after every exchange. This
would incur communication and computational overheads but could allow consistency
to be maintained for participants during an entire interaction.
The development of suitable protocols to satisfy consistency is beyond the scope of
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this thesis, its consideration as a property is to indicate ways in which the proposed
intermediary support could be extended where applicable protocols are available.
3.4 Declaration Mechanisms
This section discusses two mechanisms by which organisations can specify which available
functional properties should be satisfied for their intercepted transmissions: predicates
and annotations.
Declaration via predicates are defined as pairings of predicates and functional proper-
ties (and their characteristics). Intercepted transmissions are tested against the specified
predicate to be if the paired functional properties should be satisfied for it. Section 3.4.1
and 3.4.2 provide generalised abstractions upon which the predicates may be construc-
ted to match intercepted transmissions. 3.4.3 will demonstrate example predicates and
discuss their application.
Declaration via annotation encapsulates a business transmission and annotates the
desired properties onto the encapsulated transmission, the intermediary support will
unpack the original transmission and delivery it to ensure business level transparency is
maintained. Annotations are discussed in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Generalised B2B Abstractions
The following abstractions are generalised from the surveyed B2B standards:
• Message Identifier
• Conversation Name
• Conversation Version
• Conversation Identifier
• Business Identity (minimally of sender and recipient)
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• Business Role
• Business Requirement
• Raw Business Message
• Raw Conversation Definition
For all transmitted messages the following parameters are always unencrypted: business
identity of sender, business identity of recipient and message identifier. These are re-
quired to facilitate delivery even if all remaining data and metadata is encrypted. All
B2B standards analysed express this requirement and I assume it to be true for all
messages under the message oriented middleware paradigm.
Conversation name and version apply to the definitions of conversations whereas
conversation identifier is used to identify messages as belonging to an instance of a
conversation. Where readable, this allows messages belonging to the same instance of a
conversation to be correlated.
Business roles are generally expressed at the conversation level, they are used to indic-
ate actions expected by each participant. In previous examples such roles have included
‘sender’ with ‘recipient’ and ‘initiator’ with ‘responder’. They are identity-agnostic names
for participants that allow conversations to be applied to any two participants fulfilling
their roles.
Business requirements are named requirements that are expressed either on conver-
sations or individual messages, these may represent B2B standard independent require-
ments (e.g., non-repudiation of receipt) or reference a specific standard (e.g., ebXML
non-repudiation of receipt).
Section 3.4.3 will use the abstractions to construct example predicates, illustrating
how they are used to support B2B interactions.
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3.4.2 Intermediary Support Abstractions
In addition to the generalised abstractions in the previous section, we specify the follow-
ing abstractions:
• Property Name (with characteristics)
• Protocol Name
• Protocol Identifier (i.e., an identifier referencing a specific instance of any protocol
execution)
Property name refers to any available support property the intermediary support is able
to satisfy for intercepted transmissions (e.g., accountability), properties are declared (via
annotation or predicates) by name as required for the matching interactions.
Protocol name and identifier are not used in the definition of predicates. However,
these abstractions are used in Section 4.6 when discussing cross layer events. Specifically,
it is useful to be able to map protocol identifiers to message and conversation identifiers,
allowing automation and inference where appropriate.
3.4.3 Declaration via Predicates
By combining the abstractions from Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, declarations can be defined
using predicates to specify when matched interactions require specific properties to be
satisfied. Table 3.6 lists some example predicates and desired properties.
The final two examples represent inference using existing business level requirements.
They state that any transmissions detected to specify generic or ebXML business level
non-repudiation of origin should be provided with accountability with strong fairness
guarantees. This follows earlier discussion about capitalising on business information
where available to provider richer functionality (i.e., the inference of functional require-
ments from business level requirements).
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Predicate Properties Required
Any Message Accountability
Recipient Identity = ‘Unknown Organisation’ Accountability(Fairness, Strong)
Recipient Identity = ‘Sister Organisation’ Accountability(FullyTrusted)
Conversation Name = ‘SubmitPurchaseOrder’ Accountability(Strong),Consistency
Conversation Name = ‘SensitiveExchange’ Accountability(Strong,Transparent), Consistency
Business Requirement = ‘Non-repudiation of
Origin’ Accountability(Strong)
Business Requirement = ‘ebXML Non-repudiation
of Origin’ Accountability(Strong)
Table 3.6: Example declarations using predicates
These predicates are intended to be evaluated quickly, allowing the desired properties
to be determined as quickly as possible and satisfied in the most appropriate manner. For
multiple predicates matching a transmission the intermediary support has the option to
attempt to combine the associated properties in the best manner possible (e.g., strongest
requirements take precedence) or simply allow multiple di erent protocols to execute
(e.g., a protocol providing weakly fair accountability and a protocol providing strongly
fair accountability).
These declarations should be stored within an intermediary acting on behalf of an
organisation. For example, IntA stores declarations checked against all of A’s trans-
missions. That is, all transmissions from A can be checked against the declarations
within its intermediary to determine if support properties are required. This keeps sup-
port transparent (i.e., predicates are matched against intercepted transmissions within
an intermediary) and decoupled (i.e., the predicates are written separately from B2B
transmissions and can be constructed using standards-independent abstractions such
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as recipient identity). The implementations in Chapter 5 contained pre-programmed
predicates for deciding when fairness and accountability should be satisfied. A produc-
tion implementation would most likely use a rule-based evaluation system such as JBoss
Drools. Future work in Chapter 6 will discuss possible refinements to predicate based
declarations.
3.4.4 Declarations via Annotation
Declaration via annotation involves encapsulating an entire transmission and annotat-
ing the container with the desired properties that should be satisfied by intermediary
support. Within the intermediary support the desired properties could be separated
from the original transmission, the required support rendered and the original trans-
mission delivered onwards to its intended recipient. Encapsulation of the entire original
transmission is preferred as annotating desire properties into a transmission may not
be possible (e.g., if the contents are encrypted) or may be obtrusive (e.g., a ect the
generation of signatures and digests).
Specifically, for business transmission whose entire contents are represented by {data},
annotation encapsulates the transmission inside a technical level message whose contents
are {desiredProperties, {data}}. For some transmission of {data} from Aæ B, it would
be encapsulated as {desiredProperties, {data}}. IntA would separate {data} and satisfy
the desiredProperties before delivering it onwards to B. B receives {data} and continues
its normal operation.
Declaration via annotation is useful for its ability to specify required properties on
a per-transmission basis. Declaration via predicates, stored within an organisation’s
intermediary, will generally apply to multiple transmissions (i.e., any that match the
predicate).
Declaration via annotation does place specification requirements on an the transmit-
ting organisation, which may be considered to break levels of transparency. However,
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declaration by annotation still specifies functional properties. The specified properties
are satisfied by intermediary support and this is preferable to interacting organisations
having to implement and integrate technical protocols into their own stack.
3.4.5 Asymmetry and Decoupling of Declarations
Declarations via predicates and annotations, as discussed in the previous sections, are
defined on a per-participant level. Declarations via predicates will be stored within an
intermediary acting on behalf of an organisation with the ability to be match against
that organisation’s incoming and outgoing transmissions. Declarations via annotations
allow an organisation’s individual outgoing transmissions to specify a list of properties
to be satisfied for that transmission.
The above mechanisms facilitate asymmetric predicates for organisations. For ex-
ample, A may fully trust B but B may not trust A at all. This is represented by A
and B having separate sets of declarations (within their respective intermediaries and
on their own transmissions).
By storing declarations within the intermediaries acting on participants’ behalf, and
ensuring encapsulation where properties are annotated on to transmissions, the declara-
tions are entirely decoupled from a transmission’s contents (including which B2B stand-
ards it uses) but are still able to capitalise on transmission information where available.
3.5 Discussion: Supporting Individual Transmissions
This section discusses the ways in which individual transmissions can be supported
including examples of providing fairness and accountability and potential considerations
for optimisation.
Consider a one-way exchange pattern, as discussed in Section 2.8.2, 2.9.2 and 3.1, in
which a business message is sent including its business level non-repudiation of origin
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evidence, in response to this message a business signal is generated and transmitted
containing the business level non-repudiation of receipt for the original message.
We define bizMSG to represent a business message, bizNRO to represent non-repudiation
of origin evidence (at the business level, such as ebXML non-repudiation evidence),
bizSIG to represent a response signal and bizNRR to represent non-repudiation of re-
ceipt evidence. Figure 3.5 shows two possible conversations in which a message is ex-
changed for a signal with optional non-repudiation evidence attached to the respective
transmissions:
{bizMSG,bizNRO}
A B
{bizSIG,bizNRR}
{bizMSG}
A B
{bizSIG}
Figure 3.5: Business exchanges, possibly including non-repudiation evidence.
Both conversation consists of two transmissions (A æ B and then B æ A). After
the first transmission in either conversation, B has an advantage over A in that it can
choose not to transmit bizSIG or bizNRR (i.e., selective receipt) and A has no recourse.
What is demonstrated here is that the most granular level of support required is for a
single transmission. Taking accountability as an example, there must be proof to show
that A initiated a single transmission and proof that B accepted it.
To this end, we define the contents of a transmission to be arbitrary (and opaque) data
such that datan represents the data contained in the nth transmission. In the figures
above, data1 would represent {bizMSG, bizNRO} or {bizMSG}. Following this, we define
iNROn and iNRRn to represent non-repudiation of origin and receipt (respectively) of the
nth transmission. The i prefix on these evidence types denotes that they are generated
at lower-levels, by the intermediary support (where the biz prefix indicates business level
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elements).
By considering the example intermediary accountability support in Section 1.3, Figure
3.6 illustrates the exchanges between A, B, IntA, IntB and TTP to render the transmis-
sion of data1 from A to B accountable (by executing the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation
protocol between IntA and IntB, engaging TTP):
!data1
A IntA B
h(iNRO1)
iNRR1
iNRR1 !iNRO1
!data1
IntBTTP
!data1,!iNRO1
Figure 3.6: A single transmission rendered accountable by intermediary support.
The composition of IntA, IntB and TTP form the ‘Intermediary Accountability Sup-
port’ abstraction as defined in the example in Section 1.3. All communication between
IntA, IntB and TTP is the execution of protocols designed to satisfy the required prop-
erties. In this example accountability is satisfied by executing the Co ey-Saidha non-
repudiation protocol, fully specified in Section 5.2.
The outcome of this flow is data1 is transmitted from A to B and IntA, IntB and TTP
have copies of iNRO1 and iNRR1 proving irrefutably that A originated the transmission
and B accepted receipt of its contents.
It follows then that data2 represents {bizSIG, bizNRR} or {bizSIG} as in the second
transmissions from the conversations in Figure 3.5. The flow illustrated in Figure 3.6
could be repeated by exchanging data2 to yield evidences iNRO2 and iNRR2 for the
second transmission.
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Assuming both transmissions between A and B occur successfully, business level trans-
parency is achieved and they both receive the contents they expect (bizMSG, bizSIG and
possibly bizNRO and bizNRR) without it being observable that IntA, IntB and TTP
intervened in the transmissions to provide stronger accountability guarantees. Similarly,
unfair outcomes are prevented from occurring: evidence exists that could demonstrate
irrefutably that B received data1 but did not respond with data2 and B is unable to
initially acquire data1 without iNRR1 being pro ered on its behalf. Chapter 4 discusses
the actions that can be taken in the face of non-compliance at the technical level. For
example, should the transmission of a message from A to B be aborted if B won’t pro er
iNRR1 even if this breaks transparency?
This illustrates that by providing support for each individual transmission (i.e., trans-
mission 1 is supported by iNRO1 and iNRR1 and transmission 2 by iNRO2 and iNRR2 ),
support for the entire exchange has been achieved. This applies again to exchanges, by
supporting each exchange, entire conversations can be supported.
This means the intermediary support operates agnostic of the semantics of both the
transmission and the contents being transmitted. That is, it doesn’t matter if a trans-
mission stands alone, is part of an exchange or part of a conversation, all supported
properties are available for all transmissions and all supported properties can be satis-
fied regardless of transmission contents (i.e., the protocols can all operate while consid-
ering data to be opaque). Interestingly, this potentially allows transport protocols to be
changed during a conversation’s execution and also supports asymmetry in transports
used by both participants (i.e., A may transmit to B using a di erent transport than B
uses to transmit to A).
Following this, the analysis of B2B standards may seem somewhat redundant. How-
ever, the analysis yields that where the contents of a transmission are available (i.e.,
unencrypted), the service can inspect the contents to support its execution. This allows
the intermediary support to be able to correlate protocol executions to transmissions,
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transmissions to exchanges and exchanges to conversations. Such correlations are not
required but may be extremely beneficial to the retrieval of data from IntA, IntB and
TTP (e.g., A can query for all evidence relating to a single conversation identifier).
While the example above uses the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol for account-
ability satisfaction, the other non-repudiation protocols guaranteeing fairness discussed
in Section 2.6.3 are all equally suitable since the contents of datan can be completely
opaque to the protocol in use. However, Co ey-Saidha provides suitable clarity for the
flow diagram in this example.
3.5.1 Side Discussion: Optimisations
As hinted at above, and discussed in Section 2.10, the intermediary support may inspect
the contents of datan where unencrypted and use this information to make more informed
execution decisions. An application of this is optimising the application of Figure 3.6 to
the conversations in Figure 3.5.
The first possible optimisation we will consider is optimising up through layers of
abstraction. That is, it may be possible to replace bizNRO with iNRO1 and bizNRR
with iNRR1.
The second kind of optimisation considered is optimising down through the layers of
abstraction. That is, it may be possible to replace iNRO1 with bizNRO. It is not possible
to replace iNRR1 with bizNRR since bizNRR is not generated until the transmission of
data2. iNRR2 cannot be replaced with bizNRO as iNRR2 is proof for B where bizNRO
is proof for A.
Both of these optimisations aim to deduplicate evidence exchange during interactions.
However, they are protocol dependent, the above optimisations work specifically for
Co ey-Saidha but are not possible for the other non-repudiation protocols used in this
work. Optimising up through layers of abstraction may break business level transpar-
ency if the evidence is generated di erently from how a B2B standard specifies. Op-
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timising down through layers of abstraction may be possible but when replacing lower
level evidence, we must ensure the replacing evidence is su ciently strong (e.g., for non-
repudiation evidence, it must be witnessed by a TSA to protect against key revocation).
Another optimisation may involve not providing the transmission of data2 with ac-
countability guarantees since its contents simply inform A of data1’s receipt and iNRR1
serves the same purpose. This requires the intermediary support to have su cient busi-
ness level understanding to correlate the transmission of data2 as a response to data1.
An extreme optimisation, following the previous example, may be that transmission of
data2 to A can be completely abandoned as iNRR1 serves as su cient proof. This would
likely result in breaking business level transparency, the trade-o  is whether saving the
transmission of data2 is worth it with the additional complexity that at least IntB must
receive data2 and be able to discern that its transmission should be abandoned (i.e.,
it relies on IntB being able to view the contents of data2 and also reason about them
by both correlating the transmission as a response to data1 and determining that it is
suitable not to transmit data2 as a response).
Generally these optimisations come down to a minimal saving in overhead versus a
big increase in the complexity of understanding required to implement them.
For the case of optimisation via evidence replacement, evidences can only be treated as
redundant if they provide the same strength of guarantees. That is, iNROn and iNRRn
use TSA witnessing to protect against key revocation where bizNRO and bizNRR may
not. In this case, no evidence generate at lower levels is redundant. If the evidences
do have equal strength, then there are only two pieces of redundant evidence generated
(some iNROn that matches bizNRO and some iNRRn matching bizNRR).
For such small overheads on top of conducting fair accountability, it is worth incurring
the small overhead for an overall larger gain in the simplicity of treating all transmissions
individually and transmission data opaquely.
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3.5.2 Side Discussion: Fairness for Individual Transmissions
As introduced in Section 2.5.4, a single business transmission is the smallest guaranteed
unit of communication between two interacting participants, not an exchange. To guar-
antee fairness, the transmission must be executed as some kind of exchange at lower
levels. Furthermore, fairness only serves to protect during an exchange, accountability
is required to protect after an exchange and ensure agreements remain enforceable.
The abstraction of a single business level transmission is maintained by saying that
for the transmission of datan from Aæ B, the intermediary support guarantees the fair
exchange of {datan , iNROn} for iNRRn with guarantees that iNROn and iNRRn remain
valid in the future.
3.5.3 Side Discussion: Semantics of Accountability Evidence
This section illustrates that treating the contents of a transmission as opaque allows all
interactions to be supported even when the contents are secured. The business semantics
of accountability evidence generated for a single transmission are also of no concern to
the intermediary support. The contents could include a message belonging to an instance
of a conversation or the transmission or agreement of new conversations, by providing
evidence and being able to guarantee its fair exchange in a semantic agnostic manner,
interacting organisations are able to use the evidence to whatever ends they please.
For example, by combining proof of the origin and receipt of a transmission, and
demonstrating the transmission’s contents were a message belonging to an instance of
a conversation, the evidence generated by the intermediary support can be used to
demonstrate compliance with a given conversation, allowing dispute resolution where
required.
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3.6 Discussion: Predicate Declarations
This section demonstrates the use of declaration via predicates to infer when accountab-
ility should be satisfied using RosettaNet business level requirements. Firstly we consider
an existing RosettaNet conversation: RosettaNet PIP 3A4 (or ‘RequestPurchaseOrder’)
and describe the submission of a purchase order, acknowledgement of its receipt and
subsequent acceptance or rejection based on the validity of the contents of the purchase
order.
Figure 3.7 includes a snippet of the conversation definition from which predicates to
facilitate inference are established. The XML snippet indicates that non-repudiation of
origin and receipt are required for both the requesting message (‘PurchaseOrderRequest’)
and the response message (‘PurchaseOrderConfirmation’). Lines 4, 5, 9 and 10 mark
the exact location of parameters specifying the requirements1.
1 <ProcessSpecification name="3A4">
2 <RequestingBusinessActivity
3 nameID="InitiatePurchaseOrderRequest"
4 isNonRepudiationRequired="true"
5 isNonRepudiationReceiptRequired="true" />
6
7 <RespondingBusinessActivity
8 nameID="InitiatePurchaseOrderConfirmation"
9 isNonRepudiationRequired="true"
10 isNonRepudiationReceiptRequired="true" />
11 </ProcessSpecification>
Figure 3.7: An excerpt from the XML definition of PIP 3A4.
This constitutes a specification at the conversation level that messages require non-
repudiation evidence. It is also possible that individual RosettaNet messages contain the
same attributes in their XML definition. That is, we can tell if a RosettaNet message
requires non-repudiation by either (a) identifying an intercepted message as belonging to
1XML elements and attributes beyond the scope of the example have been omitted for brevity.
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a known RosettaNet conversation specifying the requirement for non-repudiation evid-
ence or (b) detecting the inclusion of the non-repudiation parameters of a RosettaNet
message itself.
Section 2.9.2 described three kinds of headers included in every RosettaNet message,
the service header contains information including which PIP is in execution and a unique
identifier for this particular instance of that PIP. That is, a conversation name, version
and identifier as described in Section 3.4.1. Figure 3.8 contains an XML snippet of
a service header for a message belonging to an instance of the RosettaNet PIP 3A4
conversation.
1 <ServiceHeader>
2 <ProcessControl>
3 <pipCode>3A4</pipCode>
4 <pipVersion>1.2</pipVersion>
5 <pipInstanceId>12345</pipInstanceId>
6 </ProcessControl>
7 </ServiceHeader>
Figure 3.8: An excerpt from an example RosettaNet Message Service Header in XML.
As per RosettaNet’s specification, the service header may be encrypted. However,
where it is readable, reasoning can be established to drive inference. Specifically we can
specify predicates to infer when accountability is required. The following list contains
two examples of using predicates to establish when the declaration should apply:
1. By conversation name
a) if Conversation Name = ‘3A4’ then require Accountability(Strong)
2. By business level requirement
a) if Business Requirement = ‘non-repudiation of origin’ then require Account-
ability
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b) if Business Requirement = ‘non-repudiation of receipt’ then require Account-
ability
Both cases rely on abstractions that can be extracted from known business level in-
formation. That is, intermediary support must be able to extract the information from
transmissions (i.e., su ciently unencrypted transmission elements) and know how to
match these.
For point (1a) the intermediary support must understand where a conversation’s name
is defined (Line 1 in Figure 3.7) and similarly, which parameter in a message indicates
the PIP and instance thereof it belongs to (Lines 3 and 5 in Figure3.8).
For points (2a) and (2b) the intermediary support must understand what parameters
specify non-repudiation of origin and receipt for a message (Lines 4, 5, 9 and 10 in Figure
3.7).
For points 1 and 2, participants can be provided with additional accountability guar-
antees with no extra specification cost on their part. That is, the declarations exist
within intermediary support and can infer the additional requirements for any intercep-
ted transmission where su cient information information is available. In short, once
the declaration is defined within an organisation’s intermediary, all (or a part of) their
transmissions may be supported with no extra specification e ort on their part.
Naturally, there are costs in terms of additional computation, storage and timing (e.g.,
the generation, exchange and storage of evidence) but, importantly, the business level
continues to operate as normal while still being provided with potentially stronger levels
of support. Section 5.5.5 empirically evaluates the impact of one of the implementa-
tions on typical business conversations by calculating computation and communications
overheads and comparing them to existing delays and conversation lifespans.
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3.6.1 Side Discussion: Opaque Transmissions
While the example declarations in the previous section rely on the contents of a trans-
mission being unencrypted and understandable, it is still possible to support opaque
transmissions by limiting predicates to using only sender identity, recipient identity and
message identifier. For example:
• All messages require Accountability(Fairness, Strong)
Referencing the hierarchy in Figure 3.3, we can see that this specifies accountability re-
fined by the available characteristics. In our hierarchy, this makes any protocol satisfying
the ‘strong’ characteristic of accountability suitable, specifically, Co ey-Saidha, Zhou-
Gollman, Kremer-Markowitch or Markowitch-Kremer. Importantly, this allows strongly
fair accountability to be provided to all outgoing transmissions from an organisation
regardless of their contents.
The requirement that sender identity, recipient identity and message identifier is man-
dated by the use of message oriented middleware. That is, a message must expose enough
information to facilitate delivery its intended recipient(s).
3.6.2 Side Discussion: Extracting Knowledge versus Raw Content Matching
The predicates within the declarations specified in Section 3.6 rely on the abstractions
exposed by the intermediary support, these abstractions are enabled by the interme-
diary support’s ability to understand and extract information relating to specific B2B
standards. That is, the intermediary support knows how to identify elements such as
business level requirements and conversation name for specific standards such as ebXML
and RosettaNet.
An alternative for specifying the same declarations relies on raw content matching on
conversation definitions and messages for predicates. Using the abstractions provided,
the following declaration was previously defined:
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• if Conversation Name = ‘3A4’ then require Accountability.
We can redefine this using raw content matching as the following:
• if Raw Message contains: (“<pipCode>3A4</pipCode>”) then require Accountab-
ility
In the latter version, the intermediary support does not need to be able to reason about
the B2B contents of the intercepted transmission although the entity creating the declar-
ation does (to create the pattern described the contents to be matched). Accountability
will be satisfied for any message whose contents are unencrypted and found to contain
the desired contents. A benefit to this approach is that messages belonging to B2B
standards not understood by the intermediary support can still be supported, relying on
content matching as opposed to knowledge extraction.
All of the declaration via predicate examples demonstrate the ability of the inter-
mediary support to capitalise on available information regarding the transmissions it
intercepts, enriching the functionality where suitable.
3.7 Summary
Section 3.1 and 3.2 generalised message exchange patterns and common requirements of
the surveyed B2B standards. These generalisations allow the smallest unit of supported
business interaction to be determined (a business transmission) and highlighted how
fairness, accountability and consistency are particularly suitable concerns to support via
transparent, decoupled intermediaries.
Section 3.3 specified hierarchies of properties for addressing concerns of fairness and
accountability with a discussion for how consistency could be supported in the future.
The hierarchies included varying characteristics and were mapped to technical protocols
providing their satisfaction under these characteristics. The implementations in Chapter
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5 will realise a subset of the accountability hierarchy (Figure 3.3) to provide fairness and
accountability support for intercepted transmissions.
Section 3.4 discussed predicate and annotation mechanisms for declaring when sup-
ported properties should be satisfied for intercepted transmissions. Section 3.5 and 3.6
demonstrate the general applicability of the proposed support to all B2B interactions,
situations in which business level knowledge may be capitalised upon and even that
the predicates and individual support transmission other types of message oriented in-
teractions (beyond B2B) to be supported. Elements of this chapter are referenced in
Chapter 4 in discussions about design decisions (trade-o s) and events that cross layers
of abstraction (e.g., technical events that have a consequence at the business layer).
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4 Designing and Discussion of Intermediary
Support
Section 4.1 and 4.2 begin by discussing the positioning of the support with regards
to each participant’s B2B stack and the layers of abstraction within the intermediary
support’s own stack, used to determine and provide the required support. Section 4.3
discusses communication with and within the intermediary support including details of
interception and assumptions for communication between components of the intermedi-
ary support.
Section 4.5 through 4.7 discuss design decisions relating to how support is o ered to
participants and how to deal with events that may require notification or may cross
levels of abstraction and the associated trade-o s.
Section 4.8 and 4.9 discuss components and their role within the intermediary sup-
port. Section 4.10 discusses configurations for the deployment and composition of these
components. Section 4.12 demonstrates that related work can be expressed as instances
of composition and deployment within the proposed generalised design and Section 4.13
details the instances that will be implemented in Chapter 5.
Section 4.14 summarises the design and discussions in this chapter, discussing how
their contribution (i.e., how they address the challenges outlined in Section 1.5).
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4.1 Conceptual Middleware Positioning
This section discusses the conceptual positioning in relation to general B2B stacks as
discussed in Section 2.2. This will illustrate how support can be rendered transparently
to interacting organisations at lower levels, independently of the B2B standards in use
by supporting interception and provision of support at the transport level. Figure 4.1
illustrates the transmission of a message from A to B through general B2B stacks with
zero intervening intermediaries.
A's$Business$Service
B2B$Standard
Messaging
Business
Level
Technical
Level
Transport
Physical$Delivery
A's$Stack
B's$Business$Service
B2B$Standard
Messaging
Transport
Physical$Delivery
B's$Stack
Send
Transmission
Receive
Figure 4.1: Transmission from Aæ B passing through their B2B stacks.
As per Section 2.2, a business message (or signal) is created by A’s business service.
This creation occurs at the business level, the business transmission has some business
semantics and may specify some business level requirements. A then dispatches its
transmission for delivery, incurring the use of specified message and transport formats
and protocols, abstracted away by the business level.
Based on work in Section 3.5, intermediary support must render the support it o ers
to transmissions at the transport level if it is to do so transparently and independent
of the B2B standards in use. This is achieved by placing intermediary support in the
delivery path of B2B interactions, requiring that intermediary support exposes compat-
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ible transports and can determine the sender, recipient and transmission (or message)
identifier.
By also considering that intermediary support may read the contents of outgoing
transmissions (and messages) and that certain transports may require certain types of
physical delivery, the support intermediary can be considered to be its own stack as
shown in Figure 4.2.
Messaging
Transport
Delivery
B2B#Knowledge
A's3Business3Service
B2B3Standard
Messaging
Business
Level
Technical
Level
Transport
Delivery
A's$Stack
B's3Business3Service
B2B3Standard
Messaging
Transport
Delivery
B's$Stack
Send Receive
Intermediary$Stack
Figure 4.2: Intermediary support’s positioning within the general B2B stack.
The blue stack depicts elements of the intermediary support. The solid red line
indicates where the intercepted transmission deviates from its normal delivery path with
regards to its delivery from A to B. It is important to note that the entire intermediary
stack, and elements thereof can be distributed between A, B and service providers. It
is simply useful for this discussion to consider the support o ered as an intermediary
stack through which transmissions can be routed. Critically, the grey line indicating
transmission from A to B leaves A’s and enters B’s in the same places as in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the intermediary support does not replace any layers within
the B2B stack, it provides a complete parallel support, o ering the transport layer such
that compatible transmissions could be intercepted, but transmission without interme-
diary involvement is still supported.
While shown in the intermediary stack, the B2B knowledge layer is not required to be
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involved in interception, it represents the ability to use available business information
in intercepted transmissions to drive capabilities such as business level requirement to
functional requirement inference as discussed in Section 3.6. Similarly, the messaging
layer may have minimal involvement such as being used to determine only the sender,
recipient and message identifier.
The delivery layer element of the intermediary is present as specific transports may
mandate the use of specific delivery standards, formats or protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP,
IPv4 or IPv6). Intermediary support may be required to use obey such requirements to
ensure business level transparency is maintained.
As an example, intermediary support illustrated in Figure 4.2 could support all Roset-
taNet and OTA interactions by supporting interception HTTP, HTTPS and SMTP
transports, MIME, S/MIME and SOAP messages and TCP, UDP and IPv4 delivery
standards. Declarations could be developed based on the recipient of messages such
that all of an organisation’s outgoing messages could be supported by fairness and ac-
countability, even when encrypted or part of an unknown conversation.
4.2 Middleware Layers of Abstraction
Given the intermediary support’s positioning within the B2B stack, this section defines
internal layers of abstraction used to facilitate its functionality and discusses them in
the order that they are generally encountered during normal execution of supporting
B2B interactions. Specifics regarding communication with and within the intermediary
support are discussed in detail in Section 4.3. Figure 4.3 illustrates the abstract layers
within an intermediary acting on behalf of an organisation (e.g., IntA).
The flow as illustrated in Figure 4.3 shows an intercepted transmission (datan) passing
through the conversation and exchange pattern knowledge layer that is able to extract
and reason about the contents of a transmission, the declarations and properties layer
is responsible for determining which properties (if any) are required for the intercep-
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A
Conversa*on+and+Exchange+
Pa3ern+Knowledge
Intercepted+
Transmission
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Protocol+Execu*on
datan
IntA
Figure 4.3: Layers of abstraction within IntA.
ted transmission and finally the protocol execution layer executes protocols, interacting
with another organisation’s intermediary (e.g., IntB) and security services to satisfy the
required properties. At the recipient’s end, their intermediary will ensure business level
transparency is maintained (e.g., IntB will maintain business level transparency for B
by ensuring datan is passed to the business level unaltered, as if delivered directly from
A).
Of note here (and also demonstrated in the fair accountable transmission example in
Section 3.5) is that a single business level transmission (e.g., datan transmitted from
A æ B) may result in multiple transmissions back and forth between IntA and IntB in
the execution of the required technical protocols. Critically to ensuring business level
transparency is that preservation of the abstraction of a single business level transmission
from Aæ B regardless of the underlying execution. As in previous examples, the stack
based approach with layers of abstraction is similar to layered network stacks.
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Section 4.2.1 through 4.2.3 discuss the three abstract layers in detail.
4.2.1 Conversation and Exchange Pattern Layer
The conversation and exchange pattern layer (or MEP layer) is responsible for extracting
and interpreting the contents of a transmission where available (i.e., unencrypted). It will
always determine values for the sender identity, recipient identity and message identifier
and attempt to determine values for all other abstractions defined in Section 3.4.1 (e.g.,
conversation name) to be used when determining which declarations using predicates
apply to an intercepted transmission.
The MEP layer contains instances of domain specific message exchange patterns (i.e.,
conversations in a specific B2B standard) and also of more general message exchange
patterns (i.e., transmissions, exchanges, one/two-way actions as described in Section
3.1). Knowledge of these patterns is used to enhance the functionality of the intermediary
support where possible. For example, when a transmission can be identified as part of
an exchange or conversation, the intermediary support can aid consistency support (i.e.,
trigger synchronisation at the end of a conversation to ensure a consistent outcome).
The ability to correlate related protocol executions, transmissions and exchanges and
conversations can improve the retrieval of evidence from intermediary support.
It is assumed that two interacting organisations agree to use identical (or compatible)
versions of conversations defined in their desired B2B standard and that these versions
are also known by the intermediary support (specifically by the organisations’ interme-
diaries). It is reasonable that intermediaries could expose functionality by which their
organisation could upload and update conversation definitions to be used in the course of
supporting B2B interactions. Future work in Chapter 6 discusses possible developments
relating to mutually agreed updates and the signing of conversations and agreements
along these lines.
The MEP layer is only capable of providing support for the B2B standards, conver-
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sations and general exchange patterns it is aware of. However, it may still intercept
transmissions in known message and transport formats for B2B standards that it is not
aware of. In these cases there are still two possibilities by which intermediary support
can be configured to provide additional properties to these transmissions:
1. Declarations via annotation. With known transport protocols, it is possible to
encapsulate the contents of a transmission and annotate them with required prop-
erties to be satisfied. By being able to function while treating the contents of
any transmission as opaque, intermediary support can support arbitrary transmis-
sions including B2B standards it can not reason about and general (i.e., non-B2B)
transmissions.
2. Declarations via predicates, specifically using raw content matching. An organ-
isation can define declarations within their intermediary that perform raw content
matching on intercepted transmissions. The content matching relies on the know-
ledge of the organisation to express their desired requirements but enables them
to specify ad-hoc predicates matching content that cannot be reasoned about by
the intermediary support.
In summary, the MEP layer exists to determine minimally required information (i.e.,
sender, recipient, message identifier) and, where possible, capitalise on higher level and
domain specific knowledge to better inform the lower levels of execution in supporting
B2B interactions transparently.
4.2.2 Declaration and Properties Layer
The declaration and properties layer contains the available functional support properties
(and maps them to technical protocols), the defined declarations using predicates and
is able to determine the overall required properties for an intercepted transmission (i.e.,
the combination of annotated requirements and requirements specified using predicates).
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For example, when IntA intercepts a transmission A æ B it will firstly check if the
contents (i.e., datan) are annotated with requirement declarations. These annotated
properties are added to a list of properties that must be satisfied for this transmission.
Following this, the layer will check the contents of the transmission against defined
predicates, for all satisfied predicates the declared requirements will also be added to
the list of required properties for this transmission. After these operations, the layer
can invoke the correct technical protocols (in the protocol execution layer) to satisfy the
required properties (and their given characteristics).
It may be possible to optimise on the required list of properties to satisfy once they
have all been determined. Optimisations in this case may apply simple heuristics such as
“the strongest requirement wins” where characteristics such as “strong, optimistic and
transparent fairness” would win out over lesser characteristics (e.g., just “strong and
optimistic”). Without any optimisations the intermediary support will simply execute
all protocols required to satisfy all of the properties that have been declared as required.
Common sense will be applied such that the same technical protocols are not invoked
twice for the same transmission.
4.2.3 Protocol Execution Layer
The protocol execution layer is responsible for the execution of technical protocols to
satisfy the required functional support properties (and their characteristics). The inter-
mediary support will invoke the protocols based on the results of the previously discussed
declaration and properties layer. The layer contains all available technical protocols for
execution and the components required to execute them by communicating with other
intermediaries acting on behalf of organisations and required security services.
Section 3.4.2 defined the notion of a protocol identifier. This is some su ciently unique
identifier that can be used to identify individual instances of protocol execution within
the intermediary support. This allows the association of protocol identifiers with business
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level elements where possible. If a conversation identifier is known, association allows all
protocol executions related to the conversation to be referenced or vice versa. Similarly,
protocol identifiers can be associated with message identifier to facilitate referencing.
These identifiers and their association will be referenced in Section 4.6 to automate the
handling of events crossing layers of abstraction.
A final note about the protocol execution layer is that it may be useful to allow organ-
isations to configure parameters a ecting the execution of technical protocols. Examples
of these parameters would be acceptable timeouts or the maximum number of retries
in the fact of exceptional behaviour. Reasons for allowing this configuration will be
discussed in Section 4.5 through 4.7. Referring back to the discussion of using synchron-
isation protocols to obtain consistency for B2B conversations in Section 2.6.4. It was
said that in the face of temporary failures, it may not be possible to guarantee consensus
in a distributed asynchronous system but that this risk can be arbitrarily reduced by
increasing the timeouts allowed in synchronisation protocols. Allowing the configura-
tion of the protocol layer gives an organisation the ability to configure these timeouts
for satisfactory performance.
4.3 Communication With and Within the Intermediary Support
This section discusses communication with the intermediary support (i.e., facilitating
interception) and within it (i.e., how do security services within the intermediary support
communicate with each other). Discussion in Section2.8, 2.9, 3.1 and 4.2 shows that by
exposing specific transports, transmissions from an organisation can be intercepted and
supported. Section 4.3.1 discusses some assumptions and considerations for facilitating
interception by intermediaries.
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4.3.1 Interception and Encapsulation of Transmissions
It is assumed in this thesis that conversations are executed via the asynchronous delivery
and processing of messages. That is, we adopt a message oriented middleware (MoM)
view of communication by organisations in which messages are asynchronously deposited
in to endpoints and subsequently processed by some recipient or other delivery inter-
mediary [Tan03]. For example, the transmission of a message from A æ B constitutes
the depositing of some message on a queue from which B will subsequently claim and
process it. Thus, interception under MoM is quite easily facilitated by redirecting the
flow of the message leaving A. For example, a message from A can be deposited on a
queue IntA who collects it and executes protocols to provide additional guarantees before
the message ends up deposited within IntB. From IntB the message can be deposited
on B’s queue for normal processing and both A and B’s business level remain unaware
that redirection or extra support took place at lower levels. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
examples.
A B
Deposit
BizMsg
Process
A IntA
Deposit
BizMsg
IntB
Technical
Protocols
Deposit
BizMsg
B
Process
Figure 4.4: Intercepting the delivery of a messaging under MoM.
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Figure 4.4 illustrates that participants and intermediaries may have multiple queues
for di erent purposes. For example, A has a queue containing outgoing messages, IntA
and IntB have a queue containing messages for and from A and B as well as an internal
queues for technical protocol execution. The implementations in Chapter 5 adopt sim-
ilar approaches for internal communication and facilitating interception with supported
organisations.
As previously discussed, encapsulation under MoM is easy to achieve, a message can
be considered the combination of some payload and its meta-data. Encapsulation can
be achieved by treating the entire message as the payload in a larger container message
whose meta-data constitutes the declaration of require properties for this transmission.
This ensures at the recipient side, the original message is unpacked unaltered to be
passed to the recipient organisation. Such encapsulation (and the annotation of re-
quired properties) can occur at the technical level within an organisation before the
message is transmitted. Chapter 5 discusses some caveats with encapsulation under
specific transports (e.g., HTTP and SMTP encapsulation must use transparent proxies
as intermediary endpoints). In all cases, the abstraction of a single transmission from
sender to intended recipient is maintained regardless of the amount of additional support
provisioned at lower levels.
4.3.2 Communication within the Intermediary Support
Communication between components within the intermediary support will be done ex-
clusively using the MoM paradigm. Specifically using message, queue and topic abstrac-
tions. Messages are deposited onto queues and topics who facilitate di erent modes of
communication.
A message may only be received from a queue by one recipient. That is, there may be
multiple nodes reading from a queue but a message will only be received and processed
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by one of these1.
A message deposited onto a topic may be received by zero or more subscribers to the
topic. That is, every subscriber will receive a copy of a message deposited on to a topic.
Message delivery and processing is asynchronous, meaning all components of the inter-
mediary support need not be online at the same time although, as per the assumptions
in Section 2.4.2, they are assumed to eventually come online to process queued messages.
4.4 Assumptions and Compatibility Between Participants
This section discusses compatibility considerations between organisations. Specifically,
how to deal with situations in which organisations do not employ the intermediary
support designed in this chapter. In this thesis we assume that both organisations agree
to employ compatible middleware intermediaries to aid in supporting the execution and
regulation of their interactions. However, it is still useful to consider how to handle
situations in which this is not always possible.
4.4.1 Both Participants employ Support
The first scenario considered is that both participants employ my intermediary support.
This completely facilitates the provision of support for all available requirements. Just
as organisations agree to use specific B2B standards such as RosettaNet or ebXML, it
is assumed they would agree to use intermediary support to provide them both with
additional guarantees.
4.4.2 One Participant employs Support
The second scenario considered is one in which a single participant employs my interme-
diary support but the other does not (e.g. they run a plain B2B RosettaNet or ebXML
1For high throughput applications there may be instances in which a message is accidentally retrieved
from a queue by more than one recipient, message identifiers are used to prevent the message being
processed multiple times in this case.
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stack). Under this scenario, the important decision is what to do in the face of being
unable to provision additional support. Under this scenario there are two choices.
Firstly, interaction could be abandoned with the participant not employing intermedi-
ary support under the decision that where stronger guarantees cannot be provided, the
potential loss of accountability or fairness make it too risky to continue. However, this
approach makes it likely that business level transparency will be compromised when an
organisation must be informed why all of their interactions with a specific participant
fail.
The second choice is simply to continue without being able to provision any extra
support, this approach has the benefit of maintaining transparency and the intermediary
support is capable of “vanilla” execution by definition. That is, if no additional properties
are required then regular execution takes place anyway.
4.4.3 Neither or Other Support
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with scenarios in which alternative additional
support for B2B interactions is provisioned and trivial to deal with situations in which
no additional support is provisioned (i.e., two vanilla B2B stacks interacting normally
as per their chosen standard).
4.5 Intermediary Impact upon Deadlines and Timeouts
The execution of one or more technical protocols at lower levels naturally has an asso-
ciated time cost. This may impact business level deadlines and timeouts. For example,
if a technical protocol takes too long to terminate, a delivery deadline may be missed
and a business level retransmission would occur. Obviously, implementation will place
a premium on e cient implementation to attempt to minimise the time required for
technical protocols to execute.
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Due to the possible encryption of a transmissions contents, intermediary support can-
not reliably determine the deadlines for business transmissions. This renders scheduling
or prioritising of protocol execution potentially wasted e ort. Similarly, it is impossible
for the intermediary support to controller higher level elements of processing. That is,
the intermediary support may execute as fast as possible only for another intermediary
beyond our control to delay the delivery and cause a deadline to be missed.
For these reasons, configuration of the protocol layer as discussed in Section 4.2.3 is
considered particularly useful as it allows an organisation to place their own reasonable
restrictions on the length of time protocols are allowed to execute for before timing out
(e.g., All non-repudiation protocols must terminate within sixty seconds). Beyond this,
the execution of protocols could be profiled to determine average execution times which
could potentially be factored into the definition of reasonable business level deadlines
within a conversation.
4.6 Handling Events Across Layers of Abstraction
In supporting the execution and regulation of B2B interactions, there may be eventu-
alities occurring that have impacts beyond their layer of abstraction. For example, if
technical protocols are being executed and a business conversation is abandoned, the
intended behaviour should be that all technical protocols associated with that conversa-
tion be terminated as soon as possible. Similarly, if the execution of a technical protocol
fails, this may in turn cause a business failure to occur. This section discusses possib-
ilities within the middleware design of the intermediary support for dealing with these
events automatically and allowing participants to manually trigger specific behaviour.
4.6.1 Tracking and Automating Behaviour
Referring to the discussion in Section 4.2.3 regarding the association of protocol, mes-
sage and conversation identifiers. Here we establish multiplicities for the relationships
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between all identifier types:
• one protocol identifier maps to one message identifier
• one protocol identifier maps to zero or one conversation identifiers
• one message identifier maps to zero or more protocol identifiers
• one message identifier maps to zero or one conversation identifier
• one conversation identifier maps to zero or more protocol identifiers
• one conversation identifier maps to one or more message identifiers
Not all of these mappings will always be available. That is, a conversation identifier
cannot always be determined and mappings involving this abstraction may not exist.
However, where any of these mappings exist, elements can be associated across both
levels of abstraction (i.e., protocol executions at the technical level and messages and
conversations at the business level). This allows behaviour to be inferred when events
happen at either level. The following list contains examples:
• If a business level failure is detected for a given message or conversation identi-
fier, any associated executing technical protocols may need to be informed of the
eventuality (e.g., to trigger aborts or terminations)
• If a technical failure occurs, this may require corrective or preventative action to be
taken about business level elements (associated by message of conversation iden-
tifier) such as aborting the execution of a conversation or preventing an exception
from manifesting at the business level
There operations are an instance of capitalising on higher level knowledge to enhance
the functionality of intermediary support. Only by determining this information and
associating it can this type of functionality by automated to aid in the transparent
support of B2B interactions.
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4.6.2 Notification and Manual Behaviour Triggering
The previous section discussed using association of identifiers to respond automatically
to failures at either level of abstraction. Another possibility is that an organisation may
opt to simply be notified of these eventualities such that they can respond appropriately.
This would likely entail exposing points through which organisations can manually
trigger (or inject) the resolution of technical protocols by providing a protocol, mes-
sage or conversation identifier. These points of interaction can be accessed while still
maintaining business level transparency. However, they do require e ort on the part of
an organisation in that they must subscribe to relevant notifications about the state of
their interactions, understand how to respond appropriately to relevant notifications and
how to trigger the desired behaviour within the intermediary (e.g., retry, terminate or
abort). Future work in Chapter 6 discusses the integration of work specifically designed
to monitor contracts (conversations and agreements modelled a specific way) and notify
participants when violations occur.
4.7 When to Maintain or Relax Transparency
The previous sections on compatibility, impacts on processing and deadlines and cross
layer events prompt a discussion the possible approaches towards maintaining business
level transparency and how involved or aware an organisation is with regards to technical
level execution. A motivating example not discussed explicitly so far is what action to
take when a property declared as required for a given interaction cannot be satisfied?
The following sections will discuss strictly maintaining transparency versus potentially
relaxing it to better inform an organisation’s business level processes using this example
and others discussed so far.
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4.7.1 Maintaining at all Costs
The first possibility discussed is maintaining transparency at all costs. A motivation
for this approach is to shield all lower level details (including exceptions and failures)
from the higher (i.e., business) levels. When considering eventualities such as cross
layer events, and impacts upon processing and deadlines, intermediary support must be
able to appropriately control respond to technical level events (e.g., taking corrective
measures and possibly preventing their propagation upwards).
What constitutes the correct action to take is subjective, it could be argued that for
eventualities such as an inability to satisfy a required property (e.g., strong fair account-
ability) can be handled either by allowing interaction to continue without additional
guarantees or simply causing the interaction to technically fail (i.e., TechFail). The ar-
gument hinges upon whether a precedence be place on the additional guarantees (e.g.,
fairness and accountability) or an organisation continuing to engage in B2B without
extra technical e ort on their part. Causing an interaction to fail does not break busi-
ness transparency in so much as the business level services continue to operate without
modification. However, it is a consideration that a business service with intermediary
support operating in this manner will simply try (unsuccessfully) to repeat the business
transmission until retry limits or timeouts have been reached. Ultimately a decision
must be made with regards to this trade-o .
The implementations in Chapter 5 opt to place precedence on the additional guar-
antees provided by intermediary support, treating the inability to satisfy a required
property as a technical failure of a business interaction. This is strictly true in that the
failure to execute protocols at the technical level has occurred although the grey area
is in that the technical failure occurred because the intermediary support become in-
volved in delivery and could not successfully execute the required protocols for whatever
reason(s).
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4.7.2 Relaxing for Benefits to Interacting Organisations
The second approach considers when business transparency may be broken. This may
involve feeding notifications from intermediary support directly into the flow of business
conversations. That is, a business service implemented by an organisation may choose to
use notifications from intermediary support to inform or direct the execution of conver-
sations. This approach would allow more descriptive errors to be passed to the business
layer. For example, technical failures could be split into support failures (e.g., property
cannot be satisfied) and technical failures (e.g., transmission timeout).
These intermediary support notifications (including potentially descriptive errors)
could be consumed by the business level and integrated into business services and the
flow of conversations. This could also potentially make the properties o ered by inter-
mediary support available as business level requirements directly within conversation
definitions.
4.7.3 Summary
As previously stated, the implementations in Chapter 5 will act to maintain transpar-
ency, treat the inability to satisfy required properties as technical failures and allow
these failures to propagate to the business level, potentially triggering business level re-
transmissions until retry limits or timeouts are reached or the required properties are
satisfied for an intercepted transmission. It is possible that intermediary support could
automatically retry specific technical level operations where doing so would prevent a
technical failure propagating upwards and potentially causing a business interaction to
abort, the argument for when to propagate versus when to mask an event from higher
levels is a well discussed software engineering topic [SRC84].
Future work in Chapter 6 will discuss potential refinements of the available declara-
tions to provide finer grained specification of required properties to an organisation while
still placing a premium on simplicity.
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4.8 Design of an Organisation’s Intermediary
This section will decompose intermediaries acting on behalf of an organisation (e.g.,
IntA) into the minimally required components in order for them to function in their
intended capacity. Before breaking down the individual components of an organisation’s
intermediary, it is useful to consider the flow of execution for an intercepted transmission:
1. A transmission is intercepted by (or routed through) the intermediary support
2. If encapsulated, the intermediary support extracts the contents of the transmission
from the annotated list of required properties for this transmission
3. The contents of the transmission are checked against the declarations (using predic-
ates) stored within the intermediary to see if any additional properties are required
4. From the list of required properties, determine the correct technical protocols to
execute
5. For each protocol to be executed, invoke its execution over the transmission’s
contents, through some handler
• In the course of execution, the handler may communicate with other security
services (e.g., TTPs)
6. If required, pass data to the business, preserving business transparency
• Possibly emit notifications for interested parties about the events occurring
within the intermediary support
This flow of execution allows the main components of an organisation’s intermediary to
be drawn out, listed in the following section.
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4.8.1 Middleware Components
All communication between components is conducted through the use of messages,
queues and topics as discussed in Section 4.3.
1. Endpoints through which an organisation’s transmissions are intercepted and routed
(incoming and outgoing).
2. Internal queues and topics connecting the components of the intermediary.
a) Including a topic through which intermediary support can emit notifications,
providing a known point of subscription to which interested parties can sub-
scribe.
3. A component to extract the encapsulated incoming transmission from property
annotations, if required
4. A component to determine which predicates the transmission matches and which
properties are required
5. A component to determine which protocols satisfy the required set of properties
6. A component to invoke the required technical protocols on the intercepted trans-
mission
7. For each technical protocol required, a component to handle that protocol’s exe-
cution
a) Each protocol handler may interact with required security services, other
intermediaries and other TTPs
8. A component to deliver the transmission’s unaltered contents on to the recipient
if required, maintaining business level transparency
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As a side note, where multiple protocols are invoked, they may be executed sequentially
or in parallel, they subject data for each protocol execution will always be the opaque
contents of the original transmission. That is, the protocols invoked will take action
about the transmission’s contents but never upon it, allowing parallel execution to
occur and reducing execution time.
As an example of components to enable the execution of non-repudiation, the following
list serves as an example:
1. A component acting as protocol handler for Co ey-Saidha Non-repudiation
Protocol executions
a) Interaction with a component acting as an inline TTP to guarantee fairness
b) Interaction with a component to generate evidence on behalf of the organ-
isation being supported (e.g., evidence representing A is generated within
IntA2)
c) Interaction with a component to store the evidence associated with a protocol
run
In fact all non-repudiation protocol handlers (with the exception of Mistianis’ probab-
ilistic protocol and voluntary exchange) will require components to generate evidence,
securely store evidence and act as a TTP guarantee fairness in its exchange.
There is a design decision as to whether a single handler is implemented to support
all non-repudiation protocols or whether one handler per protocol be implemented. Ow-
ing to composition I opt to implement a single component for each available protocol
that could be composed into a virtual “non-repudiation” component providing multiple
protocols.
Figure 4.5 shows the flow and connectivity of components within an organisations in-
termediary. The figure uses organisation A and their corresponding IntA as the example.
2This can be done with A remaining in full control of the evidence generation, discussed in Section
4.10.
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It should be noted that components 3-5 in the above list are likely to be implemented
as a single component whose responsibility is “determine protocols to execute” and de-
clarations via annotation and predicates are simply part of this process.
Intermediary+IntA
Extract+datan+and
Annotated+Proper3es
Determine+
Predicate+Proper3es
Determine+Protocols+
to+Execute
Protocol
Handler
Finish+and+Deliver
Transmission
A
Outgoing
Incoming
Suppor3ng+
Components
Suppor3ng+
Components
Other
Intermediaries
No,fica,ons
Protocol
Finished
Figure 4.5: Connectivity of the components of an organisation’s intermediary.
The notifications topic, seen on the bottom left of Figure 4.5 is a topic onto which
any component of IntA can publish events relevant to its operation. Connecting lines
from every component are omitted for clarity. This design makes no assumption about
where the components are hosted, Section 4.10 discusses the available configurations for
deployment and how these satisfy di erent operational requirements.
Supporting components are shown both as part of the intermediary and externally
to it. An example internal support component would be evidence generation or storage
where an example external support component would be TTPs to guarantee fairness,
TSAs to witness evidence or CAs and PKIs to facilitate public key cryptography.
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4.9 Supporting Middleware Components
In addition to the components of an intermediary acting on behalf of an organisation,
external supporting components exist. The composition of intermediaries (containing the
necessary protocol handler components) and these external supporting components allow
abstractions such as “transparent intermediary accountability support” (see Section 1.3)
or “transparent intermediary consistency support” between interacting organisations.
The following list contains external supporting components that may be interacted
with:
1. Certificate Authorities and Public Key Infrastructures to issue, verify, distribute
and revoke identity certificates, public and private keys. This enables the use of
public key cryptography.
2. TTPs to guarantee fairness for non-repudiation protocols
a) As with protocol handlers within an organisation’s intermediary, there may
be multiple component types representing TTPs for di erent non-repudiation
protocols.
3. TSAs to witness evidence generated by non-repudiation protocols
N.B. TSA engagement will be online, not inline.
4. Secure logging or storage of evidence
N.B. TTPs should always, where possible, log non-repudiation evidence in the
process of protocol execution. Evidence storage must exist within an organisa-
tion’s intermediary and may exist within the TTP. That is, it makes no sense for
an organisation’s intermediary not to store evidence relating to their interactions
but it is not strictly required that a TTP also retains copies of all evidence it sees.
Also, under o ine TTP engagement, a TTP may never see evidence.
139
4.10 Composing Components to Provide Intermediary Support Chapter 4
5. Identity Services (e.g., authorisation and authentication)
6. Consensus services
N.B. Consistency support as described in Section 2.6.4 can support more than
two participants through the use of a component deciding the outcome for all
participants
These components can all be considered security services in the ecosystem described in
Section 2.3, discussed by [BBMS01].
4.10 Composing Components to Provide Intermediary Support
This section will discuss the composition and deployment configurations that enable
the intermediary support to satisfy the properties it o ers and how the components
of these compositions are deployed between one or more service providers and within
organisations.
4.10.1 Composition to Enable Interception and Generalised Protocol
Execution
Section 4.8 and illustrated Figure 4.5 describe and illustrate the minimum required
components to facilitate the interception of a transmission between two organisations.
For example, with only the components listed in the aforementioned section and figure,
A and B would have their messages routed through IntA and IntB. However, without
any protocol handlers no extra support can be provided. The internal processing by an
organisation’s intermediary can be considered to have three phases:
Pre-processing in which it is determined what protocols should be executed for the
intercepted transmission
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Protocol Execution in which the required protocols are executed to satisfy the proper-
ties declared for the intercepted transmission
Post-processing in which business transparency is guaranteed by ensuring only the ori-
ginal transmission is passed to the recipient organisation
Figure 4.6 illustrates this, providing a base from which accountability and consistency
support will be described in the following sections.
IntA
Pre$processing
Protocol(s)
Post$processing
A
Outgoing
Incoming
Protocol51
...
Protocol5N
IntB
Figure 4.6: The components of IntA interacting to execute protocols with IntB.
4.10.2 Composition to Enable Fairness and Accountability Support
In addition to the components in the previous section, components supporting non-
repudiation protocols such as those discussed in the hierarchy in Section 3.3.3 would be
implemented as protocol handlers to enable Fairness and Accountability support. Non-
repudiation protocol handlers would be co-located with Protocol1 , ..., ProtocolN handlers
shown in Figure 4.6. Support components providing evidence generation and evidence
storage on behalf of a supported organisation would be required, their location determ-
ined by (de)centralisation of components and providers.
External support components must include TTP and TSA, the TTP may or may not
employ its own evidence storage into which copies of evidence are reliable stored. These
components would be involved in the protocol executions between IntA and IntB.
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Assuming the above components are present, intermediary support can provide Fair-
ness and Accountability support for intercepted transmissions.
4.10.3 Potential Composition to Enable Consistency Support
Consistency support, as described in Section 2.6.4 is achieved by including a synchron-
isation protocol handler within an intermediary acting on behalf of an organisation (e.g.,
IntA). This synchronisation protocol handler acts as the conversation management layer
(CML) from the referenced work [MJS06, MJSC07].
With the presence of the synchronisation protocol handler, intermediary support can
o er and satisfy the Consistency property for intercepted transmissions.
Referencing Figure 4.6, the synchronisation protocol handler would replace one of the
placeholder protocol handlers. For synchronisation involving more than two participants,
an external consensus component would be engaged.
4.10.4 Summary
The accountability and consistency support described in Section 4.10.2 and 4.10.3 can be
composed to provide intermediary support capable of satisfying accountability and con-
sistency properties. Thus, supporting new properties within the intermediary support
requires the definition of a new functional property, implementation of the necessary
protocol handler(s) to execute protocols satisfying the property (and supporting com-
ponents). Section 4.11 considers the potential locations for deployment of all components
within one or more providers and within interacting organisations.
4.11 Deployment of Middleware Components
With the components and their compositions into intermediary support defined, the
next consideration in the design is that of deployment locations. Specifically, restrictions
regarding where components may be deployed.
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4.11.1 Deployment within Supported Organisations
Two major restrictions relate to the deployment of components within organisations.
Firstly, by definition, no part of any mutually trusted third party components (e.g.,
TTPs, TSAs, CAs and PKIs) may be hosted within an organisation participating in
interactions that it wishes to support. These component must be completely independent
of interacting organisations to ensure neutrality and prevent bias.
The second restriction relates to the degree of control an organisation wishes to retain
over aspects of supporting interactions in which it is engaged. In the case of accountab-
ility support, there is a requirement that an evidence generation component be present.
The non-repudiation protocols covered in Section 2.6.3 use the public and private keys
(sensibly) of the participants to generate and validate evidence. An organisation may
not wish to divulge private keys to a component such as this, acting on their behalf.
In this case, they would host a security service representing the evidence generation
component.
4.11.2 Deployment within Security Service Providers
Any of the aforementioned components can be hosted by security service providers (see
Section 2.3). An entire intermediary support solution may be hosted by one provider
(i.e., a centralised solution), by multiple providers (i.e., a decentralised solution), or split
between one or more providers and interacting organisations. In the case of a centralised
solution using a single provider, the provider must be trusted by, and independent of,
both interacting organisations. Otherwise components cannot truly function as TTPs.
The deployment of components within multiple security providers (i.e., decentralised
intermediary support) has the benefits of allowing organisations to choose a provider who
o ers some service(s) closely matching their desired requirements. The trade-o  here is
in complexity, interaction between all components must be well defined. Additionally,
there may be situations in which parts of intermediary support o ered by di erent
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providers di erent or incompatible protocols to satisfy their requirements. Possibly
requiring some form of brokering and agreement on what additional capabilities are
available for interactions between two supported organisations.
Message oriented middleware is a particularly useful communication paradigm in en-
abling the components of the intermediary support to span multiple providers and or-
ganisations and communicate the same regardless of this. That is, messages are con-
sumed and deposited from and to arbitrarily addressed queues and topics which may
be co-located with components of the intermediary support or hosted elsewhere. Thus,
components are loosely coupled and asynchronous execution is allowed.
Providers and organisations may use cloud computing to operate their components
as discussed in Section 2.11, allowing the components to operate at a cost of only the
resources they consume (i.e., computation, storage and communication). Additionally,
intermediary support (and the components thereof) can benefit from aspects such as
scalability and elasticity. The use of open standards such as AMQP allow their backing
to be provided by cloud providers, private providers or a combination thereof completely
transparently to the intermediary support. That is, it is inconsequential what kind of
provider a topic or queue identifier is backed by. Chapter 5 discusses these implement-
ation focussed issues in greater detail.
4.12 Discussion: Previous Work as Instances of the
Generalised Design
Previous work supporting B2B interactions discussed in Section 2.12 can be expressed
as instances within the generalised design proposed in this chapter.
Cook’s work [Coo06] can be implemented by the composition of protocols implement-
ing the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol to be executed between interception
components. Yao’s work [YCW+10] could be implemented completely as-is (that is,
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with no transparency) as a set of distributed consensus components into which business
processes pass evidence allowing consensus to be reached. It is possible to adapt Yao’s
work and encapsulate its invocation inside transparent interception such that the service
it provides is called while interacting organisations retain transparency. The second im-
plementation in Section 5.4 adopts this approach of transparently invoking software as
a service (providing fairness and accountability). FIDES work could be implemented by
the creation of components to execute the FIDES non-repudiation protocol (providing
strong and transparent accountability and fairness). Note that none of these works allow
the capabilities they provide to be expressed (this is because they are designed to do one
thing) as functional properties with characteristics as in this work. In order to actually
implement previous work, the support they provide would have to be characterised in
terms of functional hierarchies such as those discussed in Section 3.3.
4.13 Instances Chosen for Implementation
Using work from [Coo06] as a starting point, the first implementation provides a decent-
ralised service constructed using JMS using no cloud hosting. Each intermediary acting
on behalf of their organisation is hosted by their own provider and support components
(e.g., TTPs and TSAs) are hosted by another provider. That is, five providers in total
(A, B, IntA , IntB and support component provider).
The second implementation provides a centralised solution using cloud computing to
satisfy all infrastructure requirements of the support service. All components of the
intermediary support are satisfied by a single security service provider (independent to
interacting participants). That is, all components of IntA , IntB and external support
are hosted by a single provider. A and B both agree to use the centralised support for
their B2B interactions.
The third implementation is a variant of the second in which timing measurements
are taken for all aspects of support to ascertain the communication and computation
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overheads of providing additional support to B2B interactions and how these overheads
compare to (and a ect) the original interactions.
Beyond the implemented configurations, other useful instances include decentralised
using cloud computing to allow variation in a choice of service providers and the potential
benefits of cloud computing. Centralised without cloud computing o ers solutions to
situations such as those where compliance issues prevent the use of cloud computing
(see Section 2.11.1). Similarly, decentralised or centralised approaches using a hybrid
of cloud and otherwise hosted infrastructure can customise elements of the system as
needed (e.g., transition them to or from the cloud) to cater to operational requirements
possibly determined by compliance or other issues.
4.14 Summary
This chapter illustrated the conceptual positioning and layers of the intermediary sup-
port with regards to the general B2B stack. That is, distributed intermediary support
components may be considered to be an intermediary stack for the purposes of support-
ing B2B interactions. The discussions in Section 4.1 through 4.7 relate to the challenges
and considerations associated with achieving transparent, asynchronous, decoupled op-
eration within the intermediary support.
Section 4.8 through 4.11 discuss components, their composition and deployment to
form intermediary support middleware addressing varying operational requirements, fol-
lowed by examples of achieving fairness and accountability support by composing specific
protocol components with general interception components and declaration mechanisms
to determine required properties. Section 4.12 demonstrates previous work also as in-
stances of composition and deployment before Section d4.13 discusses the instances of
composition and deployment chosen for implementation in Chapter 5.
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Implementations
This chapter discusses three implementations representing two instances of the pos-
sibilities discussed in Section 4.13. The first implementation is decentralised solution
constructed entirely without the use of cloud computing providers. The service uses
Java Enterprise Edition 5.0 (JEE) and the Java Messaging Service (JMS) standards to
facilitate communication. The use of non-repudiation protocols allows the delivery of all
JMS transmissions to be rendered accountable with fairness guarantees [MC09].
The second implementation is a centralised solution constructed using cloud comput-
ing for infrastructure requirements (i.e., computation, storage and communication). The
solution is written in Scala [Ode10] and uses Amazon Web Services as the cloud services
provider. Non-repudiation protocols are used to ensure the fair and accountable deliv-
ery of documents between between participants, the implementation was published in
[MC10].
The third implementation is a variation on the second with timings for all computation
and communication overheads. The locations of components are varied to demonstrate
that the processing costs of the implemented support remain steady while the commu-
nication overheads vary depending on component locations. The timings are compared
to typical B2B conversation deadlines and lifespans to evaluate the acceptability of the
intermediary implementation.
The implementations will be evaluated on their functionality, how they improve over
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previous work and what the performance impacts associated with doing so. Section 5.6
will summarise the results and evaluations.
5.1 A Common Business Message Format
For purposes of clarity in this chapter we define here a simple messaging format using
XML. Support for inspecting MIME, S/MIME and SOAP messages (such as those used
by ebXML, RosettaNet and OTA) could be added seamlessly to the implementation.
Figure 5.1 contains an example of the simple message format.
1 <Message
2 senderID="org-a.com"
3 recipientID="org-b.com"
4 messageID="msg1">
5
6 <BizInfo
7 msgName="EXAMPLE_MSG"
8 convName="EXAMPLE_CONV"
9 convID="conv1"
10 requireBizNRO="true"
11 requireBizNRR="true" />
12
13 <!-- Message Body -->
14 </Message>
Figure 5.1: A simple message example.
As with all surveyed B2B standards, we assume the entire contents of the <Message>
tag in the above example may be encrypted and thus, unreadable by intermediary sup-
port. That is, only the senderID, recipientID and messageID parameters are always
guaranteed to be readable.
Figure 5.2 shows an example business signal with a similar format.
As with the earlier message example, the contents of the <Signal> tag may be en-
crypted but senderID, recipientID and signalID parameters will always be available.
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1 <Signal
2 senderID="org-b.com"
3 recipientID="org-a.com"
4 signalID="sig1">
5
6 <BizInfo
7 signalName="MSG_ACK_RECEIPT"
8 messageID="msg1"
9 convName="EXAMPLE_CONV"
10 convID="conv1"
11 requireBizNRO="true"
12 requireBizNRR="true" />
13 </Message>
Figure 5.2: A simple signal example.
There is no body in a signal message, the signal name in combination with the conver-
sation and message identifiers provide context enabling a recipient to process the signal.
The example in Figure 5.2 is a MSG_ACK_RECEIPT event applicable to some message with
ID msg1 in some conversation with ID conv1.
All business messages and signals in the implementations discussed in this chapter will
use for formats defined in Figure 5.1 and 5.2.
5.1.1 Common Declarations via Annotations and Predicates
As discussed in Section 3.5 and 3.6, support o ered by intermediaries will be applicable
to opaque transmissions. However, where business requirements are readable, predic-
ates can be created to declare when accountability should be satisfied by intermediary
support. All implementations will support annotation of requirements onto individual
transmissions (using encapsulation as discussed in Section 3.4.4) and will be programmed
with the following predicate based declarations for the purposes of testing:
1. if recipient = ’org-b.com’ then require Accountability(Fairness,Strong)
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2. if business requirement = ’requireBizNRO’ or ’requireBizNRR’ then require Ac-
countability
3. if conversation name = ’important_conversation’ then requireAccountability(Strong)
Declarations 2 and 3 constitute using business level information to infer which properties
the intermediary support should satisfy. Declaration 1 is applicable to all intercepted
transmissions as recipient is always unencrypted information.
5.2 Co ey-Saidha Protocol Definition
The Co ey-Saidha protocol is used to provide accountability with strong fairness guar-
antees, Figure 5.3 contains the non-repudiation protocol definition [CS96]. The Co ey-
Saidha protocol involves a TTP to guarantee fairness and TSA to protect evidence
against key revocation (as discussed in Section 2.5.2 and 2.6.2).
1 IntA æ TTP : encTTP (id, A, B, datan, NRO, tsTSA (NRO))
2 TTP æ IntB : id, A, B, h (NRO)
3 IntB æ TTP : encTTP (id, A, B, NRR, tsTSA (NRR))
4 TTP æ IntB : encB(id, A, B, datan, NRO, tsTSA (NRO))
5 TTP æ IntA : encA(id, A, B, NRR, tsTSA (NRR))
Figure 5.3: Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol definition.
id represents a unique protocol identifier, meaning each protocol message contains the
context of the protocol instance to which it belongs. A and B represent the identity of
the participants on whose behalf the non-repudiation protocol is being executed. This
protocol is implemented using constructs described in the following sections.
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5.3 Implementation 1: Decentralised JMS
The first implementation is a decentralised solution where each intermediary acting
on behalf of an organisation is hosted by their own provider alongside a single provider
hosting external and trusted support components (i.e., TTPs, TSAs, CAs, PKIs). Figure
5.4 illustrates high level view of the implementation.
A
Message
B
Messages
IntA IntB
TTP
Organisa0on2A Organisa0on2BSecurity2Provider21 Security2Provider22
Non$repudia,on-Protocols
TSA
Security2Provider23
Figure 5.4: IntA and IntB collaborate on behalf of A and B to provide accountability to
message delivery.
The implementation provides accountability with fairness guarantees through the ex-
ecution of the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol, where required. By using trans-
port level interception as discussed in Section 4.1 and 4.3.1, any JMS transmission
routed through the intermediary support can be provided with fairness and accountab-
ility.
IntA, IntB and the components hosted by service provider 3 execute the non-repudiation
protocol to generate, exchange and store evidence guaranteeing fairness and accountab-
ility. A and B exchange JMS messages whose contents are business messages and signals
as discussed in Section 5.1.
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5.3.1 Message Processors and Groups
The implementation is based around the notion of processors and processor groups.
Processors are invoked with some intercepted message to take some action about it.
Groups of processors are logically partitioned to form components. To facilitate loose
coupling and asynchronous execution, processor groups are connected using JMS queues
and topics. A processor group has four connected locations:
Input: A mandatory location specifying where messages to be processed by a processor
group should be collected from.
Output: An optional location specifying where the intercepted, unaltered, message should
be deposited once processing is complete.
Signal: An optional topic into which significant events during a processor group’s exe-
cution are deposited for interested subscribers.
Audit: An optional topic into which extremely detailed messages about a processor
group’s execution are deposited, allowing its behaviour to be audited.
Figure 5.5 illustrates example processor groups and their interconnection using messaging
queues. The figure omits signal and audit topics for clarity, their use is discussed in
Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
Intermediary support components, as described in Section 4.8 and 4.9, are implemen-
ted as processor groups.
The pre-processing group in Figure 5.5 is responsible for determining which proto-
cols to execute, programmed with the predicate declarations discussed in Section 5.1.1
and capable of supporting annotation via encapsulating an entire JMS transmission
within another JMS transmission. The processing group is responsible for executing the
Co ey-Saidha protocol to satisfy fairness and accountability where required. The post-
processing group is responsible for ensuring that the original business level transmission
152
5.3 Implementation 1: Decentralised JMS Chapter 5
Intermediary+IntA
Pre-processing+Group
Processing+GroupPost-processing+Group
A
Outgoing
Incoming
TTP
TSA
P1 P2
P2 P1
P1 P2
P4 P3 IntB
Figure 5.5: An example intermediary with three processor groups.
is passed upwards to maintain transparency.
Processor groups are connected using JMS queues and topics (thick black lines at the
border of the organisation, intermediary and processor groups) although the processors
inside groups may, where required, connect to arbitrary JMS queues and topics to deposit
and retrieve additional messages.
5.3.2 Signal and Audit Topics
Signal and audit topics decouple processor groups from event notification and auditing
concerns (e.g., logging). Processors simply emit events and audit messages and these
are routed to their processor group’s signal and audit topics if defined.
This implementation defines a single signal and audit topic for an organisation’s in-
termediary. An authorised logger is subscribed to the audit topic to log all messages
generated and sent during the execution of intermediary support. This logging will
include all evidence generated and exchanged in the execution of the Co ey-Saidha
non-repudiation protocol. Authorised parties may also subscribe to signal topics to be
notified of significant events within the intermediary support (e.g., protocol invoked,
protocol terminated and protocol failed).
Access control restricts the subscription to sensitive topics to prevent unauthorised
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Figure 5.6: An evidence logger attached to the intermediary’s audit topic.
parties from obtaining information such as non-repudiation evidence and prevent fairness
from being compromised.
5.3.3 Fairness and Accountability Support
The support for fairness and accountability are implemented in three processor groups
corresponding to the general areas outlined in Section 5.3.1.
NR-Pre-Process: This group determines if fairness and accountability are required.
This is determined either by annotation (in JMS this is achieved by key-value
pairs in the encapsulating message’s meta-data) or by predicates programmed to
implement the declarations specified in Section 5.1.1.
NR-Process This processor group executes the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol
in cooperation with the recipient’s intermediary (e.g., IntB), a TTP and a TSA.
If no non-repudiation is required the message will be delivered straight to the
recipient’s intermediary who will pass it through to the business level.
NR-Post-Process: Post-processing ensures only original transmissions are passed to the
organisation. For example, a transmission from A æ B will be passed to B’s
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business level by IntB’s post-processing group once a non-repudiation protocol has
successfully executed.
An evidence logger, as shown in 5.6 is implemented simply as a JMS subscriber to the
audit topic that logs received audit messages into a MySQL database.
TTPs and TSAs involved in the execution of the Co ey-Saidha protocol are only ever
concerned with technical level messages. As such, TTPs and TSAs are implemented
as single processor groups who collect messages from an input queue and deposit their
results on determined protocol queues.
For the TTP, the output destination depends on the current step within the Co ey-
Saidha protocol (as per the definition in Section 5.2). The TSA’s output destination will
correspond to whoever used it to witness their evidence. That is, if A sends a message
to the TSA to be witnessed, the TSA will deposit the witnessed message back to A.
5.3.4 Testing
The implementation was tested to ensure that it functioned as intended and also that is
functioned under a variety of transmissions it could intercept. To this end, transmissions
and evidence stored in the MySQL audit database will be compared to test data to
ensure the correct evidence was generated, exchanged and stored providing fairness and
accountability for the intercepted transmissions.
The test data includes various transmission contents to ensure:
1. That predicates function for opaque transmissions where only the sender, recipient
and message ID are known
2. That predicates function for clear transmissions and can correctly use business
level information
3. That support can be provided to both opaque and clear transmissions
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Based on the above, the following transmissions were constructed for testing, using the
message from Section 5.1 as a template:
1. An encrypted transmission whose recipient is ‘org-b.com’ to trigger predicate (1)
in Section 5.1.1
2. An unencrypted transmission whose recipient is ‘org-b.com’ to trigger predicate
(1) in Section 5.1.1
3. An unencrypted transmission expressing a business level requirement for NRO
evidence to trigger predicate (2) in Section 5.1.1
4. An unencrypted transmission expressing a business level requirement for NRR
evidence to trigger predicate (2) in Section 5.1.1
5. An unencrypted transmission whose conversation name is ‘important_conversation’
to trigger predicate (3) in Section 5.1.1
6. An encrypted transmission with an annotated requirement for Accountability
7. An unencrypted transmission with an annotated requirement for Accountability
8. An encrypted transmission that does not require additional support to be provided
9. An unencrypted transmission that does not require additional support to be provided
Testing the intermediary support with each of these transmissions and validating the
evidence will address the points discussed at the beginning of this section.
For each of the above transmissions, those requiring support will result in the genera-
tion, exchange and storage of non-repudiation evidence providing fairness and account-
ability. The evidence is stored in a MySQL audit database as described in the previous
section. This means for each transmission requiring support, the database will contain
two rows:
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1. A row containing the intercepted transmission, a protocol run identifier and TSA-
witnessed NRO evidence
2. A row containing the intercepted transmission, a protocol run identifier and TSA-
witnessed NRR evidence
The protocol run identifier for corresponding NRO and NRR rows will be identical as
they are produced during the same protocol execution.
For all transmissions requiring support (1-7 in the above list), both associated rows
were retrieved from the database and validated to ensure that they correctly represen-
ted the intercepted transmission. That is, the NRO evidence correctly represented the
intercepted transmission and the NRR evidence correctly represented the NRO evidence
and intercepted transmission.
Logging within the implementation verified that the correct predicates were being
triggered for test transmissions 1-5 and that transmissions requiring support (1-7) were
only delivered to their recipient upon successful completion of the Co ey-Saidha protocol,
providing fairness and accountability.
5.3.5 Evaluation and Summary
Based on the testing in the previous section, this implementation is capable of intercept-
ing any JMS transmission and providing it with fairness and accountability support,
where required, by invoking the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol. The imple-
mentation allows the declaration of when fairness and accountability are required using
both annotations and predicates against which intercepted transmissions are tested.
The resulting evidence which is exchanged on behalf of interacting organisations and
stored was correctly associated to the intercepted transmissions and the NRR evidence
was correctly associated to its corresponding NRO evidence. While B2B interactions
are supported such that predicates like those in 5.1.1 can be specified, any intercepted
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JMS transmission can be supported and predicate support could be widened to extract
information from messages belonging to other application domains.
In comparison with [YCW+10] (Yao), this implementation provides stronger account-
ability guarantees by engaging with a TTP to ensure deterministic fairness and a TSA to
witness evidence to address selective receipt and key revocation issues. The implement-
ation operates transparently whereas Yao’s implementation required business processes
to explicitly emit accountability evidence. Both this and Yao’s work operate asynchron-
ously and independent of B2B standards in use.
In comparison with [Coo06] (WSNR) and [NZB04] (FIDES), this implementation
is improved in its transparent and asynchronous operation. Compared specifically to
FIDES this implementation improves by o ering automated support that can be place
in the delivery path of B2B interactions. WSNR and FIDES both provide determin-
istic strong guarantees but place integration requirements on interacting organisations.
WSNR requires a SOAP interceptor to be integrated into an organisation’s B2B stack
and FIDES requires an manual workflow to be defined in which the proprietary FIDES
clients are used to engage with FIDES servers to facilitate non-repudiable exchanges.
WSNR and FIDES both execute synchronously, requiring all involved components (or-
ganisations and intercepting components) to be online at the same time.
All works, including this implementation, require some minimal set of trusted com-
ponents to be hosted in a location independent from all interacting organisations. This
work specifically considers decentralised operation as an example that an organisation
can be supported by an external intermediary service provider acting upon its behalf in
combination with other providers hosting trusted components (e.g., TTPs and TSAs)
and intermediaries for other organisations.
On a more technical level, the design of processors and processor groups could be
improved to support parallel execution of processors within groups and also to provide
more flexible interconnection between processor groups. In this implementation a trans-
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mission flows through all groups even if those groups were to implement a protocol not
required for the intercepted transmission. The design in Chapter 4 dispatches transmis-
sions only to protocol handlers that are required to be invoked, the improvement was a
consequence of this evaluation.
The use of JMS was problematic in a number of ways. First and foremost is that JMS
defines no wire-level format for transmission. That is, two vendors implementing the
same reference interface for JMS may not interoperate. The requirement that everyone
uses the same vendor’s (and version) implementation of JMS is not realistic in open
heterogeneous networks. Beyond this, JMS has no standardised mechanism for remote
addressing. There is no standardised way to pass a portable URL referencing a JMS
queue or topic. Ad-hoc solutions exist, generally relying on Java Naming and Directory
Interface (JNDI) standard to perform remote lookups. The JMS reference API also con-
tains no standardised mechanisms for connecting to JMS services, it simply treats them
as an implementation specific detail. As with the URL issue, ad-hoc solutions exist that
abstract away vendor specific details but no standardised solution is available. As a final
minor issue, JMS messages are not serialisable, this makes their use in operations such
as signatures, encryption, hashes and digests an ad-hoc solution alongside URL schemes
and dealing with remote or di erent JMS services. The use of JMS for heterogenous
networks relies on additional support to marshall between vendor implementations.
In summary, the implementation addresses the requirements of intercepting transmis-
sions and transparently supporting them. The support rendered is o ered via functional
properties (fairness and accountability), paired with technical protocols providing their
satisfaction (Co ey-Saidha) and declared as required in a decoupled manner through
the use of annotations and predicates. The MoM based communication renders the
implementation asynchronous.
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5.4 Implementation 2: Centralised, Cloud (AWS)
This implementation provides a centralised solution using cloud computing for all infra-
structure requirements. Amazon Web Services (AWS) are used as the cloud provider
for the following services: Simple Queueing Service (SQS), Simple Notification Service
(SNS), SimpleDB Service (SDB), RelationalDB Service (RDS), Simple Storage Service
(S3) and Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2).
The implementation is written in a combination of Scala and Java [Ode10]. Both
languages compile to Java byte-code, Section 6.3 discusses the use of Scala (a functional
language) and the possibility of leveraging it to provide domain specific APIs onto B2B
and other conversational standards. Open Java libraries (e.g., Typica) are used to access
Amazon Web Services.
All components of the intermediary support are satisfied by a single security service
provider (independent to participants supporting their B2B interactions). That is, all
IntA , IntB and other support components (i.e., TTP, TSA) are hosted by a single pro-
vider. A and B both agree to use, and trust, the same provider and the centralised
support it provides. The security service provider is assumed to trust the infrastruc-
ture upon which their intermediary support operates (trust in the cloud is discussed in
Section 6.3). Figure 5.7 illustrates the high level view of the system. As with the JMS
implementation in Section 5.3, this implementation uses the message formats, predicates
and protocols defined in Section 5.1, 5.1.1 and 5.2.
5.4.1 Interaction with the Service
Figure 5.7 illustrates the provision of components acting on behalf of A and B within the
intermediary support (i.e., IntA and IntB). The centralised nature of the intermediary
support means that it is not necessary to deploy a complete set of these components
for each organisation. Instead, it can provision what is minimally required to allow an
organisation their own point of interaction with the service.
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Figure 5.7: A single provider allows A and B to interact with accountability and fairness
guarantees.
Since communication with and within the service is message based (using queues and
topics), each user of the intermediary support is provisioned with the following:
Outgoing Queue: onto which outgoing messages are deposited
Incoming Queue: onto which incoming messages are deposited by the intermediary sup-
port
Notification Topic: allowing a user to subscribe to events generated by the intermediary
support
Configuration Data: containing all predicate declarations and configuration for a par-
ticular organisation (e.g., cryptographic keys or acceptable timeouts for protocols)
Figure 5.8 illustrates the provision of queues and topics for organisations. Queue and
topic names are prefixed with the identity of their respective organisations to prevent
naming collisions and mechanisms exist to prevent unauthorised parties interacting with
the queues and topics (either encryption of contents or the use of authentication and
authorisation mechanisms).
Compared to the JMS implementation it may be noted there is now a single notification
topic as opposed to an event and audit topic. This single topic employs message prefixes
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Figure 5.8: The provisioning of points of interaction per organisation as opposed to com-
plete sets of components.
to provide a desired verbosity of messages received by a subscriber. That is, a receiver
can choose to receive messages from a topic or queue with a given prefix. This approach
is similar to logging architectures in which logs capture events at a desired levels of
granularity (e.g., critical events, exceptional events, debugging information and complete
trace information).
The centralised support uses reliable storage for all generated evidence and provides
mechanisms for its retrieval by authorised parties, removing the requirement for a logging
component to be attached to the notification topic to log all generated evidence.
Under Amazon Web Services, Simple Queue Service (SQS) and Simple Notification
Service (SNS) are used to facilitate queue and topic based communication, respectively.
SQS queues and SNS topics are addressed and accessed using HTTP. To this end, the
implementation will intercept transmissions over HTTP and HTTPS using transparent
HTTP(S) proxies.
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5.4.2 Message Processing
Messages processors in this implementation present a simpler but more powerful refine-
ment over the JMS implementation. Processors are not organised into groups, but the
same behaviour may be achieved if desired. In this implementation a message processor
is created with a single parameter, an incoming location (i.e., queue or topic) from which
it should retrieve messages and engage in its execution. Under this implementation, pro-
cessor groups, as in the JMS implementation, could be achieved by a linear arrangement
of multiple processors.
Processors may query for global configuration parameters (e.g., configuration specified
by the security service provider) or organisation-specific configuration parameters (e.g.,
configuration specified by users of the intermediary support). The output destinations
of processors are dependent upon the context of their execution (i.e., their role, the
identities of the involved participants from the intercepted transmission and available
configuration parameters).
Critically, messages are not removed from queues until their processing is complete.
They are flagged as “in use” by a receiving processor, preventing the same message being
processed by other processors at the same time. As a message contains the complete
context for its processing (e.g., a business transmission to be supported or a protocol
message with protocol information), this allows message processors to arbitrarily crash
and be recreated without a loss of messages within the system. Messages that are not
removed from a queue will eventually have their “in use” marker removed and be pro-
cessed. This also allows multiple processors (of the same functionality) to be subscribed
to the same queue, providing horizontal load balancing to handle increased workloads.
5.4.3 Centralised Support Components
Figure 5.9 details the components (i.e., queues, topics, message processors and support
components) of the centralised intermediary support.
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The provision of queues and topics for each organisation maintain the abstraction of
intermediaries acting on their behalf. Internally, however, messages may be processed
from A and B’s queues by the same message processor. This is a consequence of the
centralised design, it is entirely possible to spawn individual message processors per
organisation but not required in this implementation. This would also allow an easy
migration to a decentralised deployment if desired.
The centralised design also facilitates the complete execution of non-repudiation pro-
tocol by a single processor. That is, the centralised support contains components capable
of generating evidence on behalf of all interacting organisations.
The implementation does, however, also support evidence generation outside the cent-
ralised support, this is facilitated by providing a technical API to organisations which
can be used to drive exchanges if desired. This API maintains business level transpar-
ency but does require an organisation to become involved in driving the execution of
exchanges and reacting accordingly to generated events. It breaks the strictly centralised
design of the support but the sensitive nature of divulging the required cryptographic
keys involved in evidence generation make it a potentially useful feature, allowing or-
ganisations to retain control of their own private keys.
The Work queue shown in Figure 5.9 is fed by all queues that intercept messages
outgoing from organisations. That is, theWork queue is an aggregation of all intercepted
messages requiring non-repudiation protocol execution. Messages outgoing from A or
B would go through the pre-processing message processor and, if required, be passed
to the Work queue for processing by a non-repudiation protocol processor. It is also
possible that a message not requiring any additional support is passed straight from pre-
processing to post-processing for delivery to its recipient. The aggregation of messages
awaiting protocol execution into a single queue allows the number of non-repudiation
processors to be increased arbitrarily to deal with processor crashes and/or workload
balancing.
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Figure 5.9: Exchange service internal components and message flow.
Similarly, the Done queue is an aggregation of all messages that have successfully had
non-repudiation protocols executed for their contents. The messages are distributed to
their respective organisations’ queues.
The Amazon Web Services are leveraged in the following manner in the centralised
intermediary support implementation:
Simple Queueing Service (SQS) queue based MoM communication
Simple Notification Service (SNS) topic based messages between nodes.
SimpleDB Service (SDB) global configuration and organisation-specific configuration
storage and querying
RelationalDB Service (RDBS) SQL databases for storing logs and non-repudiation evid-
ence
N.B. Non-repudiation evidence storage period can be configured per-organisation
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and defaults to 5 years
Simple Storage Service (S3) storing copies of the intercepted data unless configured
not to
Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) to host linux virtual machines executing all intermediary
support components (Java 6, Scala 2.8)
Amazon was chosen as the cloud provider simply for ease of use, they are assumed to be
su ciently trusted as a cloud provider. All services apart from EC2 scale automatically.
That is, SQS and SNS scale with increased communication demand, SDB and RDB will
scale to increased database read or write activity and S3 will scale to meet increased
storage demand. EC2 requires manual intervention to increase the power of the currently
executing VMs or deploy new ones. Each deployed VM must also have its operating
environment configured (i.e., Linux, Java and Scala).
5.4.4 Testing
Testing for the cloud based implementation was exactly the same as that described in
Section 5.3.4. That is, the same 9 test transmissions were used to ensure correct function-
ality across encrypted and unencrypted transmissions where support is declared using
annotations, predicates or not required at all. For each transmission, the two generated
rows of evidence were extracted and validated to ensure the NRO and NRR evidences
correctly associated with each other and with the originally intercepted transmission.
All transmissions were intercepted as required.
The first 7 transmissions had their required properties identified (i.e., the correct
predicates were matched or annotations extracted) and satisfied by the intermediary
support. Furthermore, messages were only delivered to their recipient upon successful
completion of the protocols. Transmissions 8 and 9 were successfully passed straight
through the intermediary support without traversing the protocol processors.
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5.4.5 Evaluation and Summary
Based on the successful testing of this implementation, HTTP transmissions can be
intercepted and provided with fairness and accountability support, where required, by
invoking the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol. As with the JMS implementation,
transmissions other than those in the B2B domain could be intercepted and supported.
This work is more in line with [YCW+10] (Yao) than the JMS implementation. That
is, this implementation provides accountability and fairness support in the cloud as
a service. Additional components intercept transmissions between organisations and
transparently invoke the service, where required, using the contents of the intercepted
transmission. Such an improvement was discussed in Section 2.12 that would allow
Yao’s work to be invoked transparently. As it is, this implementation improves over
Yao’s support by transparently providing fairness guarantees and stronger accountability
guarantees (i.e., the use of TTPs and TSAs to protect against selective receipt and key
revocation). This implementation represents the same asynchronous, automated and
transparent improvements over [Coo06] and [NZB04] as the JMS implementation.
The use of centralisation requires that interacting organisations fully trust the single
service provider although the components could be decentralised as in the JMS imple-
mentation. The centralised intermediary support allows the expedited execution of the
Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol where all information is available within the ser-
vice. As it is still possible for an organisation to retain control of evidence generation
(through the use of the technical API), expedited execution may not always be possible.
The implementation leverages cloud hosting for all aspects. All cloud services used
scale automatically to cope with demand except EC2 although services exist to provide
automatic scaling of EC2 deployments. Compared specifically to the JMS implement-
ation, cloud computing made the acquisition and configuration of resources easier and
quicker.
The use of SQS and SNS mean that messages are not lost within the system in the
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face of processor crashes. New processors spawn and will eventually process messages
that are flagged as re-available for processing.
The manner in which the support is provided (i.e., fairness and accountability as a
service with components to facilitate transparent interception and invocation) prompt
the consideration that the intermediary support in this thesis could also be realised as
“Delivery as a Service”, this is discussed in Section 6.3.
The use of Amazon Web Services for all services brings with it the advantages that
Amazon do not charge for data that passes within their own services and they can
provide improved quality of service (e.g., they guarantee instant delivery of notifications
from EC2 instances to SNS topics and they guarantee delivery of messages from SNS
topics into SQS queues). The other side of the argument is that by choosing a single
provider for all infrastructure needs, a service provider is subject to all of their guarantees
regarding availability, reliability, durability and performance.
In summary, as with the JMS implementation, support is successfully o ered to in-
tercepted HTTP transmissions in a transparent manner. Realised by the mapping of
functional properties to technical protocols and declared as required through both pre-
dicates and explicit annotations on transmissions. The implementation improves on
previous work by addressing the challenges of transparency, asynchronous operation,
loose coupling and automated operation.
5.5 Implementation 3: Centralised, Cloud (AWS) with Timing
Measurements
The JMS and AWS Cloud implementations discussed in the previous sections were tested
(in Section 5.3.4 and 5.4.4) in terms of their functionality. That is, they correctly identi-
fied when support was required and provided it in the correct manner (ensuring delivery
after non-repudiation protocols had executed). This implementation modifies the cent-
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ralised implementation discussed in the previous section to remove logging statements
allowing accurate timing data to be collected.
Finely grained timing data will be taken for communication and processing such that
overheads for each can be calculated. From these timings we will extrapolate the total
impact of intermediary support for a variety of configurations (e.g., centralised, decent-
ralised and over varying locations) and compare them to deadlines and lifespans for
typical B2B conversations.
This implementation will be timed using two transmissions:
1. An unencrypted transmission expressing a business level requirement for NRO
evidence to trigger predicate (2) in Section 5.1.1
2. An unencrypted transmission with an annotated requirement for Accountability
These transmissions declare the same requirements from intermediary support (i.e., Ac-
countability) using both predicates and annotations. Both transmissions will have a fixed
size of 512 kilobytes, this is slightly larger than the largest text-based messages seen in
conversations specified in [OAS01b, Ros09, Ope11b].
This implementation will consider two locations for the operation of example business
services (i.e., the services whose interactions will be supported) and two locations for the
operation of the centralised intermediary support. For business services, servers located
in Newcastle upon Tyne, England (Newcastle) and London, England (London) will be
used. For intermediary support, servers located in Amazon’s EU Ireland (AWS-EU)
and US-East Northern Virginia (AWS-US) locations will be used. Each AWS virtual
machine is configured using the m1.medium profile providing 3.75Gb memory, 1 AWS
virtual core with 2 EC2 Compute Units and 410Gb storage space [SGR09, AFG+10].
For each business service location (London and Newcastle), 10,000 transmissions will
be sent to each intermediary support location (AWS-EU and AWS-US). Providing a total
of 40,000 transmissions whose communication and processing overheads will be timed for
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evaluation. Relevant latencies between all four sites will be calculated to demonstrate
that processing overheads are stable while communication overheads vary depending on
locations.
5.5.1 Measurements Taken
The implementation will take the following communication measurements:
1. Communication latency between the transmitting organisation and the intermedi-
ary support.
2. Communication latency within the intermediary support. That is, inter-component
latencies within the intermediary service provider.
• N.B. In decentralised systems these could also be inter-provider latencies.
3. Communication latency between the intermediary support and the recipient or-
ganisation.
4. Communication latency between transmitting organisation and recipient organisa-
tion (for comparison).
The following processing measurements will be taken:
1. Time taken to facilitate interception (i.e., to get the transmission in to the inter-
mediary support).
2. Time taken to determine the desired support properties to satisfy (predicate or
annotation driven).
3. Time taken to execute the required protocols.
4. Time taken to execute post-processing cleanup before delivery towards recipient.
Composite timings will be taken including the following:
170
5.5 Implementation 3: Centralised, Cloud (AWS) with Timing MeasurementsChapter 5
1. End-to-end business transmission time. That is, the total time taken between dis-
patching a transmission from a sending organisation and its arrival at the recipient
organisation.
• N.B. This timing does not include business level processing, this occurs before
transmission at the sender and after receipt at the recipient.
2. End-to-end intermediary support timing. That is, total time taken to intercept,
process and forward to transmission towards its recipient.
All of the above measurements will be taken for 10,000 transmissions under the following
four experiments:
1. Business services operating onNewcastle servers, Intermediary support operating
on AWS-EU servers.
2. Business services operating onNewcastle servers, Intermediary support operating
on AWS-US servers.
3. Business services operating on London servers, Intermediary support operating
on AWS-EU servers.
4. Business services operating on London servers, Intermediary support operating
on AWS-US servers.
5.5.2 Results
Table 5.1 shows the median observed communication latencies between the four loca-
tions.
* The observed latencies within the AWS-EU and AWS-US locations (3ms and 2ms)
actually represent local connections to HTTP servers running on the same machines,
not communication between di erent servers within the server locations. These figures
are included as they comprise portions of the total time taken to render support to
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Location Newcastle London AWS-EU AWS-US
Newcastle 9 39 99 172
London 39 15 119 220
AWS-EU 99 119 3* -
AWS-US 172 220 - 2*
Table 5.1: Latencies between server locations, measured in milliseconds.
intercepted transmissions. Timings between AWS-EU and AWS-US zones are not taken
as this experiment assumes centralised providers.
Table 5.2 shows the observed median processing times for intermediary support oper-
ating on AWS-EU and AWS-US servers.
AWS-EU AWS-US
Interception Processing 3 1
Determine Properties
(Predicates) 12 11
Determine Properties
(Annotations) 15 18
Execute Protocols 38 46
Post-processing 1 2
Table 5.2: Median processing times for intermediary support operating in AWS-EU and
AWS-US locations, measured in milliseconds.
Medians calculated for interception processing, protocol execution and post-processing
are averaged across 20,000 transmissions (2 business service locations tested per inter-
mediary support location at 10,000 transmissions each).
Medians calculated for determining properties via predicates and annotations are
10,000 each (the transmissions from each business service location are half annotation
based and half predicate based).
Table 5.3 shows the median end-to-end times for all four experiments.
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AWS-EU AWS-US
Newcastle London Newcastle London
Business Transmission Time 251 296 406 510
Intermediary Support Time 53 58 68 62
Table 5.3: Median end-to-end times for intermediary support involvement, measured in
milliseconds.
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Figure 5.10: Graph comparing end-to-end time measurements taken, measure in
milliseconds.
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.10 indicate that the total time taken by the centralised in-
termediary support remains stable where end-to-end business transmission time is most
significantly impacted by communication overheads.
5.5.3 Centralised Support Costs
The performance of the intermediary support was stable on both servers, owing to the
same AWS EC2 hardware provision profile (m1.medium). The expected result for cent-
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ralised intermediary support running on equally provisioned and prioritised virtual ma-
chines was that the intermediary support operation would be similar across both servers.
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.10 demonstrate this, showing that total time taken for interme-
diary support to fully process intercepted transmissions averaged (median) between 53
and 68ms where the remaining communication overheads constitute the majority of the
end-to-end business transmission time taken.
The blue portion of the bars in Figure 5.10 comprise transmission from sender to
intermediary support and transmission from intermediary to recipient. That is, we would
expect the blue bar to be approximately double the median latency between support and
interacting organisations. This is observed for all four scenarios.
For example, communication latency between Newcastle and AWS-EU is 99ms (Table
5.1), median total time taken by intermediary support is 53ms and median total business
transmission time is 251ms (Table 5.3). Following this we would expect the total business
transmission time minus time taken by intermediary support to be approximately two
times the communication latency (sender to support followed by support to recipient)
giving:
251ms≠ 53ms = 198ms = 2 ú 99ms
The centralised nature of the support has helped to keep total intermediary support
time low. The communication latency for requests within the centralised support was
shown as 2ms for AWS-US and 3ms for AWS-EU in Table 5.1. Each supported trans-
missions results in a call to evidence generation, time-stamping and evidence storage
components within the centralised design as shown in Figure 5.9.
The centralised implementation optimises support component invocation and only
calls each of these components once per protocol execution to generate, timestamp and
store both kinds of evidence, resulting in three requests each with a request and response
component with communication latency in both directions.
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For the AWS-US server, three invocations with internal communication latency in both
directions gives: (2 ú 2ms) ú 3 = 12ms. That is, a median 12ms of the total time taken
by intermediary support operating on the AWS-US server was internal communication.
For the AWS-EU server (3ms) the corresponding time is (2 ú 3ms) ú 3 = 18ms. These
figures can be subtracted from the total time taken by intermediary support to give a
median total computation time within intermediary support.
5.5.4 Estimating Decentralised Support Costs
Following the above, we can begin to extrapolate and estimate the costs associated
with decentralising components in terms of the messages that are required to be passed.
Considering the Newcastle to AWS-EU scenario in Table 5.3, end-to-end business trans-
mission time was 251ms and total intermediary support time was 53ms. Of the 53ms,
18ms of that was communication latencies as discussed in the previous section. This
gives 53ms≠ 18ms = 35ms of pure computation time within intermediary support.
Using 35ms as a base and assuming that all components run on hardware matching the
AWS EC2 m1.medium profile, we can estimate time taken by this intermediary support
running in decentralised configurations by calculating number of messages to be passed
and the latencies between the component locations.
The Co ey-Saidha protocol defined in Section 5.2 requires five protocol messages to
be passed. Additionally, two invocations of component services for evidence generation,
time-stamping and storage are required (with communication latency in both directions)
and two transmissions delivering the transmission from sender to intermediary support
and from intermediary support to recipient.
If we imagine an example set of distinct providers with an average inter-provider com-
munication latency of 20ms, and provider-to-organisation latencies of 50ms, executing
the Co ey-Saidha non-repudiation protocol, with individual components for evidence
generation, time-stamping (witnessing) and storage, total intermediary support time
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would be:
35ms Base processing time
+ 5 ú 20ms Co ey-Saidha Message Passing
+ (2 ú 20ms) ú 6 Support Component Communication
+ 2 ú 50ms Provider to Organisation Latency
= 835ms Business Transmission Time
Using the communication latencies in Table 5.1, a worst case scenario using the ob-
served values would involve all communication having a median latency of 220ms. Insert-
ing 220ms for all communication into the above expression would result in an end-to-end
business transmission time of 4215ms. Similarly, a best case fully decentralised system
using the lowest cross-location latency (39ms between Newcastle and London) would
result in an end-to-end business transmission time of 776ms. If we considered di erent
providers all located in Newcastle (9ms median communication latency between ma-
chines) the end-to-end business transmission time would be 206ms.
In summary, the total intermediary support time is a function of base processing
time of protocol(s) to be executed combined with the latencies for inter-component
(and potentially inter-provider) communication. End-to-end business transmission time
becomes a function of total intermediary support time and communication latencies
between interacting organisations and support intermediaries.
5.5.5 Evaluation and Summary
The functionality of this implementation was tested in Section 5.4.4. This implementa-
tion disabled logging and console output and deferred output of timing data to ensure
that data collected was accurate and that finer grained timing operations did not unin-
tentionally increase the timing of larger operations.
The impact of support on interactions between organisations in any two locations may
be calculated by subtracting the communication latency between the two organisations
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from the end-to-end business transmission time involving intermediary support between
the organisations. If we consider a business transmission between two organisations
in Newcastle, with centralised intermediary support hosted on AWS-EU servers, we
know median latency directly between organisations is 9ms (Table 5.1), and end-to-end
business transmission time via intermediary support is 251ms (Table 5.3), giving an
impact of 251ms≠ 9ms = 242ms.
OTA and ebXML Common Business Processes do not specify default timeouts or
lifespans for their conversations except for acknowledgement that they may be “long-
lived” due to asynchronicity [Ope11b, OAS01b]. RosettaNet does not specify expected
life spans for entire conversations but does mandate a default two hours timeout on
individual exchanges. Given that the worst case estimated timings were measures in the
seconds (4215ms in the previous section), the impact of the intermediary support on B2B
conversations can be deemed acceptable (0.000583% of a default two hour deadline).
We assume that for additional protocols, and more realistic (i.e., powerful) servers,
acceptable impacts on B2B interactions could be maintained.
5.6 Summary
The implementations in Section 5.3 and 5.4 had their functionality tested in Section 5.3.4
and 5.4.5, demonstrating that the evidence was correctly generated, stored and that
transmissions were not delivered until protocols had successfully executed. Essentially,
fairness and accountability were provided successfully to all intercepted transmissions
requiring them.
The implementation in Section 5.5 was tested in terms of its performance and impact
upon typical B2B transmissions and evaluated to be acceptable in these terms. That is,
support was provided in between hundreds to thousands of milliseconds and the default
deadlines and timeouts of B2B interactions far exceed these [Ros02, Ros09]. The size of
the transmissions used in performance testing was larger than any message observed in
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example conversations in ebXML, RosettaNet and OTA.
In terms of previous work, the implementations improve over [Coo06] by being trans-
parent, asynchronous and loosely coupled. [NZB04] is improved over by the implementa-
tions being automated, transparent, asynchronous and potentially supporting additional
protocols and properties. [YCW+10] is improved over by transparently encapsulating
the invocation of underlying support and providing stronger accountability (and fairness)
guarantees. Both [Coo06] and [YCW+10] allow multiple protocols but do not provide
a notion of functional properties satisfied by the supported protocols. [Coo06] essen-
tially supports synchronous execution of arbitrary protocols over an intercepted SOAP
message without a notion of what support the protocols provide. [YCW+10] provides
a system that is implicitly programmed to deliver Accountability with no refinements
on the type of support o ered although execution among the Accountability services in
the Accountability Service Domain is abstracted away meaning it could be improved (to
address key revocation) but would still be invoked in a non-transparent manner (i.e.,
business processes are still expected to emit their own evidence).
The implementations have the predicates described in Section 5.1.1 explicitly pro-
grammed in to them. The use of a rules engine to allow dynamic definition of predicates
would likely incur an increase in execution time by intermediary support.
A limitation in terms of real world use is that all interacting participants must employ
compatible intermediary support in order to have stronger guarantees provided for their
transmissions. Properties cannot be guaranteed without cooperation from intermediaries
acting on behalf of both sides of an interaction (and independently trusted components).
Section 4.4 discussed these issues but the best approach is subjective.
In order to enable the functionality of declarations by predicates intermediary sup-
port must be programmed with the knowledge to extract and understand information
from intercepted transmissions where available such that predicates relying on that in-
formation can successfully be interpreted. While it is beneficial that the implemented
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intermediary support provides its functionality at the transport level (i.e., all JMS or
HTTP transmissions can be intercepted, regardless of B2B or other content), in order
to capitalise on any domain specific information, the intermediary support must under-
stand how to extract that information. Similarly, if defining predicates using raw content
matching, as discussed in Section 3.6, those predicates require that the defining party
assumes specific knowledge about the contents of intercepted transmissions.
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6.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis sought to alleviate the requirements of expertise, infrastructure and integra-
tion placed on interacting participants who wished to support their interactions. This
is achieved by the design and implementation of intermediary support middleware that
operates asynchronously, transparently and decoupled from higher level communication
standards (e.g., B2B). By enforcing these characteristics, support intermediaries can
be provided by support service providers through which transmissions are routed and
provided with additional support. These combination of factors allow the aforementioned
requirements (expertise, infrastructure and integration) to be alleviated from interacting
participants.
The support o ered by the middleware intermediaries was abstracted into mappings of
functional properties (describing what support is o ered) and technical protocols (defin-
ing how the support is satisfied). The hierarchies in Section 3.3 represent an application
of functional properties mapped to technical protocols in the B2B domain. That is, these
concerns were identified as relevant to B2B interactions in order to support regulation,
and suitable protocols were identified that could be encapsulated into intermediary sup-
port to address these concerns with added challenges of transparency and loose-coupling.
The generalised middleware design proposed in Chapter 4 is capable of expressing
related work upon which this thesis builds, as demonstrated in Section 4.12.
Issues of transparency are motivated by a desire to ensure separation of concern
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(Chapter 1 and 2). In doing so, higher levels of abstraction (e.g., B2B) can be sup-
ported at lower levels (i.e., transmission level by the intermediary support in this thesis)
as demonstrated in Chapter 3 through 5.
Ensuring loose-coupling is also motivated by a desire to ensure separation of concern,
discussed throughout Chapter 1 through 3. In doing so, transmissions in any application
domain can be supported simply by intermediary support exposing the correct trans-
port standards (e.g., JMS or HTTP) and the declaration via annotation and predicate
mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 through 5.
By adopting a message oriented middleware approach, and assuming participants will
eventually be online to exchange messages (Section 2.4), asynchronicity is supported
within intermediary support, better supporting the potential longevity of interactions
such as those in the B2B domain. Additional benefits of supporting interactions using
intermediaries as done in this thesis include the expression of asymmetric requirements by
interacting participants and the support for asymmetric transports within the generalised
middleware design.
The implementations in Chapter 5 server as proof of concept of the approaches dis-
cussed throughout the thesis and are demonstrated as functioning as expected (Section
5.3.4 and 5.4.4) and performing acceptably with regards to their impact in the chosen
application domain (i.e., B2B, Section 5.5).
The approach of providing intermediary support at lower levels (e.g., transport level)
allow the support o ered to be tailored to other application domains relying on message
oriented middleware seamlessly. Similarly, the notion of altering execution at lower levels
to provide additional or altered functionality while maintaining higher level operation
may be applied beyond the message oriented middleware domain. For example, Platform
as a Service o erings may be adapted to become Accountable Platform as a Service,
discussed in future work in Section 6.3.
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6.2 Summary by Chapter
This section summarises the chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 1 introduced the general problem area (supporting message oriented interac-
tions) and an application domain of such issues (B2B). The approach of using transpar-
ent intermediaries was introduced and discussed in the context of providing fairness and
accountability to B2B interactions.
Chapter 2 more thoroughly defined the B2B application domain including termino-
logy, assumptions, concerns, technical protocols and a survey of existing B2B standards
to motivate the pursuit of a lower level approach that was standards independent and
application domain agnostic (i.e., not just B2B). Related work was surveyed both in the
domain of supporting B2B interactions and supporting general message oriented inter-
actions to investigate suitable methods for ensuring transparency and loose-coupling.
Chapter 3 generalised the background and surveyed material to better understand how
all interactions could be supported (i.e., the smallest unit of message oriented interaction
that must be supported) in the general domain, and how such support could be applied
to all transmissions (both clear and opaque) using declaration mechanisms. B2B specific
property hierarchies for fairness, accountability and consistency were devised to be later
implemented as an example of providing intermediary support in the B2B domain (i.e.,
functional properties paired with technical protocols realised by support intermediar-
ies). Section 3.5 and 3.6 discussed supporting individual transmissions and declaration
mechanisms.
Chapter 4 discussed considerations for compatibility and ensuring transparency within
intermediary middleware and went on to propose components that could facilitate trans-
parent interception to be subsequently composed with components implementing specific
protocols to satisfy the functional properties they were mapped from. Configurations
for composition and deployment were discussed to demonstrate the flexibility of the
proposed design and previous work demonstrate to be instances of components imple-
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menting specific protocols.
Chapter 5 implemented proof of concept systems and evaluated them in terms of
functionality and performance to gauge how support is improved over previous work
(specifically over [Coo06, YCW+10, NZB04]) and what its e ect on interactions in the
B2B domain might be (the comparison of median support time versus unsupported
transmission time).
6.3 Future Work
Section 2.11 discussed the various levels of delivery associated with cloud computing us-
age. Of these models, Platform as a Service provides a monitored execution environment
into which specially packaged applications are deposited to be automatically deployed
and executed (e.g., Google Application Engine). Following the theme of providing sup-
port at lower levels, it may be possible to provide an Accountable Platform as a Service
into which arbitrary applications are deployed. As the application makes use of the
features provided by the platform, additional functionality could also generate account-
ability evidence. All of this could occur transparently to the deployed service. This
represents an application of the work beyond the domain of message oriented middle-
ware.
The centralised cloud based implementation was implemented in two pieces, an inter-
mediary providing Accountability as a Service and boundary interceptors marshalling
incoming and outgoing communication. This presented the possibility to represent ex-
changes (or protocol executions) as resources using Restful architectures. This would
require well defined semantics for the resources and operations (i.e. the HATEOAS con-
straint discussed in [Fie00]). Similarly, protocols can be adapted for execution via HTTP
(although not requiring Restful architectural constraints) providing a well understood
and accessible representations through which participants may easily interact.
The centralised cloud implementation also prompted the exploration of domain spe-
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cific APIs to programatically drive conversations under specific B2B standards. The use
of the Scala language was suited to this. Such work would take conversations defined
in well-known B2B standards such as RosettaNet or ebXML and produce an API used
to drive them. For example, RosettaNet PIP 3A4 may be turned into an API that
capitalises on the names of the messages (e.g., SubmitPurchaseOrder) to provide more
intuitive method names (e.g., submitPurchaseOrder(RequiredItems)) and automate the
generation of RosettaNet messages and send them for delivery. This approach com-
pletely breaks transparency but does o er the ability to hide technical details and allow
engagement in conversations using familiar terminology capitalising on domain specific
knowledge.
Another interesting problem is the possible calculation of a conversation’s structure
simply by observing transmissions between participants. That is, is it possible to de-
termine a conversation’s structure by observing transmissions and if so, can properties
then be attributed to that conversation based on its associated transmissions’ require-
ments. It may then be possible to associate transmissions with a calculated conversation
to determine potential requirements.
On a more technical level within the intermediary support itself, declaration mechan-
isms within the support could be refined to allow finger grains of expression (e.g., re-
quired versus desired properties) and specify whether certain characteristics are already
satisfied by specific criteria in intercepted transmissions (e.g., does this standard already
provide strong fairness?).
The satisfaction of consistency as property using synchronisation as discussed in
[MJSC07] are not applicable to all intercepted transmissions (e.g., if the contents of
a transmission are opaque), it would be preferable to find alternative techniques applic-
able to all interactions although this was beyond the scope of this thesis. Additionally,
techniques may exist for better ascertaining ideal points of synchronisation for a given
flow of execution (e.g., a conversation).
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The use of cloud computing prompts the requirement that service providers trust the
infrastructure upon which their services are deployed. Work is ongoing into ensuring
execution environments are trusted that must be integrated into any realistic o ering
hoping to support real world interactions [SGR09, CS11]. Organisations cannot be
realistically expected to trust service providers who can provide no proof of trust in the
infrastructure upon which the services are deployed.
The capturing of trust as a property with three levels of granularity (full, semi and
none) may be inadequate for future requirements. It may be better to model trust as
some metric or heuristic (e.g., express trust a some probability p) [JsIB07]. This may be
of use when considering when it is worth invoking extra support versus when it is not.
For example, a su cient probability of trust may allow the use of probabilistic protocols
for accountability and fairness.
The intermediary support could provide support for fairness through the support
for fair exchange protocols similar to those discussed by [VPG99]. These protocols
support the definition of item descriptions that can be used by a TTP to verify that
the items being exchanged are the expected items before passing the exchange items to
their respective recipients. Support for this was not included in this thesis as evidence
demonstrating accountability cryptographically binds the contents of the transmission
to its origin and receipt meaning there is proof any participant sent an unexpected or
invalid item. [VPG99] also discussed the modular composition of protocols from smaller
building blocks, this would be interesting in terms of dynamically composing protocols
with new previously unsolved combinations of characteristics.
Strano’s work, discussed in [Str09] and shown as an instance of deployment and com-
position configurations in Section 4.12, constitutes a service designed specifically to react
to events and how they a ect current engaged contracts. That is, participants emit events
when they take an action (e.g., “I sent this type of message”), and a centralised contract
monitor evaluates this event against a contract. Contracts are modelled as EROP sets
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(electronic rights, obligations and prohibitions) which dictate the actions that can, must
and should never be taken. An issue with this work was that participants communicate
directly (e.g., A æ B and B æ A) and emit their own, untrusted, events. The work
could be adapted such that messages from A and B are intercepted by intermediary
support who is then responsible for generating and emitted trusted events to provide
irrefutable contract monitoring. This would entail determining the context of the inter-
cepted transmission to su ciently advise some central (trusted by and independent to
all participants) monitor.
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